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This thesis answers the question: ‘what explains Jordan’s international alignments 
between 1955 and 1957?’ In so doing, the thesis addresses the broader question of why 
states in the Global South make alignments and explores the conditions under which 
these alignments are generated. The thesis advances beyond existing accounts in the 
historical and International Relations (IR) literature: especially the ‘omni-balancing 
school who argue that in Southern States, ruling regimes balance or bandwagon (like 
state actors in neo-realist theory) but directed against both internal and external threats. 
This thesis argues that such explanations explain Southern state behaviour by some lack 
or failure in comparison to the states of the global North. The thesis argues that omni-
balancing imports neo-realist assumptions inside the state, endowing regimes with an 
autonomy they do not necessarily hold. 
The thesis adopts the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development to 
overcome these challenges in explaining Jordan’s alignments between 1955 and 1957. 
Using this case study, at a turning point in the international relations of the Middle East 
where Jordan could have taken either path, the thesis illuminates the potential utility of 
this theoretical framework for the region as a whole. The thesis argues that in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries a ‘combined social formation’ emerged east of the Jordan 
river through the processes of Ottoman mimetic reform, land reform and state 
formation under the British mandate. The main characteristics of this social formation 
were a relatively egalitarian rural land-holding structure and a mechanism of 
combination with the global capitalist system through British subsidy to the former 
nomadic pastoralists in the armed forces, replacing formerly tributary relations.  
The thesis traces the social bases of the struggles that produced Jordan’s alignments 
between 1955 and 1957 to the emergence of this combined social formation and 
presents case studies of: the Jordanian responses to the Baghdad Pact, expulsion of 
British officers in the Jordanian armed forces, the Suez Crisis, abrogation of the Anglo-
Jordanian treaty and acceptance of US aid at the time of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The 
thesis will be of interest in the fields of IR and Middle East studies: contributing to IR 
by critiquing existing approaches and demonstrating the utility of a new theoretical 
framework that can overcome the dichotomy of universality/specificity in the region. 
 ix 
Note on Transliteration 
 
  This thesis uses a modified version of the International Journal of Middle East 
Studies system of transliteration for Arabic names. Diacritics are not used for long 
vowels, and emphatic consonants are rendered as the equivalent Latin consonant. 
Hamza  before a vowel at the beginning of a word is not indicated. Thus, for 
those sounds that do not exist in English the convention used in this thesis is: 
                
  ʾ   ء    
   dh   ذذ    
 s   صص    
    d   ضض    
 t   طط    
 z   ظظ    
 ʿ   عع    
 gh   غغ    
 a’ at the end of a word‘   ةة
 
 Arabic terms are rendered in italics: commonly used words derived from Arabic 
(e.g. sheikh) are not. Common English spellings for personal and place names are 
used rather than transliteration: e.g. ‘Amman’ rather than ʿAmman, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser rather than Jamal ʿAbd Al-Nassar. Transliterations in quoted material are 
left in the original.  
 x 
Glossary  
ʿAdwan    Large tribal confederation in central Jordan 
ʿAshira (pl. ʿashaʾir)   Tribe/tribal confederation 
Baʿath Party  A pan-Arab nationalist party 
Bani Sakhr                                           Large tribal confederation in central Jordan 
Desert Patrol                                       Force founded in 1930 to replace TJFF 
Dirah  Tribal territory 
Effendiyya  Section of the Middle Class: see Chapter 5 
Fellahin  Settled agriculturalists: peasants 
FCO  Foreign and Colonial Office 
Free Officers (Egypt/Jordan)  Nationalist army officers’ group 
Hadari  Sedentary 
Huwaytat  Large tribal confederation in Southern Jordan 
Ikwhan (Saudi Arabia)  Tribal supporters of the House of Saud 
JD  Jordanian Dinars 
JNM  The Jordanian National Movement 
JCP  The Jordan Communist Party 
Khuwwa  Tribute taken by nomads 
Mafruz  Individually held land 
Muqataʿa (Iraq)  Estate  
Mushaʿa  Collective and redistributive land tenure 
Pasha     Ottoman official, officer 
Sarkal (Iraq)    Intermediary between landlord and cultivator  
Tanzimat    19th Century Ottoman reforms 
TJFF  Transjordan Frontier Force 





Note: The Amirate of Transjordan was founded in 1922, becoming the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan in 1946. For brevity, this thesis uses ‘Jordan’ and Transjordan’ 
interchangeably for the Mandate and Ottoman periods 
 xii 
Table of Figures 
Figure 1 Jordanian Alignments 1955-7 ..................................................................... 28	  
Figure 2: Modes of Production .................................................................................. 41	  
Figure 3 Model of Uneven and Combined Development in Russia .......................... 64	  
Figure 4 General Model of Uneven and Combined Development ............................ 65	  




  Why do the states of the ‘Third World’ or the ‘South’ make their geopolitical 
alignments1?  Do they do so on the same basis as the states of the global North, or are 
they distinguished by the inapplicability of theoretical explanations derived from the 
Northern experience? Are the rulers of Southern states really so autonomous of ⎯or 
insecure within⎯their societies that they freely maneouvre between external and 
internal allies, seeking always to maintain their hold on power?  
 
This thesis addresses these questions through a focused case study: providing a 
new answer to the question ‘What explains Jordan’s international alignments between 
1955 and 1957?’ This historical period was one of enormous upheaval in the Middle 
East: the founding of independent states, the coming to power of military regimes 
influenced by an Arab nationalism that inspired mass opposition to existing monarchical 
or republican rulers, and a wave of anti-colonial and social ferment on a scale not to be 
repeated until the present time of writing. In this context, Hussein bin Talal, having 
ascended the throne of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1953, opened the 
possibility of the country asserting its independence from British control and aligning 
itself with the forces of anti-colonial Arab nationalism exemplified by Nasser’s Egypt.  
By 1957, however, this moment had passed and Jordan had returned firmly to the 
Western fold under the leadership of politicians from the generation that founded the 
state under the Amir Abdullah. This shift marked a decisive re-alignment of Jordan with 
the former colonial power and its successor in the region, the United States, against 
Arab nationalist forces. This thesis makes a contribution by offering a new explanation 
for these alignments, based upon the theoretical framework of uneven and combined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  I follow Glenn Snyder and Curtis Ryan’s definition of geopolitical alignment ‘as an informal 
relationship between two or more states, involving expectations of political and economic support that 
may include, but is not restricted to, security affairs’ cited in Ryan, Curtis R. (2009) Inter-Arab Alliances: 
Regime Security and Jordanian Foreign Policy. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.p.5. There are also 
negative alignments: the ending of an existing relationship of this kind or the rejection of an offer of such 
relationship. ‘South’ and ‘North’ refer to positions in a structure of relationships explored more fully in 
Chapter 2 of the thesis. These definitions are inseparable from that structure, changes in which thereby 
disrupt the binary opposition presupposed by ‘North’ and ‘South’: however, for the sake of convenience 
the ‘South’ refers to post-colonial states, or those that were the ‘object of colonial expansion’ rather than 
those that were doing the expanding⎯ see Slater, David. (2004) Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking 
North-South Relations. London: Blackwell. p.8 
 2 
development, thereby intervening into debates on the international relations of 
Southern states. 
 
 This first, introductory chapter reviews the literature on the international 
relations of the South and identifies the gap into which the thesis makes a contribution: 
the inability of existing theories, predicated on uni-linear ideas of development and the 
separation of geopolitical and social modes of explanation, to account for the basis 
upon which Southern ruling regimes ‘balance’ between external and internal enemies. 
The chapter reviews this literature, seeing its application to the international relations of 
the Arab world and in particular of Jordan as providing, within a body of generally 
insightful theory, a particularly sharp example of this lacuna. The chapter then explains 
how the thesis will work to fill this gap by providing a historical sociological explanation 
of a case study of Jordanian alignments in the mid-1950s: therefore defining historical 
sociology and its contribution and outlining the methods of the thesis. The final section 
of the chapter provides an overview of the thesis as a whole. Before doing so, however, 
it is necessary to identify and explain the problem that the thesis seeks to address. 
 
 
1.1 The International Relations of the Southern State: the 
literature 
  
International Relations theory, in its conventional ‘Neo-Realist’ and ‘Liberal’ 
variants, has proved a source of dissatisfaction to scholars analysing the polities of the 
Global South (see Ayoob, 1997 2005, Dannreuther, 2007, Krause, 1996, Krause and 
Williams, 1997, Smith, 2005, G.Neuman, 1998, Slater, 2004, Thomas, 1987).  Dealing 
mainly with questions of state behaviour under the conditions of the wealthy economies 
of the global North, Kenneth Waltz’ neo-realist model of states as like units primarily 
concerned with security seemed not to fit the states of the South, whose regimes were 
insecurely embedded in societies that could not be assumed to operate as sealed boxes 
identical to the state (Waltz, 1979:128). Although further research fleshing out the neo-
realist programme made use of evidence from the South (Krasner, 1985, Walt, 1987 ) 
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this was more often in the vein of confirming neo-realist assumptions about the state 
than challenging them. Likewise, the concern of liberal scholars with conditions of co-
operation under economic and social interdependence (Keohane, 1984, Keohane and 
Nye, 2001) seemed remote in cases wherein ‘state structures have been at the center of 
intense discord over how societies should deal with their integration into the larger 
world economy’(Migdal, 1994:10). The overall criticism of existing IR theory, then, is 
that its core concepts and models of interaction are restricted to a particular Northern 
experience, insufficiently able to explain, understand, or evaluate the geopolitics of the 
South (Neuman, 1998:3). 
 
 1.1.1 Consensus: the dilemma of the Southern State 
 
What is the nature of this lack of fit, according to the critics of mainstream IR 
theory as applied to the South, and what are the solutions to it? The arguments are 
varied but convergence is visible around the notion of the Southern state as 
fundamentally different from the Northern experience⎯indeed, in some sense deficient 
in qualities that would allow traditional IR theory to apply to it. The basis of such theory 
in the notion of an autonomous state capable of carrying through its plans, at least 
within domestic society, results in difficulties in its extension to Southern states where 
this assumption does not hold (Migdal, 1994:11).  According to this view, the Southern 
state falls low down on the continuum of ‘stateness’ (Nettl, 1968:562) and allowance 
must be made for this condition when analysing the international relations of such 
states. 
 
In particular, these critiques hold that core concepts of mainstream IR theory 
appear inadequate when applied to Southern states⎯because, Kal Hoslti argues, the 
state in its assumed European form is not present in the South (Holsti, 1998:109). 
Stephanie Neuman identifies the core concepts of IR that do not fit the South; these are 
anarchy, international system, sovereignty, and alliance formation (Neuman, 1998:6-11). 
Anarchy refers, of course, to the central idea of the Realist tradition that there is no 
higher power than the state: the corollary of this being that the state is the unified centre 
of power and authority in a certain jurisdiction and that the international system consists 
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of units such as these that may ally or oppose each other in order to assure their 
security. The perceived inadequacies of these concepts revolve around the nature of the 
Southern state. A single anarchic international system cannot be posed because 
Southern states in their weakness experience hierarchy as the primary external constraint 
on their behaviour and lack of order as the primary domestic condition, thereby 
reversing the distinction usually drawn in IR theory between domestic peace and 
international anarchy (Ecude, 1998:64-5, Neuman, 1998:4-5). The idea of sovereign 
state implies a unity and capacity that may not hold in the South where post-colonial 
borders cut across competing loyalties, with the result that the ‘state’ is one actor among 
many seeking power and security (Neuman, 1998:7-11). Caroline Thomas echoes this 
critique with a slight distinction, arguing that because the ‘process of forging loyalty to 
the state is still at an early stage…[p]olitical, economic and social structures are weak 
and often inflexible’: therefore ‘the problem of internal security makes the problem of 
external insecurity all the more acute’ (1987:4). 
 
 There is some degree of consensus then that the particular character of 
Southern states and their international relations lies in the insufficiency of nation-state 
identity, centralized authority and sovereign independence. The result of this 
disaggregation is the ‘third world security predicament” in the form of a ‘lack of internal 
cohesion…lack of unconditional legitimacy of state boundaries, state institutions and 
state governing elites; easy susceptibility to internal and inter-state conflicts; distorted 
and dependent development’ (Ayoob, 1995:20). Although it may be able successfully to 
penetrate society and extract resources from it, the Southern state frequently finds its 
ambition to regulate its citizens’ behaviour frustrated (Migdal, 1988:8-9). 
 
 The overall impression of these analyses of Southern state formation is a 
contrast with their Euro-Atlantic counterparts. The elements of this contrast often 
appear contradictory. Thus ‘civil society’ is portrayed as simultaneously too strong or 
too weak (Sadowski, 1993:19); the state as a substitute for an entrepreneurial middle 
class or a constraint upon it; non-state groups and loyalties as competitors or 
components of the state. The gist of the contrast is that between a mediated, 
institutionalized politics and one in which social groups measure up their naked forces 
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against one another, a distinction with a long history in comparative political science. 
Thus Samuel Huntington characterizes the ‘praetorian society’ as one in which ‘social 
forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, [and] no corps of 
professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries 
to moderate group conflict’ (Huntington, 1968:194). The story is thus a dichotomous 
one, divided between ideal types of institutionalized and peaceful Northern polities on 
the one hand and the fragile late developing South on the other (Dannreuther, 
2007:310-11).  If the Southern state, as these accounts claim, is different then one would 
certainly expect additions or revisions of IR theory to be necessary in the light of these 
differences: and such an enterprise has been undertaken in the theories cohering around 
ideas of quasi-states, subaltern realism and omni-balancing. 
1.1.2 Theoretical Solution(s): quasi-states, subaltern realists and omni-
balancers 
 
How is this conundrum of the Southern state grasped in IR theory? Three major 
contributions may be identified, all revolving around the same fundamental notion of 
the Southern state as insufficiently embedded in or representative of its society and 
thereby compelled to adopt a different mode of geopolitical alignment to that of 
Northern states, one that serves the needs of the ruling regime rather than the whole 
society. 
 
Robert Jackson provides the most provocative version of this thesis, arguing 
that the states of the South are largely juridical constructs: ‘quasi-states’ whose 
sovereignty consists only in the negative sense of being free from external internal 
intervention but bereft of the positive capabilities actually to make use of this 
independence (1990:29). The acceptance of the norm of national liberation that 
followed the de-colonization of European empires means that such states are exempt 
from the ‘power competition’ through which they would normally be subsumed under 
the more powerful, and instead are sustained by an international society of multilateral 
agencies, aid and so forth (1990:23). The international relations of such states are not 
governed by what Jackson calls ‘the traditional sovereignty game’ but rather by the 
imperative of ‘quasi-statesmen’ to retain and increase the subventions they seek in order 
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to develop their economies while fending off any claims about international human 
rights (1990:171). As Mandy Turner argues, Jackson’s fundamental premises and 
empirical evidence derive from the European statesmen who acquired and administered 
the colonies and mandates, accepting their notions of backwardness and tutelage over 
colonial peoples2 (Turner, 1999:36).  
 
 Jackson’s argument therefore concerns legal norms and the perceived inability 
of Southern states to live up to these in their positive content. More pertinent to the 
discussion of the alignments of Southern states is Mohammed Ayoob’s idea of 
‘subaltern realism’⎯ Ecude advances a kindred idea of ‘peripheral realism’ (Ecude, 
1998:60-1). Ayoob argues that there is a particular ‘Third World Security Predicament’ 
that consists of the fact that the ‘Third World state elites’ major concern⎯indeed, 
obsession⎯is with security at the level of both state structures and governing regimes’ 
(1995:4). The insufficient ‘stateness’ and competing centres of authority in the Southern 
state, perhaps with more popular legitimacy, ‘makes the states acutely vulnerable to 
external pressures’ (1995:4). Domestic and international insecurity are inextricably 
intertwined: state elites seek to construct or participate in regional balances of power in 
order to ‘further success of their state-building enterprise, especially since this is an 
activity usually undertaken concurrently by neighbouring states that are at the same 
stage in the development of their polities’ (1998:42). The entire process results from the 
unavoidable imperative to adopt the model of the sovereign state: the Southern state 
having to telescope into a few decades the process of building and expanding legitimate 
authority that took centuries in the North, and unsurprisingly not doing as well 
(1997:22).  
 
 Ayoob thus roots the claimed inadequacy and insecurity of the Southern state 
regime in an explicit schema of development in which Southern states are at a 
particularly early stage. More concerned to extend than replace the framework of neo-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Jackson is at pains to stress his distance from colonial prejudice and his reliance on empirical 
pragmatism(1990:10-11).  Nonetheless, the patterns of comparison and allegory in his argument, linking 
‘quasi’-states’ supposed dependency on international society to that of ‘poor citizens in welfare states’, and 
‘affirmative action programmes which seek to extend substantive benefits to people who would not 
otherwise qualify for them’ (1990:29) suggest an unacknowledged substratum of conservative 
assumptions. 
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realism, Stephen David proposes a revision to the propositions of that research 
programme: the idea of ‘omni-balancing’ (1991) . Omni-balancing is particularly 
important because, as is discussed below, it has been especially taken up in explanations 
of the geopolitics of Arab states and even more so in the case of Jordan (Brand, 1994, 
Frisch, 2011, Ryan, 2009). David’s claim is that the idea of a balance of power formed 
by states against a countervailing threat from another state, or joining with that state 
where the option of balancing is not available, is ‘basically correct’ (1991:233). However, 
the conditions of the Southern state require some revisions to this theory, he argues. 
The specific conditions are essentially those outlined in the theoretical perspectives 
above: both the domestic and international environments are ‘unstable, dangerous and 
often fatal’ to rulers unsuccessful in maintaining their regimes (1991:235). Furthermore, 
the recent and artificial nature of the post-colonial state means that regimes act not ‘in 
the national interest’ but in their own, or that of some sub-national group (1991:239). 
 
 On the above basis, David argues that the assumption that external threats will 
be the greatest security concern does not hold for Southern states. Rather, the rulers of 
these states face at any one time ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ adversaries that could be 
either external or domestic: the resultant behaviour may involve aligning with or 
appeasing apparently more threatening states (potentially a secondary adversary) in 
order to be more able to face down the primary internal adversary (1991:235). This is 
what is meant by ‘omni-balancing’⎯balancing in all directions. The theory therefore 
represents an extension of neo-realism rather than a replacement for it: retaining the 
idea that politics is a balancing act amongst competing interests but taking the South as 
an exception to the rule by which this balance is peacefully achieved at the domestic 
level. Southern state rulers are then seen as the actors rather than the state itself, acting 
in their interests rather than that of the security of the state and balancing between 
external and internal threats to preserve these (1991:237). 
 
1.1.3 Empirical problems: omni-balancing, Middle East International 
Relations and Jordan 
 
 Omni-balancing has come to enjoy a fairly wide theoretical currency but one 
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particularly concentrated in studies of the Middle East (Freij, 1997, O'Reilly, 1998, 
Olson, 2006). Stephen David himself uses the Egyptian foreign policy switch under 
Sadat from Soviet to US ally as one of his major case studies (1991:249-50). This 
regional concentration may reflect what Ayubi refers to as a history of Arab states’ 
appearing ‘so easily able to switch regional and international alliances’ and ‘able 
overnight to launch complete reversals in domestic policy’ (Ayubi, 1995:1). Historical 
sociologists and international relations scholars have argued the effects of the Southern 
security predicament are particularly acute in the region (Hinnebusch, 2003, Lustick, 
1997, Tilly, 1991). We find in the literature on omni-balancing a progression from a 
focus on the global South, discussed above, to one on the Middle East, then to Arab 
monarchies (Frisch, 2011, O'Reilly, 1998) and then to one member of that category, 
Jordan. 
 
 The idea that the Middle East, and especially the Arab world, stands out as an 
example of the omni-balancing approach reflects a broader conception of development 
(or lack of it) in the region, in line with the perspectives on the Southern state presented 
above.  
These claims are not without empirical support, but reflect a view of Arab states as 
trapped in a balancing act between a ‘Westphalian’ world of sovereign states and society 
composed of some super, or sub-national primordial identity such as Arabism or Islam3 
(Bacik, 2008:49-50, Telhami and Barnett, 2002:15). In particular, the authoritarian 
monarchies of the region are seen as successful mediators between social groups and 
between domestic and international levels, acting ‘as referees of the political 
field…[with] more freedom of maneuver to divide, manipulate, and thus control 
society’s competing groups’ (2003:5). Lucas describes the Moroccan and Jordanian 
monarchies in particular as such ‘linchpin’ monarchies (Lucas, 2004:111). Hillel Frisch 
argues that the omni-balancing (or, as he terms it, counterbalancing) lies behind the 
persistence of Arab monarchs in power, and the Jordanian Hashemites especially 
‘successfully met the challenges [to their rule]…through techniques of counterbalancing 
between the Palestinians and Jordanians of East Bank origins on the home front and a 
strong relationship with the US on the external front’(Frisch, 2011). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For a stringent critique of this position see Stein, Ewan. (2011) Beyond Arabism V. Sovereignty: 
Relocating Ideas in the International Relations of the Middle East. Review of International Studies. 
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It is unsurprising, then that Jordan has formed the case study basis for the most 
rigorous work based upon the premises of omni-balancing in the works of Laurie Brand 
(1994) and Curtis Ryan (Ryan, 2009). Although their rich analyses deal with later time 
periods, Brand and Ryan’s characterizations of the sources of Jordanian alignments are 
particularly useful because they link the empirical questions to the themes of omni-
balancing and the idea of the Southern security dilemma discussed above. Both draw 
upon Stephen David’s version of omni-balancing (Brand, 1994:32, Ryan, 2009:9) to 
expand the neo-Realist version of security into a concept more amenable to a Southern 
state such as Jordan. Ryan and Brand thus follow the argument that because Southern 
states are weak in capacity, legitimacy or both, the basic policy concern is regime rather 
than ‘national’ security (2009:12). Where the two differ is that Brand focuses on the 
‘exigencies of maintaining financial solvency… as a critical component of regime… 
security’ (Brand, 1994:25), a focus that Ryan critiques as mono-causal and neglecting the 
‘multi-dimensional influences’ that regimes must take into account to preserve 
themselves (2009:10). 
 
Laurie Brand’s central concept of budget security refers to the pursuit of a 
‘range of possible responses to challenges to financial solvency’, alignment decisions 
being a component of that range (1994:28). Financial solvency is essential to preserve a 
given regime’s coercive power or distributive capacity: thus ‘[r]egime security in its most 
basic terms may in fact be budget security, understood in terms of reproducing the 
conditions necessary for the ruling coalition to pay the bills, preempt the development 
of opposition, or cultivate sufficient domestic support to make coercion against such 
groups possible’ (1994:26). Yet the conditions to be reproduced are, for Brand, 
essentially the narrow indicators of the Political Economy of International 
Relations⎯customs duties, trade relations, the proportions of different sectors in GDP 
and so forth (1994:33).  I argue the reproduction of a regime in power requires more 
than that. The conditions of a regime’s remaining in power also involve the 
reproduction and management of structures of social relations, which generate the 
social groups that may threaten or support the regime, but which do not necessarily stop 
at the borders of the state. In particular the struggles over Jordan’s external subsidy 
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reflected more than just differences over aid but conflicts over the way that aid 
structured the relationship of the state and certain social groups within it to the global 
capitalist system⎯a critique of and engagement with Brand’s work that is taken up in 
the empirical sections of this thesis in Chapters 5 and 6. The notion of budget security 
explains the vital need for aid: it does not explain the choice of the particular provider 
of that aid amongst alternatives.  
 
 Curtis Ryan extends Brand’s account by arguing ‘that states align and realign 
according to relatively narrow interests of regime security’(Ryan, 2009:13), of which 
budget security is merely one aspect. Thus ‘alignment and realignment depend not only 
on opportunities and constraints presented by the anarchic nature of the international 
system, but also on domestically generated policy preferences, which have pragmatic 
and material bases, rooted in the coalition of elites that make up the ruling 
regime’(2009:13). Ryan identifies an ‘internal security dilemma’ by which the 
authoritarian states of the Arab world further militarize their societies to suppress 
internal opposition, feeding into the conventional external security dilemma and further 
exacerbating the internal problem as development stagnates (2009:33). The choice of 
alignment partners to alleviate this dilemma reflects the influence of the level of internal 
and external threat, the military balance, the political economy of the state and the 
legitimating factor of Arab nationalism (2009:39).  
 
Ryan succeeds in extending Brand’s concept to cover factors other than 
budgetary solvency. However, like Brand, Ryan’s treatment of regime security as the 
analogue of a neo-realist model of international security is insufficient. It imparts to the 
state/regime a near-absolute autonomy, deriving from neo-Realist premises of 
sovereignty in anarchy, that there is no a priori reason to believe it possesses. The 
parsimony of the neo-realist model is its virtue. Hence the stress neo-realism has always 
laid on anarchy as the precondition for the security dilemma. States must, at a logical 
level, be independent of one another and concerned to defend their independence by 
force in order for the dynamic of the security dilemma work. Why, however, should we 
begin from the ontological assumptions of neo-Realist theory and assimilate the 
Hashemite regime to that logic? 
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 1.1.4 Gap and Critique: the importing of neo-realist assumptions 
 
 The above question leads us to the gap in explanatory frameworks that extend 
the neo-realist model: relying on an idea of a dislocated Southern state as simultaneous 
balancer in international relations and domestic politics. I argue that we cannot analyse 
Southern geo-politics successfully through this lens for the following reasons; its 
conception of the Southern state and development is uni-linear, idealizing the Northern 
state and explaining Southern state behaviour by the absence of certain characteristics 
rather than their presence; it perpetuates a division between internal-social and external-
geopolitical explanation by importing the neo-realist model of anarchic sovereign units 
inside Southern societies; and omni-balancing and subaltern realism give an insufficient 
account of the particular social bases upon which actors make their alignment decisions. 
Omni-balancing’s application to Jordan provides an example of this gap, reinforcing 
already existing lacunae in the diplomatic history of the state. I argue below for uneven 
and combined development as a better framework, rooted in historical sociology rather 
than neo-realist IR, through which to analyse Jordanian alignments. Prior to doing so 
however, we need to explore the gaps in omni-balancing and associated theories. 
 
 The first criticism to be made of the omni-balancing approach and the 
associated literature on Southern IR is its uni-linear vision of development, which leads 
to an explanation by the absence of certain ‘Western’ characteristics rather than 
explanation by the presence of empirically verifiable factors. Mohammed Ayoob argues 
that the Southern state is in the ‘early stages’ of the process of state-building 
characterized by Charles Tilly in the European case of the centralization of coercive 
power (Ayoob, 1997:122). It is the stresses of this compressed version of state-building 
that produce the internal threats to ruling elites, the specific characteristic of the 
Southern state that makes a revision of IR theory necessary (1998:45). The Southern 
state needs time to complete its journey to full statehood. Stephen David, in like 
fashion, argues that the artificiality of the colonial state means that a ‘type of narrowly 
defined interest perpetuates itself by preventing the formation of a national 
consciousness’, vesting the ruling regime with the independence and insecurity reserved 
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for the nation-state unit in conventional neo-realism (David, 1991:239). Thomas 
(1987:4), and Holsti (1998:114) similarly work from the premise that there is a particular 
type of Western state, with an attendant form of security and alignment-making, that is 
either absent in the South or present only at an early and difficult stage. 
  
 My critique here is not to claim an identity between Northern and Southern 
states. The lack of resources, deadly contention over forms and personnel of rule and 
general frustration of the capacity of the central state to achieve its plans are real 
phenomena in much, if not all, of the South. We can identify, with regrettable ease, an 
enormous economic, social and political gap between certain ‘advanced’ states and 
others not so blessed. My criticism of omni-balancing/subaltern realism in this regard is 
that explains outcomes by deviations from a norm that may not itself exist, or at least 
cannot be assumed to be the end-point to which Southern states are striving. This is 
most clear in the distinction drawn between the ‘national security’ interests of the 
Northern state and the ‘narrowly defined interest’ of the Southern ruling group (Ayoob, 
1998:41-2, see also Brand, 1994:23, David, 1991:239, Ryan, 2009:9). 
 
 Why assume that there is some actually-existing ‘national security interest’ that 
Northern states follow and Southern states do not? Omni-balancing theorists seem to 
accept particular, un-examined conception of the state as the representative of the 
greater good or general will of a society. Two decades of critical security studies, as well 
as ample historical examples have problematized this assumption4(Booth, 2005:13, 
Fierke, 2007:34). Who defines what a ‘threat’ is, by whom it is posed and how it should 
be combated? Neither in the North nor the South can such questions be answered 
objectively on the basis of an assumed ‘national interest’: who would then define what 
that interest is? If we cannot assume, however, that the rulers of Northern states and 
their conceptions of national security embody the interests of the society they rule, then 
we cannot explain the behaviour of Southern states by virtue of negative contrast with 
the North. As Simon Bromley puts the point in relation to more general theories of  
‘modernization’: the ‘West developed because it had the following features⎯and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Examples such as Mrs Thatcher’s condemnation of the National Union of Miners as ‘the enemy within’ 
or the McArthyite purges of the early cold war immediately come to mind. 
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non-European world remained undeveloped because it lacked them. But what is the 
evidence that it was this lack that accounts for the fortunes of  the non-European 
world?’(Bromley, 1994:7).  The decision-makers of North and South may still differ in 
the interests they serve and how they seek to secure themselves, but that difference 
would need to be established by historical and sociological investigation rather than 
posed as the absence or insufficient development of national integration, representative 
pluralism or some other assumed characteristic of Northern polities. Rather, we should 
focus on ‘the historical character of  surplus appropriation… the specific social relations 
which have governed these processes and… their patterns of  reproduction and 
transformation by social forces’ (1994:4) for explanations of  Southern state behaviour. 
As is explained below and further elaborated in Chapter 2, this thesis uses the 
theoretical framework of uneven and combined development to carry out such a task 
for Jordan. 
 
 Once we have problematized the contraposition of a Northern state attentive to 
the general security of the society it rules and a Southern state inadequate in this regard, 
a further lacuna in the omni-balancing or subaltern realist approach reveals itself. This is 
the importation of the model of sovereign states in anarchy inside the politics of 
Southern states themselves. As has been indicated by the review above, an important 
step in the arguments for a particularly Southern geo-politics is the claim that in the 
South the dichotomy of internal peace and external (potential) war is at best reversed, 
and at worse a state of permanently fighting on two fronts of insecurity (Ayoob, 
1998:45, Brand, 1994:22, David, 1991:237, Neuman, 1998:3, Ryan, 2009:9, Thomas, 
1987:4). On this basis the apparatus of neo-realism is retained with the one 
modification: that Southern ruling regimes and the internal and external threats to them 
are identified as the actors rather than states (Ayoob, 1997:121, Brand, 1994:23-4, 
David, 1991:236, Ryan, 2009:12). Yet, if we regard the idea of ‘national security’ in the 
North with scepticism then the explanatory model of omni-balancing becomes more 
difficult to sustain. We cannot simply refer to the regime’s desire to survive⎯a given⎯ 
as the source of particular alignments worked out automatically through a neo-realist 
logic or ‘objective laws that have their roots in human nature’ (Morgenthau in David, 
1991:237). It does not tell us very much to say that a regime desires to survive⎯on what 
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basis do regimes do so? Why are they threatened by certain internal forces and not 
others? Why amenable to certain alignments and not others? Or to take up the empirical 
gap addressed in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis ask, why did King Hussein reach out to 
certain allies and aid providers, proving more responsive to certain social groups at 
certain times?  Once the uni-linear model of ‘true’ national security versus merely regime 
security in the South is undermined, it becomes necessary to answer such questions.  
 
 If we do wish to answer such questions then we have to reverse the manoeuvre 
effected by omni-balancing and sub-altern realism. These take the premise of the 
autonomy of the state system and geopolitics from ‘domestic’ social forces and then 
read this absolute autonomy back into the state itself. It then becomes impossible to 
explain the bases upon which certain alignments are made by the omni-balancing rulers 
both internally and externally: the explanations are given in the premises. If we assume 
that rulers are balancing to stay in power, and then explain that they choose options 
certain to help them stay in power, then the theory is likely to run close to tautology. 
Neither the assumption nor the explanation are unreasonable, however. My criticism is 
that they produce incomplete rather than incorrect explanations. We need to know why 
certain options and alliances lead to survival and strength: this means analysing in their 
own right the social bases and relationships that constitute and limit the interactions of 
the state system rather than import the model of absolute political autonomy. For this 
reason I propose a historical sociological approach, and in particular the theoretical 
framework of uneven and combined development, as a more fruitful lens of analysis. 
 
 
1.2 Thesis contribution: historical sociology and uneven and 
combined development 
 
What does it mean to take a historical sociological approach, and what is the 
contribution of the particular variant of historical sociology I propose to adopt? In the 
following section I offer a broad definition of historical sociology and its various 
streams and outline the engagement of this approach with the IR and the Middle East. 
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Then I argue that further explanation for Jordan’s alignments is required beyond 
diplomatic history or agent-centred foreign policy analysis and that uneven and 
combined development, as a variant of historical sociology, can provide a fruitful 
alternative theoretical framework. 
 
1.2.1 The Definition and Traditions of Historical Sociology 
 
 Historical sociology is quite a slippery term, and its proponents more often 
practice this approach than define it, or offer definitions in terms of what historical 
sociology is not rather than what it is (for example, Halliday, 2005:36, Hobson, 
2002:13). Thus, Philip Abrams argues that ‘there can be no relationship between’ the 
disciplines of history and sociology because ‘in terms of their fundamental 
preoccupations, history and sociology are and always have been the same thing’ 
(Abrams, 1982:x). That fundamental pre-occupation, Abrams argues is the common 
human condition of being able to act, to make and re-make institutions and practices 
but only within a framework and basis constructed by our predecessors⎯all of this 
being a time-bound process (1982:3). Theda Skocpol echoes this characterization, 
identifying historical sociology as work that ‘ask[s] questions about social structures or 
processes understood to be concretely situated in time and space…address[es] processes 
over time and take[s] temporal sequences seriously in accounting for outcomes’ and 
‘highlight[s] the particular and varying features of specific kinds of social structures and 
patterns of change’ (Skocpol, 1984:1). One might object that everyone knows structures 
and processes are thus situated. However, historical sociology defines itself in this way 
precisely because the disciplines of history and sociology do effect the separation against 
which Abrams and Skocpol argue5. Where history reconstructs moments, actors and 
understandings and sociology examines structures of action or meaning at particular 
chronological or spatial points, historical sociology seeks to unite the two. Events, 
action and understanding occur within and through structures: but these structures are 
the mutable and emergent results of previous time-bound processes.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A particularly spirited defence of this division is to be found in Goldthorpe, John H. (1991) The Use of 
History in Sociology:Reflections on Some Recent Tendencies. British Journal of Sociology 42:211-30. 
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 The roots of historical sociology are to be found then simply in the classical 
works of social theory: of Weber, Marx, Durkheim, De Tocqueville and others 
(Skocpol, 1984:356). The broad designation of historical sociology thus covers traditions 
that would be considered widely divergent in other contexts: the Weberian tradition 
centred on the building of ideal-types to understand differing constellations of 
domination: the historical materialist tradition (to which this thesis belongs) rooted in 
the notion of changing social relations of production: or the deep reconstruction of 
historical practices of the subject as exemplified in the work of Michel Foucault 
(1984:367-70). In general, however, these traditions all orient themselves towards the 
idea of a ‘transformation’ or transition of some kind, usually identified with some period 
around the year 1500 CE in Western Europe, that brought about contemporary forms 
of the state, production and belief (Abrams, 1982:4, Gellner, 1991:16, Skocpol, 1984:1). 
Marxists identify this transition with the emergence in some sense of a ‘capitalist mode 
of production’. The second chapter of this thesis presents a theoretical framework, 
uneven and combined development based on this idea, and its reformulations through 
engagement with the challenges of actual history. Scholars influenced by Weber 
emphasize a more contingent relationship between three (with some variation, Michael 
Mann opting for four and Charles Tilly for two) autonomous instances of 
power⎯production, knowledge and coercion or capital, state and ideology(Gellner, 
1991:21, Giddens, 1985:2-5, Mann, 1993:254, Skocpol, 1979:4-5, Tilly, 1992:14-16).  
 
1.2.2 Historical Sociology in International Relations and the Middle 
East 
 
The problem-area of historical sociology, concerning the rise and transformation 
of the modern state, has led to a significant overlap with International Relations theory 
(Hobden, 1998:2). In particular, the work of historical sociologists influenced by the 
Weberian tradition, such as Michael Mann, Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly, has found 
a ready acceptance in IR because it seemed to fill in a gap in the realist idea of the state 
(1998:4). Tilly’s model of state formation, for example, depicts the impact of large-scale 
wars fought by Europe’s medieval and early modern polities. Kings had to develop 
taxation systems and bureaucracies to fund and run their wars, bringing in train the 
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social struggles and political forms characteristic of modernity (Tilly, 1992:67). Michael 
Mann lays a similar emphasis on the ‘caging’ (an evocative reference to Weber’s 
characterisation of rational-bureaucratic modernity) of social relations within states in 
the militarily competitive ‘multi-actor civilization’ of early modern Europe (Mann, 
1993:254). Theda Skocpol, in explaining the constitutive revolutionary conflagrations of 
modernity, explicitly makes reference to the ‘analytically autonomous level of 
transnational reality’ (Skocpol, 1979:22). This mode of historical sociology has therefore 
held a particular appeal to realist-influenced IR scholars, given the stress it lays on the 
autonomous operation of the states system within a world of multiple struggles for 
domination. Indeed, a later generation of Weberian historical sociologist have criticized 
this body of work precisely for incorporating uncritically a Waltzian neo-realist view of 
the states system (Hobden, 1998:8, Hobson, 2002:63). 
 
The second chapter of this thesis takes up historical materialists’ engagement 
with the question of political multiplicity and historical multi-linearity, and presents 
uneven and combined development as an alternative framework. For the present 
however, it is worth noting that historical sociology, in Weberian and historical 
materialist forms, has already strongly influenced scholarship on the international 
relations of the Global South and the Middle East in particular. Omni-balancing type 
approaches at least implicitly rely on a historical sociology of differential state formation 
between the North and the South. In Mohammed Ayoob’s case, this involves explicitly 
drawing on Tilly’s model to characterize the process that has been compressed or 
remains at an early stage in the South (Ayoob, 1998:43-4). In the Middle East, in 
particular, the historical sociology of the formation of states and the incorporation of 
the region into a global system of competitive states and capitalist social relations 
already forms the basis for much IR analysis (see Halliday, 2000:8-9, 2005:99-100, 
Hinnebusch, 2002a:1-2, 2002b:34-5, Lustick, 1997).  Ian Lustick explains the attempts 
to re-organise the region around the unifying state project of a ‘conquering core’ as 
examples of the process undergone in Europe in Italy and Germany and explicitly 
borrowing Alexander Gerschenkron’s notion of ‘historical backwardness’ (see Chapter 2 
of this thesis), although treating these are largely autonomous of the changing nature of 
social relations (Lustick, 1997:657). Where this thesis fits in the stream of historical 
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sociology of the international relations of the Middle East is in taking the insights of 
scholars such as Fred Halliday and Ray Hinnebusch that the inter-state relations of the 
region interact fundamentally with the contradictions of class and state formation 
brought about by the integration of the region into the global system of capitalist social 
relations and competitive states. However, I seek to systematize those insights through 
the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development and examine its utility 
in explaining particular cases of alignments in a specific state, Jordan. 
 
1.2.3 Jordan in the Literature: the need for explanation beyond 
diplomacy 
 
Is it necessary, however to adopt such a level of analysis? Might we not adopt a 
simpler, actor-oriented approach such as that in the tradition of Foreign Policy 
Analysis? If Foreign Policy Analysis means an approach that embeds the foreign policies 
of Middle Eastern states both within the histories of social change in the region and a 
modified form of International Relations theory (such as Halliday, 2005, Hinnebusch, 
2002b) then this thesis also belongs to that tradition. However, I do not adopt the 
approach that seeks to ‘attain generalizable knowledge’ about decision-makers’ 
behaviour ‘in terms of independent and dependent variables’ (Breuning, 2007:21). The 
implicit assumption of this approach, which this thesis does not share, is to act as a kind 
of expert in the policymaking process in order to ‘to help leaders make better decisions’ 
(2007:8). Since the evaluation of a ‘better’ or ‘worse’ decision involves an implicit value 
judgement in favour of the decision-maker (for example, one can only consider King 
Hussein’s policy decisions ‘good’ or ‘bad’ if one shares his aim of maintaining 
Hashemite rule) this thesis does not adopt it. The attempt to put ‘the human decision 
maker at the center of its endeavor’ and considers structures only in their aspect as 
domestic or external constraints (2007:173) is certainly understandable as an approach 
to historical evidence refracted through the experience of such decision-makers. 
However, it is vulnerable to the same criticism as that made above against omni-
balancing perspectives. This is that the approach is not necessarily incorrect but does 
not go far enough in explanation.  We register Hussein, or others, as the actors in 
deciding on a particular policy through the narrative of formation of that policy: to go 
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further and know how he was in a position to make such a decision and why requires an 
analysis based on structures such as that offered in this thesis. 
 
Indeed, part of the contribution of this thesis lies in moving beyond the focus 
on the agency of King Hussein that characterises most previous work in the 
(diplomatic) history of Jordan (as seen in Ashton, 2008, Dann, 1989, Milton-Edwards 
and Hinchcliffe, 2001, Moussa, 1988, Robins, 2004, Salibi, 1993, Shlaim, 2007). At first 
sight the claim that Hussein’s decisions were responsible for Jordan’s alignments seems 
quite obviously true. Jordanian kings do not merely rule but govern, and with the brief 
but significant exception of the Nabulsi government (October 1956 to April 1957) 
Jordanian foreign policy was conducted by the King. The alignments analysed in this 
thesis (Hussein’s dalliance with the Baghdad Pact, his subsequent attraction to the 
Egyptian-Syrian axis, the annulment of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and final return to 
Western tutelage) all these are taken to reflect the personality and decisions of the King 
himself. Thus, in his recent and extensive biography of Hussein, Avi Shlaim attributes 
the variations in Jordan’s alignments to the character of the King, his misjudgements 
and coups de main (Shlaim, 2007:90-105). 
 
Nigel Ashton’s biography of Hussein also reads Jordan’s international politics 
through the person of the king: his ‘astute understanding of power’ (2008:4), his 
empathy and idealism and his Hashemite Arabism (2008:10). The to-and-fro in Jordan’s 
alignment in the mid-1950s is again to be explained by the ‘uncertain and inconsistent’ 
judgement of the young monarch, and his return to pro-Western position as an instance 
of his now mature ‘personal and political courage (2008:50, 66). Of course, biographers 
explain events by the participation of their subjects in them and cannot be expected to 
provide more structural factors. However, more general treatments of the diplomatic 
history of the period (Dann, 1989, Gerges, 2001, Robins, 2004, Satloff, 1994) are just as 
likely to explain the Jordanian alignments of the 1950s with reference to Hussein’s 
personal political survival strategy. Thus Philip Robins describes the King’s foreign 
alignments as characterised by ‘policy mood swings’ (Robins, 2004:88). Satloff, like 
Shlaim, sees the confusion around the alignment with the Baghdad Pact as the result of 
‘serious faults of judgement and leadership’ and ‘naïveté’ on the part of a ruler who was 
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still very young (Satloff, 1994:124).  Fawaz Gerges emphasizes Hussein’s ‘tactical 
flexibility and adaptability’ as ruler whose ‘acts in inter-Arab affairs were taken for 
internal purposes and to ensure the survival of his throne’ (Gerges, 2001:89).  
 
These works are not inaccurate or empirically shoddy. They are mostly 
exemplary reconstructions based on archival sources and interviews and critical 
engagement with them is therefore all the more revealing. My criticism rather is that 
these accounts emphasize agency at the expense of structure. King Hussein was a 
politically astute man. However, political acumen always uses certain resources to 
achieve given aims by concrete processes. To explain those aims, resources and 
processes requires us to examine the structures in which individuals, both internal and 
external, are embedded. Recent work on Jordan has added such explanation, especially 
that of Yoav Alon (2006, 2007). Alon echoes the notion of ‘combination’ used in this 
thesis, describing Jordan as an ‘improbable combination of foreign and colonial regime 
together with indigenous Arab tribal society’(2007:3). I provide a fuller engagement with 
Alon’s work in Chapter 4 because he is concerned with the Jordanian state-formation 
process itself rather than argument about its impact on later alignments⎯his argument 
and research therefore complement this thesis and provide evidence for its claims about 
the integration of tributary social relations into the colonial state.  
 
A related concept here is to be found in Gokhan Bacik’s idea of ‘hybrid 
sovereignty’ (2008). Bahcik argues that Western sovereignty⎯in the sense of 
independent, uniform and ‘rational’ authority across a delineated territory⎯was 
‘injected’ into the region in the Ottoman and colonial periods (2008:15). However, these 
alien structures remained largely formal, encasing within them ‘primordial and 
traditional patterns of behavior remain prevalent in the weak states’ of the Arab world 
(2008:5). As a result, ‘[g]iven the survival of transnational group identity, it is common 
for people to form alliances with foreign powers/ governments, even when those 
alliances are against their own rulers’ (2008:49). In particular, Jordanian politics is 
structured by the opposition between West Bank and East Bank, and by the search for 
budget security (2008:12). Bacik thus does not advance greatly on Brand’s work. 
Although strenuously denying any notion of ‘failure’ of the Arab state to follow some 
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Western model (2008:35-6), Bacik seems to accept at face value the self-conception of 
the Western state as ‘neutral and rational… objective, anticipatable [sic] accountable and 
transparent institutions’ against which the Arab state may be compared (2008:20). The 
contribution offered in this thesis by uneven and combined development is a different 
argument to Bacik’s based not on the failure of a Weberian ideal type but on the 
presence and interaction of identifiable social relations of production. 
 
1.2.4 The Contribution of Uneven and Combined Development 
 
 It is here that I offer the theoretical framework of uneven and combined 
development as a route out of the impasse, and the explanation of Jordanian alignments 
in the 1950s as a test-run of its utility6. I provide a full explication of this theoretical 
framework in the following chapter, but at this point it is necessary to say why uneven 
and combined development is needed and might be used. After all, the concept 
originates with Leon Trotsky’s intervention into the debates among Russian Marxists 
before, during and after the Revolution. The concept informs Trotsky’s Results and 
Prospects (Trotsky, 1972a:29-38), but is most fully developed in his History of the Russian 
Revolution. Uneven and combined development began, then, as the answer to the 
question best put by W.H. Auden; why did ‘old Russia suddenly mutate/ into a 
proletarian state?’ (in Knei-Paz, 1978:1). The concept has been extended since in both 
its chronological scope (see Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2008, Matin, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2007, Rosenberg, 1996, Rosenberg, 2006) and problem area (Dufour, 2007, 
Lacher and Teschke, 2007, Shilliam, 2009, Teschke, 2003). In the following chapter I 
draw upon previously published work (Allinson and Anievas, 2010a, Allinson and 
Anievas, 2010b, Allinson and Anievas, 2009) to develop a more extensive account of 
uneven and combined development as a theoretical framework. Nonetheless, one might 
argue that Tsarist and revolutionary Russia and Jordanian foreign policy in the mid-
1950s are not easily comparable objects of investigation and that uneven and combined 
development therefore represents an unpromising avenue of theoretical exploration. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Mandy Turner uses the case of Nasser’s Egypt to argue for the utility of uneven and combined 
development as an explanation of the expansion of international society, but unfortunately her thesis 
remains unpublished. Turner, Mandy Mary 1999 The Expansion of International Society?: Egypt and Vietnam in 
the History of Uneven and Combined Development,PhD, International Relations, London School of Economics 
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Yet, the application of unfamiliar concepts to a new context may provide a route 
to original and innovative research. Such is the attempted contribution of this thesis, 
developing the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development by using it 
to structure the empirical investigation of the Jordanian case. Moreover, contrary to 
appearances, the idea of uneven and combined development represents an intervention 
into precisely that problematique of the international relations of the Southern state 
surveyed above. Trotsky’s original proposal of the ideas, if not the term itself, of uneven 
and combined development was directed precisely against a narrative of uni-linearity 
leading to a particular political outcome, from which different paths would then be 
considered incomplete or deviant. The common assumption of Trotsky and his 
theoretical opponents amongst the Russian Marxists of the early twentieth century was 
proletarian revolution to overthrow capitalism was possible, desirable and necessary. 
Needless to say, this goal is not shared by the majority of IR theorists. Nonetheless, and 
surprising as it may seem, it is the structure of the debate on this shared premise that 
sheds light on the theory of the international relations of the Global South and the 
Jordanian case as an instance of that wider phenomenon. 
 
 The question in this debate that Trotsky sought to answer was whether Russia 
had passed through the ‘necessary’ stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution and 
capitalist development sufficient to provide the material and political bases for socialist 
revolution. The classical position in this debate taken up by the Menshevik faction of 
the Russian Social Democratic Party, was that late-developing states remained unripe for 
socialist revolution. Thus, the task of the proletariat was to ally themselves with the 
bourgeois in its struggle against pre-capitalist forms of rule. A second position, 
articulated most forcefully by Lenin, argued for an independent proletarian strategy of 
leadership to achieve bourgeois-democratic aims.  
 
Trotsky’s striking intervention, upon which I expand in Chapter 2, was to begin 
from the recognition of the international character of the world capitalist system. It 
proposed that Russia’s minority working class movement could successfully telescope 
the supposedly indispensable stages of bourgeois democracy and capitalist development 
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into a single ‘uninterrupted’ or ‘permanent’ stage from which it would necessarily 
promote socialist revolution internationally. From this perspective, Trotsky conceived 
the Bolshevik revolution as a result of the international development of capitalism of 
which its fate was also bound. The essence of Trotsky’ argument might be summarized 
as the interaction of different patterns of social relations in a given society (or rather 
‘social formation’) under the impact of the global expansion of capitalist social relations 
such that the distinct character of the resultant ‘combined social formation’ itself feeds 
back into the system of geopolitical competition that originally produced it. 
 
What advantages does this framework offer by comparison with the 
perspectives reviewed above? Chapter 2 fully presents this theoretical framework but a 
quick explanation of its potential advantages is necessary here. One benefit is that 
uneven and combined development integrates social and ‘international’ explanation 
rather than subordinate one to the other, as in the conflation of domestic opposition 
and economic reproduction with the threat models of international security in omni-
balancing and budget security. Nor does it assume that there is an ideal-type of state and 
state behaviour against which Southern states are measured and found wanting. Rather 
it seeks to explain the social bases and forces that contest the geopolitical alignment of 
the state, in the combined social formation brought about by the ‘whip of external 
necessity’ (see Turner, 1999:60-2 for a related argument). Uneven and combined 
development thus offers historical sociological explanations but of forces that are 
themselves ‘internationally’ constituted. Thus, in uneven and combined development 
the fusion of dissimilar social structures (or modes of production) within a single 
formation—represents the composite effect of geopolitical-military pressures 
establishing trajectories of social struggle that then feed back into geopolitical 
interactions such as alignments. How would such a theoretical framework be compared 
to empirical evidence, and following what methods? 
 
 
1.3 Research Methods and Case Selection 
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As the preceding discussion has clarified, this thesis should be considered a 
work in the historical sociology of International Relations. Historical sociology refers to 
the general methodological approach defined in the section above. In this section I 
present the methods of the study: explaining the small-N case study in historical 
sociology; introducing the case and its selection criteria; and the method of data 
collection in historical evidence. 
  
1.3.1 Methods and Data  
 
The first key point is that this thesis is not a work in the discipline of history, 
but International Relations. It does not seek to reconstruct events but to evaluate 
particular theoretical explanations of events and thereby to judge the validity and 
usefulness of the theories upon which those explanations are based. In particular, the 
thesis introduces the novel theoretical framework of uneven and combined 
development (outlined more fully in Chapter 2) as such an explanation. The successive 
chapters then offer empirical historical evidence to substantiate and develop that 
framework. The aim of the thesis being to build theory by exploring the utility of this 
theoretical framework, it adopts the first of three strategies identified by Skocpol for 
historical sociological research: to ‘apply a single theoretical model to one or more of 
many possible instances covered by the model’ (Skocpol, 1984:362).  
 
I undertake this strategy because, as Skocpol argues it is appropriate when the 
‘practitioner… is chiefly interested in demonstrating and elaborating the inner logic of a 
general theoretical model’ and ‘detailed application of the general model to a relevant 
historical case (or cases) is very valuable, because it prompts the theorist to specify and 
operationalize what would otherwise necessarily remain very abstract concepts and 
theoretical propositions’(1984:365). This thesis aims to undertake such a task for uneven 
and combined development. 
 
 Of course, no research strategy is without its drawbacks. One question that may 
arise in relation to this strategy is the nature of the data used in this thesis. The thesis 
relies mainly on secondary sources⎯historians’ work⎯ supplemented with primary 
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sources of three kinds: the published British records of the mandate period and the 
Foreign and Colonial Office7; participants’ memoirs; and semi-structured interviews 
with selected interviewees. The reason for this choice is that the aim of the thesis is not 
to establish what happened, but to address a gap in International Relations theory of 
which the case of Jordanian alignments in the mid-1950s provides an example. This 
implies, then, that the time a historian would take to track down archives and people 
and the correspondences between their accounts is better taken in critiquing the existing 
theories, elucidating my own theoretical framework and then comparing to the evidence 
in the secondary sources: taking Skocpol’s advice to use ‘excellent studies by 
specialists… as the basic source of evidence for a given study’ (1984:382) 
 
 The choice of such secondary sources poses some problems, however (well 
noted in Lustick, 1996). One of the main criticisms of historical sociologists is that ‘the 
connection between the claims they make about the past and relics that could 
conceivably serve as warrants for these claims is often… quite impossibly loose’ and 
reliant upon an arbitrary selection of secondary sources (Goldthorpe, 1991:223). It 
should be noted, however, that primary sources do not themselves offer neutral access 
to the events of the past: they are ‘second-order interpretations referring to the first 
order ones that individuals generate when they act and interact’ (Mouzelis, 1994:35). 
Selection goes on amongst these (in terms of what is preserved and by whom) as it does 
amongst secondary sources. Nonetheless, the question of knowing how the sources can 
support the argument is still a difficult one. 
 
           To answer that question in the empirical sections of the thesis, I ‘triangulate’ 
amongst secondary sources (Lustick, 1996:616). The advantage of looking at a particular 
period of one particular state’s history is that it is possible to cover all the relevant 
monographs ‘to construct a background narrative from the identity of claims made by 
different historians despite their approach from different archival sources and/or 
implicitly theoretic or political angles’ (1996:616). However, there are still points where 
the sources disagree or where a claim is crucial to the argument of the thesis: in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The FCO records from the Amman embassy and the Iraqi mandate reports are published in the 
Cambridge Archive Editions series, Records of the Hashemite Dynasties. The reports of the Transjordan 
mandates were consulted in the original League of Nations publication. 
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case I adopt Skocpol’s suggestion that ‘[s]econdary research can also be strategically 
supplemented by carefully selected primary investigations or reinvestigations’ (Skocpol, 
1984:382). 
 
 How can primary sources be reliably ‘selected’? There are three kinds of primary 
source used in this thesis: the published British archives, memoirs (of both British 
officers such as Glubb and Jordanian political activists and army officers) and semi-
structured interviews with surviving participants. Why these and not others? There are 
both practical and methodological reasons for the choice of these supplementary 
primary sources. I have used the published British archives because the UK was the 
mandatory authority over (Trans) Jordan, and the alignment choices of the 1950s 
revolved around relations with the former colonial power. In addition to this research-
based choice, there is the problem that there are no central Jordanian archives save for 
the Hashemite family records themselves, access to which is to reserved for those on 
close terms with the ruling regime (for example Shlaim, 2007). Of course, the British 
records provide the British point of view. I have therefore also used the memoirs and 
texts of Jordanian participants from across the spectrum of political positions of the 
1950s⎯ from the King and his supporters, from members of the Free Officers, from 
the Communist and Baʿath Parties. The edited workshop Hukumat Suleiman Al-Nabulsi 
by the Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre also provided transcripts of the recollections of 
participants in the case studies of this thesis. Many of the key participants in the events 
are now dead or too infirm to be interviewed: I conducted interviews with participants 
(usually at lower levels or ranks on account of their youth at the time, such as Sheikh Al-
Jazi or Munir Hamarneh) accessed through a ‘snowballing’ process via colleagues at the 
Centre for Strategic Studies at Jordan University, Amman. 
 
1.3.1 Jordanian Alignments as small N-Case study: data points and 
selection criteria 
 
 If these methods of data collection offer reasonable conclusions about Jordan, 
can they be generalized in any way to the population of Southern states and their 
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alignments? This thesis adopts Rueschemeyer’s position that a ‘long sequence of  
historical development offers, provided that it is approached with sufficiently specified 
theoretical expectations, a large number of  theoretically relevant observations that may 
rule out or suggest the revision of  a whole series of  propositions’(2003:311). The 
observations of  this thesis, consisting of  the historical record, link the propositions 
derived from an explanatory theory to the phenomena they purport to explain. Thus a 
single or small N case study can still contribute to the growth of  knowledge because: 
 
‘[D]etailed case analyses often entail the generation, testing, revising, and 
retesting of  explanatory propositions within the same complex material. The 
discipline that in such endeavors [sic] is imposed on willful interpretation and 
speculation derives from the often large number of  theoretically relevant 
observations and from the fact that, for each of  these, analytic intent and 
empirical evidence can be fairly closely matched, more closely than is possible in 
many studies with large Ns’ (2003:315). 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 take as data points Jordan’s alignments of 1955-7, reaching back 
further into the country’s history to trace the social origins of these. 
  
What are we talking about when we discuss these Jordanian alignments?  To 
begin with the easy part of the question, ‘Jordanian’ here refers to the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, situated between Palestine/ Israel and Iraq. Founded in 1921 as the 
Emirate of Transjordan under British mandate authority. The territory was first 
conquered (in the Arab revolt of 1917) by Abdullah, a scion of the Hashemite ruling 
clan of the Hijaz. Renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946, the state 
became notionally independent but tied to Britain through the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 
1948. The Jordanian Army was funded by Britain and led by British officers (particularly 
the commander John Glubb ‘Pasha’). The Kingdom expanded as a result of the 
foundation of Israel and the consequent expulsion of the Palestinians from their 
homeland⎯Palestinian refugees came to form the majority of the population and the 
West Bank was annexed to the Kingdom. Abdullah was assassinated in 1951: his son 
and heir Talal fell mentally ill and the throne passed officially to his son Hussein.  
 
Hussein’s foreign policy therefore was developed in response to three main 
aspects: the relationship of dependency on British imperial power; the challenge of 
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radical Arab nationalist forces to that power and regimes (such as the Hashemites) 
associated with it; and the continuing conflict with Israel, increasingly allied to Jordan’s 















of Arab solidarity 
pact: 
 January 1957 
Rejection of Arab 
Solidarity Pact/ 





























Why this state, and these times? As the second section of  this chapter explained, the 
major works seeking to apply variants of  omni-balancing (Brand, 1994, Ryan, 2009) 
have relied upon case studies of  Jordanian alignments, as has the most in-depth 
application of  the constructivist approach to alignments in the Middle East (Lynch, 
1999). The choice of  Jordan therefore provides useful theoretical alternatives and 
predecessors against which to ‘play off’ the explanations offered by uneven and 
combined development. If  uneven and combined development offers more satisfying 
explanations in these cases then this would suggest a broader validity of  the theory in 
the Middle East and the Global South, even if  it cannot be said to have been established 
as a nomothetic law on the basis of  these studies. 
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Furthermore, Jordan offers the ‘power of  the good example’. Being a state 
essentially created by external intervention, in the midst of  a bitter (Arab-Israeli) 
conflict in a central area of  geopolitical competition, populated in its majority by 
refugees from that conflict and ruled over by a foreign (Hijazi) authoritarian monarchy 
in close alliance with external powers, Jordan would seem the perfect candidate to 
support omni-balancing theories. Indeed, this may be the reason why it has been chosen 
for the most rigorous versions of  omni-balancing. Also, the period of  1955-7 saw the 
widest variation in alignments in Jordan’s history, with the possible exception of  the 
Gulf  War of  1991. Such wide oscillations suggest a great autonomy of  the regime⎯ 
taken together with Jordan’s inauspicious conditions therefore, if  uneven and combined 
development offers a convincing alternative for the social origins of  Jordan’s 
alignments, it is quite likely it can be extended to other cases. 
 
As a final consideration, the time and place chosen for the case study of  this 
thesis allows us to draw wider conclusions about the Middle East as a whole. The 
particular alignments analysed in this thesis represent a period in which Jordan was at a 
juncture between two potential outcomes seen elsewhere in the region. On the one side 
lay a ‘shaikhly authoritarianism’ of  the right and on the other a ‘populist 
authoritarianism’ of  the anti-colonial left (Hinnebusch, 2006:378). Jordan was in many 
ways a middle case between these two extremes: neither a populous radical republic 
such as Egypt or Syria was to become, nor an oil-based conservative monarchy such as 
Saudi Arabia or the Gulf  sultanates. In the mid-1950s, however, the future of  Jordan lay 
in the balance: the resolution of  the crisis of  the mid-50s on the basis of  a pro-Western 
alignment led to a return to conservative monarchy. This was not pre-ordained, 
however. The events examined in this thesis constitute the process by which Jordan 
took one path rather than the other and therefore may be instructive for the region as a 
whole. 
  
1.4 Summary of the Thesis Argument 
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The methodological approach of  this thesis is thus a historical sociological one. 
In the content of  its arguments and the manner of  their presentation, however, the 
argument follows one particular stream in historical sociology: the Marxist approach of  
‘rising from the abstract to the concrete.’ This first introductory chapter has established 
the concrete research question and the problematique in International Relations theory to 
which the answer will contribute. The rest of  the thesis puts forward that answer⎯that, 
rather than the model of  an autonomous omni-balancing king, the social bases of the 
struggles that produced Jordan’s alignments between 1955 and 1957 should be traced to 
the emergence of a ‘combined social formation’ in Jordan and its predecessors in the 
late Ottoman and British mandate periods. The main characteristics of this social 
formation were a relatively egalitarian rural land-holding structure and a mechanism of 
combination with the global capitalist system through British subsidy to the former 
nomadic pastoralists in the armed forces, replacing formerly tributary relations.  
 
Chapter 2 explains the theoretical framework of uneven and combined 
development and defines the key terms of tributary and capitalist relations, unevenness 
and combination. The chapter proposes uneven and combined development as a 
theoretical framework that recognises the multi-linear and interactive character of 
development. The chapter argues for a definition of ‘development’ as patterned change 
in social relations, referred to as modes of production. It defines unevenness as the 
chronologically and geographically uneven spread of this patterned change, thereby 
producing a greater accumulation of productive force. The chapter then defines 
combination as the causal interaction of different kinds of social relations of production, 
in particular that produced by the globally expansive nature of capitalist relations. 
Drawing on the insights of Francophone Marxist anthropology such as the work of 
Pierre Phillipe Rey and Claude Meillasoux, the chapter identifies the transformation of a 
particular social relation (the direct extraction of surplus as by pastoralists and semi-
pastoralists) and its combination with global capitalist relations through the British 
colonial subsidy as the key to understanding the Jordanian combined social formation 
and its later alignments. This claim sets the terms for the research presented in the 
subsequent two chapters. 
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Chapter 3 continues the argument by establishing the nature of the pre-capitalist 
relations that were combined in Jordan. The chapter proposes that these are best seen as 
‘tributary relations’, whereby surplus product is directly taken by ‘extra-economic 
compulsion’ from the direct producers. However, these relations were characterized by 
a constant re-negotiation and re-formation of lower and higher points in the chain of 
tribute-taking: leading to what I call the ‘fractured tributary relations’ of the tribe 
characteristic of both settled and nomadic pastoralist communities in the lands that 
became Transjordan. The chapter relates how the nomadic pastoralists nonetheless 
enjoyed a strategic advantage over the settled communities and therefore most often 
exacted tribute from them. The chapter traces the origins, process and results of the 
Ottoman attempt to transform these relations in the Tanzimat reforms: which, I argue 
represent an instance of the operation of uneven and combined development through 
the ‘whip of external necessity’ by which pre-capitalist societies were forced to respond 
to the military-geopolitical and economic pressures emanating from more advanced 
capitalist powers. 
 
Chapter 4 pursues the argument that the Jordanian military constituted the link 
between the long-term social process of  uneven and combined development and the 
conjunctural alignment choices of  the 1950s. The military, as in other Arab countries, 
became a field of  political contestation in Jordan in the 1950s. However, the social base 
of  the Jordanian military was a rather peculiar one, and a source of  power for the 
regime against the anti-colonial movement. Chapter 4 explores therefore the role of  the 
army in the Jordanian state-formation process, considering whether it represented a 
conduit of  the combination of  the fractured tributary relations presented in chapter 3 
with the global capitalist system via Britain’s military subsidy. Through a focused 
comparison with Iraq chapter 4 therefore substantiates Haim Gerber’s claim that 
‘because the agrarian and class structure [of  Jordan] was more balanced… possibly this 
is why the army did not become a mirror of  class struggle as in other Arab countries’ 
(Gerber, 1987:149). The chapter seeks to show how the subsistence crisis among the 
Jordanian bedouin in the 1930s, resulted from global depression, traditional dearth and 
exacerbated to the point of  existential crisis by the imposition of  state boundaries and 
the replacement of  camels by motorized transport. In particular I examine how the 
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mandate state, in the form of  Glubb Pasha, created an important part of  Jordan’s 
combined social formation unintentionally and for geopolitical reasons. Glubb 
undertook consciously to ‘set in motion processes that reconfigured the economic bases 
of  the nomadic economy, and put in place a system of  militarized social provision that 
eased the plight of  the poorer Bedouin’(Tell, 2008:11). It was this transformation that 
replaced tributary relations with the British subsidy. 
 
The fifth and sixth chapters of  the thesis present explanations of  Jordan’s 
alignments between 1955 and 1957 on the basis of  the social origins outlined in the 
preceding two chapters. Chapter 5 deals with the struggle over the Baghdad Pact, a 
turning point in Jordan’s alignments as Hussein and his associates vacillated between an 
anti-Soviet alliance with Britain, the traditional imperial patron, and a mass movement 
inspired by anti-colonial nationalism. The chapter argues that Hussein’s oscillation 
between these positions reflected the pull of  two poles within Jordan’s combined social 
formation: on the one hand the ‘new effendiyya’ produced by the expansion of  the 
mandate state together with the dispossessed urban poor and refugees, and on the other 
the sections of  the armed forces whose subsistence had been guaranteed by the British 
subsidy and at first passively, then actively supported the King and his smaller ruling 
condominium of  merchants, landowners and sheikhs. Chapter 6 expands this historical 
analysis with studies of  the expulsion of British officers in the Jordanian armed forces, 
the Suez Crisis, the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and the acceptance of US 
aid at the time of the Eisenhower Doctrine. In these case studies the thesis presents the 
utility of uneven and combined development over other explanations in explaining the 
social bases of the contingent political struggles that led to the eventual alignment 
outcomes. 
 
The concluding chapter 7 recapitulates the results of  the thesis and attempts to 
draw from them implications for the study of  the International Relations of  the Middle 
East as a whole and especially in the contemporary region. The chapter proposes that 
uneven and combined development may offer a route out of  confrontations on the 
questions of  the specificity/ universality of  the Middle East and the disciplinary 
question of  whether to focus on Middle Eastern studies or International Relations. In 
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the final section I suggest that uneven and combined development, as a theoretical 
framework designed originally to explain (and advance) social revolution in a so-called 
‘backward’ country, may have a particular potency in analyzing the contemporary 
revolutionary upheavals in the region. Of  course, any such claim requires a much 
greater theoretical specification of  uneven and combined development. It is to this task 







2. The Theoretical Framework of Uneven and 
Combined Development 
In this chapter I outline the analytical tools, basic concepts and intellectual 
heritage of the theoretical framework used in this thesis, namely uneven and combined 
development. This is an important task because both the general paradigm to which 
uneven and combined development belongs⎯that of historical materialism, which term 
I shall use interchangeably with ‘Marxism’⎯ and the contents of this framework itself 
are likely to be less familiar to IR scholars than the established schools of Realism, 
Liberalism, Constructivism and so forth. In this chapter I therefore seek to develop a 
revived and novel theoretical framework from outside the mainstream schools of 
international relations in order to understand a particular set of phenomena later in the 
thesis: Jordanian alignments. In so doing, I seek to establish a means to add empirical 
substance to a debate around this theoretical framework, which has been criticised for 
lacking such substance. Uneven and combined development being a relative new-comer 
as an explicit theoretical concept in the study of International Relations, the main task 
of this chapter will therefore be to explain and define its terms and the analytical tools it 
offers for the rest of the thesis.  
A basic definition of uneven and combined development is this: the interaction 
of different patterns of social relations in a given society (or rather ‘social formation’) 
under the impact of the global expansion of capitalist social relations (the ‘world 
economy’) such that the distinct character of the resultant ‘combined social formation’ 
itself feeds back into the system of geopolitical competition that originally produced it. 
Of course, simply to state the terms is not to substantiate their internal coherence or 
empirical reference. The rest of this chapter carries out that task. It begins with a 
restatement of the questions addressed by uneven and combined development. As I 
attempt to demonstrate below, uneven and combined development represents an 
attempt within the historical materialist tradition to grapple with the questions of the 
interrelation of the geo-political and the social and the international relations of ‘late-
developing’ states. Uneven and combined development thus addresses the same 
problematique with which this thesis concerns itself. It may then help us address the gaps 
in the responses of other theoretical traditions (reviewed in the previous chapter) to 
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these questions. However, uneven and combined development is not a stand-alone 
theory or panacea. It is based on a long engagement of historical materialists with the 
problems of the geopolitical and of ‘late-development’.  
The chapter therefore undertakes a clarification of the historical materialist basis 
to uneven and combined development and then reviews the contributions of historical 
materialist approaches to international relations such as the Lenin-Bukharin theory of 
imperialism, Rosa Luxemburg’s work on colonial expansion, World Systems and 
Dependency theory and the “political-Marxist” school of Ellen Meiksins Wood, Justin 
Rosenberg, Benno Teschke and Hannes Lacher and the ‘two-logics’ controversy in 
recent Marxist international relations theory. Drawing from these contributions, the 
chapter then outlines the history and debates on the idea of uneven and combined 
development and presents a synthetic framework of the concept. This framework uses 
the previous contributions to fill in the gaps of Trotsky’s original and insightful but 
rather sketchy conceptualization of uneven and combined development. Thus, the 
theoretical framework presents ‘combination’ as the interweaving of a world economy 
(the global expansion of capitalist social relations through both market and state 
competition) with local social relations deriving from a pre-existing tributary mode of 
production⎯drawing therefore on the work of Nazih Ayubi and the anthropologists 
Pierre Phillipe Rey and Claude Meillasoux. In the final section of the chapter, the place 
of agency, norms and the state are discussed, making use of Ayubi’s idea of the ‘relative 
autonomy’ of the state within the ‘compound world economy’ (1995:13) and the 
discourse of Arab nationalism as an instance of the attempt to create a particular 
‘historic bloc’ (1995:28). 
2.1 Why Uneven and Combined Development?  
As the previous chapter demonstrated, attempts to explain the phenomena of 
international relations in general and the foreign policies of states in the global South in 
particular encounter a ‘basic methodological disjuncture between sociological and 
geopolitical forms of explanation’ (Rosenberg, 2006:312). Historical materialism has not 
solved this problem. Indeed, where Realists and Neo-Realists have been accused of 
over-emphasizing a trans-historical anarchical system at the expense of understanding 
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the variations of domestic societies8, historical materialists often face the opposite 
charge of focusing exclusively on a domestic social model and failing to understand or 
theorize the interactions amongst states, or reducing them to an epiphenomena of 
domestic social relations.  Thus Kenneth Waltz argues that ‘Marx and the Marxists 
represent the fullest development of the second image’ i.e., of the claim that ‘the internal 
structure of states determines not only the form and use of military force but external 
behavior generally’(Waltz, 1959:125). This criticism holds that historical materialists are 
concerned with processes of change from one kind of society to another and therefore 
not with the proper object of IR theory in the Realist tradition: the relationships 
between multiple societies conceived as sovereign states (Halliday and Rosenberg, 
1998:383).  In this view, historical materialist categories of social relations (e.g. the 
‘capitalist mode of production’) are seen as domestic attributes of states which seem to 
be ineffective compared with the ‘distribution of capabilities’ as the source of behaviour 
in the international system: the common behaviour of ‘capitalist’ and ‘socialist’ states 
providing evidence for this claim (Waltz, 1979:127). As Fred Halliday writes, from 
within a historical materialist perspective: ‘[t]hose who… have sought to elaborate a 
Marxist approach to International Relations have laboured under the theoretical 
difficulties that confront those who seek to analyse politics, and ideological factors, 
within the confines of specific states themselves’ (Halliday, 1994:48). 
Other schools of IR theory have mounted similar criticisms of historical 
materialism. Martin Wight argued that Marxism was fundamentally a ‘theory of 
domestic society’ (1995:23). Kubalkova and Cruickshank’s study of Marxism and IR 
sees the two as at ‘different wave lengths’ and operating ‘at cross purposes’ (1989:11). 
Alexander Wendt’s influential statement of the Constructivist approach shares with 
Waltzian neo-Realism the explanatory priority placed on the system of sovereign states. 
However, Wendt argues the nature of that system may vary with the inter-subjective 
meanings emergent within the interactions of state leaders (Wendt, 1999:247). Wendt 
argues that the modes of production in Marxism are cultural, rather than material, forms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A body of work has emerged in International Relations which seeks to rehabilitate the tropes of pre-
Waltzian realism (tragedy, prudence, limited knowledge and so forth) through a ‘counter-memory’ –see 
Molloy, Sean. (2006) The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan.These are works of intellectual history, however. Their empirical referents are to bodies of 
thought or the relationships between them: of interest, but not the subject of a thesis such as this one, 
based on the premise that there is something outside of the text. 
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and therefore vulnerable to ‘idealist critique’ when offered as an explanation for 
international relations (1999:136). Historical sociologists, who share a general 
methodological outlook with Marxists, have also criticized historical materialism from 
the other side of the debate, arguing that Marxists have failed to integrate the impact of 
inter-state conflict and competition even on the decisive revolutionary moments they 
identify as crucial to the transition from one kind of society to another. Thus Charles 
Tilly famously argued that war made states (Tilly, 1992:67) and Theda Skocpol identified 
‘developments within the international states system as such’ as central factors in the 
making of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions (Skocpol, 1979:23). Michael 
Mann advances the claim that ‘[s]tates did not grow primarily to cope with emerging 
classes….but to fight costlier wars and then to assist industrialization’ (Mann, 1993:728). 
These historical sociological explanations of the transition to capitalist (or ‘industrial’) 
society thus often find it easier to rely on the realist model (Mann, 1988:140-42, 
Skocpol, 1979:22) than on historical materialist premises. 
These objections are strong ones. Historical materialism in its original form, like 
the other components of classical social theory in Weber and Durkheim, has displayed a 
tendency to fail to account theoretically for socio- political multiplicity and its effects 
(Rosenberg 2005; 2006; 2007). In part this is because Marx consciously and famously 
abstracted the inter-societal from his conception of society and its development 
(1990:727). Marx did write a great deal about the subject-matter of what would now be 
considered IR⎯around eight hundred pages on wars, diplomacy, and colonialism 
(Rosenberg, 1994:162)⎯but this research was not integrated into his theoretical system 
(Halliday, 1994:59). This has given rise to the criticism that Marxism is a variant of 
Eurocentric modernization theory, reliant upon what Charles Tilly calls the ‘pernicious 
postulate’ of development within a singular model of society (Tilly, 1982:11) and 
abstracted from the England of Marx’s day. Such an impression is hardly dispelled by 
such epigrams as that delivered by Marx to ‘backward’ German philosophers on the 
example of England’s industrialization: ‘De te fabula narratur!’ (‘This story is told of you!’).  
Apart from such verbal asides, Marx appears to have intended (although this 
may have been a short-lived plan) further volumes to Capital that would deal with 
questions of the state and International Relations (Callinicos, 2009:34) . Whether he 
dropped the plan or not, Marx did not produce these works and left later generations of 
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Marxists to grapple with the problem of integrating Marx’s model of capitalist social 
relations with a world divided into multiple states and in which non-capitalist social 
relations predominated in most areas. The third section of this chapter explains the 
contributions of later historical materialists in grappling with this problem and argues 
that uneven and combined development represents such an attempt to respond to 
objections such as those outlined above: a response characterized by chronologically 
and geographically embedding Marx’s model of social relations in an actually existing 
world of multiple states and different forms of social relations (modes of production). It 
is argued that uneven and combined development is an attempt to deal with the 
problem that ‘very concept of the "international" itself poses problems for Marxists … 
[having] seen world affairs confidently in terms of a single world process.’ (Halliday, 
1994:49). Uneven and combined development recognizes the existence of 
determinations arising from the fact that all societies coexist with and interact with 
others—thereby super-adding ‘a lateral field of causality over and above the “domestic” 
determinations arising from each and every one of the participant societies’(Callinicos 
and Rosenberg, 2008:621). Before explicating how uneven and combined development 
can do this, it is necessary to explain the basic premises of the framework in the 
historical materialist conception of the social. 
2.2 Basic concepts of Historical Materialism 
This thesis offers a social explanation of Jordan’s geopolitical alignments in the 
1950s: but what does ‘social’ mean in the framework of uneven and combined 
development that is presented to reach this explanation? The conception of the ‘social’ 
adopted here is the historical materialist one, which this section now broadly outlines. 
Much of what follows is a brief summary of often-contradictory definitions within 
Marx’s own writings and those of later Marxists. The following section outlines the 
basic proposition of historical materialism, the meanings of the terms ‘mode of 
production’ and ‘social relations of production’ and Marx’s account of the nature of 
capitalism. These clarifications are necessary because it is these basic concepts that have 
been modified through the intellectual engagement of IR and Marxism outlined in 
section 3 of this chapter and which go on to form the building blocks of uneven and 
combined development used in the rest of the thesis. 
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2.2.1 Social Relations of Production and Modes of Production 
The most basic proposition of historical materialism is contained within the 
phrase itself: the idea that history starts from ‘the real process of production, starting 
out from the material production of life itself’ (Marx and Engels, 1999:58). Or, to use a 
more modern idiom, we should explain interactions amongst humans and their 
institutions by reference to a ‘foundation’ in material production that ‘ultimately governs 
the "social, political and intellectual life-processes in general"’ (Brewer, 1990:11). This is 
a very controversial claim, around which much of the criticism of Marxism centres. 
However, it is, like the Realist assertion of a logic of anarchy in international politics, a 
‘hard core’ postulate of the kind identified by Imre Lakatos: an overarching claim that 
organises a research programme and to be judged by its ability to ‘resolve anomalies by 
introducing auxiliary theories that expand the explanatory power of the core postulates’ 
(Burawoy, 1989:761). Uneven and combined development represents an attempt at such 
expansion on the basis of this fundamental claim: extending historical materialist 
analysis to the domain of International Relations of the Global South. 
From this postulate we get the most basic historical materialist concept of use to 
this thesis: that of the ‘mode of production’. I summarise a mode of production as a 
way of organising the ‘social relations of production’. We can identify, in the abstract, a 
limited number of ways in which such relations may be structured. A mode of 
production is not a tangible thing in which social relations operate⎯rather the social 
relations of production operate in ‘social formations’. The problematic questions of 
ideas, agency and the autonomy of the state are left aside for now to give a clearer 
picture of what these basic concepts mean: these thorny problems are addressed in the 
last section of this chapter. For now, what does ‘social relations’ of production’ mean in 
this thesis?  
‘Social’ and ‘relation’ should not give us too much trouble: they are used here in 
their commonsense meaning as regularized interactions amongst people or groups of 
people. What about production? Production is the most basic prerequisite of human 
existence: the drawing of sustenance by humans from their physical surroundings. Of 
course, all animals do this but humans are distinguished by their use of technology (not 
just tools but tools to make tools) and their capacity for their organisation of production 
amongst each other to change over time. Production means, therefore, labour⎯‘an 
 40 
appropriation of what exists in nature for the requirements of man…common to all 
forms of society in which human beings live’ (Marx, 1990:290). What changes is not the 
need for this labour but the way in which it is organised, controlled and its products and 
material prerequisites distributed. These are production relations: ‘relations of effective 
power over persons and productive forces’(Cohen 1978: 63)9.  
Production relations are patterned and change over time, Marx argues, as a 
result of the internal struggles that they generate. The central elements of these patterns 
may then be distilled in abstract form: a ‘mode of production.’ The basic elements of 
these patterns are labour and the productive forces (i.e. the means of production) which 
‘for any production to take place…must be connected’(Marx, 1978:120). It is possible 
for this effective control over labour, its means and its products to be distributed equally 
amongst a community’s members. This was the prospect sketched by Marx of 
communism in both its ancient and future forms. In between lie modes of production 
that generate classes⎯where the direct producers do not control production but are 
rather subject to the effective control of another group who extract a surplus from the 
labour of the first group in production. From this premise Marx argues that: 
The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of 
the direct producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude, as 
this grows directly out of production itself and reacts back on it in turn as a 
determinant… It is in each case the direct relationship of the owners of the 
conditions of production to the immediate producers⎯relationship whose 
particular form naturally corresponds always to a certain level of development of 
the type and manner of labour, and hence to its social productive power⎯in 
which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice. 
(Marx, 1978:927) 
It is these patterns of the social relations of production that are ‘developing’ 
unevenly and being combined in uneven and combined development. They mean the 
‘relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers’. 
There are many potential cultural and jurisprudential forms of these relationships. 
However, historical materialism claims that we can distinguish patterns between them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Critics of Marx from the Weberian or Neo-Realist traditions often distinguish between ‘power’ and 
‘production’ as two alternatives sources of human action. On the basis of this distinction Marxism is 
criticised, for example, for failing to acknowledge the importance of power as the key concept of 
international relations. This criticism is misplaced because power, in the sense of control over things and 
people in production, is central to historical materialism. The changing patterns of power over production 
are the explanatory mechanism of the theory. The claim is not that power does not matter but that certain 
empirical outcomes of social life can be traced back, as emergent phenomena, to such patterns of power 
over production – a type of power known in capitalist societies as ‘economic’ but in others as divinely 
ordained or simply a brute fact of life. 
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on the basis of who controls the means of production, the produced surplus and the 
labour power that acts on the former to produce the latter. Do the direct producers 
control their own means of production? Do they control the surplus produced? If not, 
who does? We can schematize the possible production relations in the following table: 
 
 
Figure 2: Modes of Production, adapted from Cohen (1978:70) 
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production 
























This table is a representation of the logically possible abstractions of production 
relations. Yet it includes at the left hand side at least two different ‘modes’ in each cell. 
This is because there is a further axis of differentiation in those modes dependent on 
whether the direct producer controls the means of production, therefore necessitating 
the organisation of coercive power in some way to appropriate the product (Brenner, 
2001:178).  
 2.2.2 The Capitalist Mode of Production 
The task⎯far from universally successful⎯ of historical materialists in 
International Relations theory has been to reconstruct the relationship between a 
particular mode of production (capitalism) and the global expansion of the system of 
sovereign states: phenomena that Marxists have seen as largely coeval (Halliday, 
1994:61). In this thesis in particular, an argument will be advanced about the 
combination of social relations characteristic of two modes of production in Jordan, the 
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capitalist mode and the tributary mode. The tributary mode is explored in depth at the 
beginning of the next chapter where we examine the nature of social relations in 
Ottoman and British Mandate era Jordan. Here it is necessary to explain Marx’s view of 
the capitalist mode of production, the only mode that he analysed in detail, in order to 
understand its expansion as a world economy. 
The capitalist mode of production for Marx is, as summarized above, characterized 
by the separation of direct producer⎯the worker⎯ from the means of production.  
The worker is not compelled, as in the tributary or slave modes, to offer either labour 
power or surplus in the form of products to those (the capitalists) who control the 
means of production. However, the worker must sell her labour power to some 
capitalist in order to access the means of production, thereby providing the owner of 
the means of production with the surplus value that, Marx argues, is the source of 
profit. Furthermore, there are many competing capitalists ‘exploiting’10 labour power to 
produce profit in this way. Or to use Gerry Cohen’s clarification: capitalist social 
production relations are those in which ‘immediate producers own their own labour 
power and no other productive force’ and ‘the point of production…is to use exchange 
value to produce more exchange value and then to use the additional exchange value to 
produce still more and so on’ (Cohen, 1978:181).  Robert Brenner has usefully 
characterized Marx’s picture of the capitalist mode of production as functioning based 
on ‘rules of reproduction’ for the social actors in the system. These are constituted by 
two antagonistic relationships: the ‘vertical’ antagonisms between capitalist and labourer 
and the ‘horizontal’ relations among individual competing capitals (Brenner, 2006:6-7). 
The vertical antagonism results in the class struggle between capital and labour over the 
labour process and its product. The horizontal antagonism results in the competitive 
pressure on particular capitals to produce more efficiently, by intensifying the labour 
process, using innovative technology or geographical expansion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In Marx’s sense this means that the value produced by the workers’ labour power for the capitalist is 
less than that she receives in return as wages. 
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2.2.3 The Capitalist Mode of Production, Primitive Accumulation and World 
Economy 
	  
Why is this relevant? This characterization of the capitalist mode of production 
is relevant because it offers us the means to understand the linked expansion of the 
states system and world-economy into which this thesis argues Jordan was integrated 
with consequential effects for the country’s later alignments. It does so in two ways: 
explaining the origins of that expansion and its nature. Capitalism, if this analysis of it is 
accepted, is an inherently expansionary system. As explained above, each capitalist is 
driven to seek advantage at the expense of others. The main strategy to achieve this is 
by increasing the surplus value produced by the workers— extending the working day 
or introducing labour-saving technology without a commensurate reduction in working 
time. A further strategy is to expand into those areas where capitalist relations do not 
prevail. The competition among capitals thus leads them to search out new markets and 
ever-greater sources of profit across the globe, thereby unifying the world through the 
universalization of specific combinatory mechanisms. As the capitalist system matures, 
more and more societies become locked into processes and structures of 
interconnection and constitution by the emergence of a world economy. However, the 
state and inter-state competition was to play a significant role in transmitting these 
imperatives and therefore their impact even on areas (such as Jordan) where capital did 
not make a productive investment: a key aspect of the contribution of uneven and 
combined development which is discussed further below. 
The origins of capitalist expansion lie, then, in the nature of the ‘specific 
economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers’. 
What of the second aspect of the expansion, the character of the transformations 
wrought on other societies? It will be recalled that capitalism is distinguished by what 
Marx called the ‘dual freedom’: the worker faces no direct coercion to work for any 
specific capitalist, or indeed to work at all, but being ‘free’ of the means of production 
she in effect has little choice but to do so. This situation differs from other modes of 
production in which ‘non-economic coercion is the basis for appropriation of surplus 
by a ruling class or its agents’ (Haldon, 1993:65). To move from the latter system to the 
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former implies a change in the entire basis of politics. This claim has two important 
consequences for the expansion of the international system and its nature in the Global 
South, of which Jordan is a part. First, capitalism is unique in separating off the 
‘political’ realm from the ‘economic’ and therefore creating a global system of 
interactions between these political realms (states) apparently separate from the social 
relations of production over which they preside: in Justin Rosenberg’s words ‘the 
structural specificity of state sovereignty lies in its "abstraction" from civil society⎯an 
abstraction which is constitutive of the private sphere of the market, and hence 
inseparable from capitalist relations of production’ (1994:123). In this argument (at this 
point presented only at an abstract level) a ‘geo-politics’ separate from ‘economics’ 
comes with capitalism because only capitalism produces a ‘politics’ separate from 
surplus extraction (1994:83). 
The second contribution of Marx’s characterization of the capitalist mode of 
production is to direct our focus to the historical production of its precondition: the 
potential worker free from both means of production and from the compulsion to 
produce. In its concrete form this process is masterfully depicted by Marx as ‘primitive 
accumulation’. ‘Primitive’ here means original: the accumulation in question is of the 
means of production in the hands of (potential) capitalist at one end and property-less 
(potential) workers at the other, i.e. the ‘dual freedom’ described above. These are the 
preconditions⎯ which does not mean the same thing as the causes⎯for capitalist social 
relations of production. These pre-conditions imply both the forcible separation of 
direct producers from control of the means of production (such as peasants from their 
land) and the removal of the power of other classes (such as feudal lords or tribal 
sheikhs) to compel the direct producers to hand over surplus by extra-economic 
coercion (1994:163). Marx summarises his definition of this ‘primitive accumulation’ in 
his notes on pre-capitalist modes of production:  
[Primitive accumulation is] a historic process which dissolves the different 
forms, in which the labourer is an owner and the owner labours. First and 
foremost: 1) a dissolution of the relation to the earth...2) dissolution of the 
relations in which man appears as the proprietor of the instrument of labour… 
dissolution both of the relations under which the labourers themselves, the 
living units of labour power are still a direct part of the objective conditions of 
production and are appropriated as such (Marx, 1978:97-98) 
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  It is this concrete process that uneven and combined development offers first as 
an analytical tool for understanding the Jordanian case (Turner, 1999 presents a similar 
argument for Egypt). This unevenly distributed ‘historic process’ of dissolution and 
reconstitution is the starting point for tracing back the trajectories of any particular 
post-colonial state⎯a task undertaken for Jordan in the third and fourth chapters of 
this thesis. Those chapters look at how ‘the relation to the earth’ and the dissolution of 
the ‘different forms in which the labourer is an owner and the owner labours’11 under 
the impact of the attempt and failure of the Ottoman Empire to compete with the 
capitalist powers such as Britain and France. This process (resulting in a certain kind of 
‘combined development’ defined below) then provides an alternative account of the 
origins of Jordan’s geopolitical alignments.   
 The argument is jumping ahead of itself here, however. Before any discussion of 
the concrete case, certain problems in the concepts presented above must be 
recognized. Chief among these is that Marx’s model of the transition to capitalism is an 
abstraction based largely on the singular English experience and written as if there were 
only one society in the world. As Marx recognized, these were stringent and clearly 
counter-factual conditions. However, the work of embedding this abstraction in time 
and space was never fully carried out by Marx. As a result, it has been easy for Marxists 
themselves and others to see historical materialism as positing a world of separate 
societies: such entities passing uniformly through time and stages of modes of 
production like a locomotive on the rails. This view implies precisely that 
‘methodological nationalism’ or dominance of domestic factors for which historical 
materialism has been criticised. Even worse: it may lead to the teleological conclusions 
of modernization theory or assumptions of the superiority of ‘civilized’ over ‘primitive’ 
nations. There has been no shortage of historical materialists willing to confirm such an 
impression, from elements of Marx’s own 1859 Preface to a Critique of Political Economy 
itself through to Bill Warren’s declaration that ‘direct colonialism…acted as a powerful 
engine of progressive social change’ (Warren, 1980:9). 
 One of the advantages of uneven and combined development is to suggest that 
this interpretation of Marxism, although certainly available in the texts themselves, is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This dissolution and reconstitution, expanded upon in chapter 3, involved the tributary relations 
prevalent in the Transjordanian steppe in the late Ottoman Empire: ‘primitive’ in the context of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ , it must be stressed, means ‘original’ rather than any ‘primitive mode of production.’ 
 46 
a necessary one. A good reason for adopting a mode of production approach⎯further 
specified as uneven and combined development⎯is in fact that it allows us to ‘visualize 
intersystemic and intrasystemic relationships’(Wolf, 1997:76).  The important issue is 
not Marx’s (often scattered and inconsistent) schema of modes of production but rather 
his method of abstracting ‘’the strategic relationships involved in the deployment of 
social labor by organised human pluralities…that underlie, orient and constrain 
interaction’ (1997:76). Marx provided a full account of the dynamics of only one of 
these, the capitalist mode. In Capital he consciously treated this example as if it were an 
isolated, singular society only in order to be better able to understand its fundamental 
dynamics. Throughout his and Engels’ historical work, and in political correspondence 
such as that with the Russian Marxist Vera Zasulich, frequently reaffirmed the multi-
linear and interactive character of actual historical development (Lowy, 1981:23-4), an 
emphasis that has been re-discovered by recent research (see Anderson, 2010). Indeed, 
Marx took up precisely the example of the contrast between the  expropriation of the 
Roman peasantry (creating the original “proletariat” but not capitalism) and the English 
transition to capitalism to argue that ‘events that are strikingly analogous, but taking 
place in different historical milieu, lead to totally disparate results’ (Marx, 1982:110). 
Nonetheless, the problem remains that historical materialism has had to grapple with 
the actually existing capitalism rather than an abstract one, and therefore with the 
existence of a states system and non-capitalist social relations which do not simply 
recede once capitalism comes on the scene. Later generations of Marxists attempted to 
deal with these problems (Brewer, 1990:15-16). They produced theoretical resources of 
use to this thesis: it is to their contributions that we now turn. 
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2.3 Theoretical Inheritance: Marxists and International 
Relations 
	  
 The subject matter with which this thesis engages through the case of 
Jordan⎯the relations between states and the politics of late-developing states⎯ has 
thus proved quite thorny terrain for historical materialists. However, the attempts of 
previous generations of historical materialists to deal with these questions have 
produced pertinent insights. This is because Marxists after Marx, from the ‘classical 
Marxists’ of the first quarter of the twentieth century onwards, were faced with real-
world problems of imperialism and war and therefore to develop answers to two linked 
questions: i) what is the relationship between capitalism (a social system) and the 
international system of states and ii) why and how did capitalism expand into non-
capitalist societies? These questions cover our area of interest in this thesis (the 
relationship between late-development and geopolitical alignments) and the 
contributions produced in answering are therefore worth considering in detail. 
 2.3.1 Classical Marxism: Lenin, Bukharin, Luxemburg 
	  
 The version of these arguments with which most IR scholars are familiar is that 
presented in Lenin’s pamphlet Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism. However, this 
short work should be considered a distillation of arguments formulated with much 
greater theoretical sophistication in Nikolai Bukharin’s Imperialism and World Economy 
(Callinicos, 2009:52). Lenin’s pamphlet is fundamentally concerned not, as much of the 
later theorizing inspired by it has been, with the relationship between the colonized and 
colonizing world but with the reasons for the outbreak of the First World War 
(Halliday, 1994:54). Lenin’s primary argument, based on the work of the liberal John 
Hobson, was that ‘imperialism’ (in the sense of war between the major powers to divide 
the world’s territory and resources between them) equates to ‘monopoly 
capitalism’(Lenin, 2010:110). Capitalism, Lenin, claimed had reached a stage where 
finance and industrial capital had merged in huge monopolies: therefore ‘the export of 
capital’ had become more important than commodities, and the major capitalist states 
therefore came into conflict over the spaces into which to export this capital (2010:94-
5). Moreover, this system blunted the revolutionary potential of the proletariat (thereby 
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explaining the failure of workers’ organisations to oppose the First World War) by 
making it ‘economically possible to corrupt certain sections of the working 
class’(2010:160) . 
 There is a problem here, however. Capital, in the sense of loans, shares and so 
forth, did not flow most profitably from the big capitalist states to the colonies, but 
rather to other capitalist states. Nor was there any visible mechanism by which the 
benefits of such investments as did exist were transferred to an ‘upper strata’ of the 
workers: indeed it was the higher-skilled and better paid workers who tended to found 
and join Communist Parties on the Leninist model (Callinicos, 2009:50). Bukharin 
(1973) argued a version of Lenin’s thesis without these empirically incorrect claims. He 
identified two contradictory tendencies in the capitalist world economy as it expanded: 
on the one hand, a tendency toward the concentration of capital and its integration into 
particular states and the other a tendency for capital and production to be 
internationalized (1973:121).  The consequence of these two contradictory tendencies 
was for ‘state capitalist trusts’ to compete militarily as well as economically (1973:123-4). 
 As Bob Sutcliffe has pointed out, Lenin’s pamphlet does not really concern the 
relationships between colonial powers and their colonies or ‘developed’ and ‘under-
developed’ countries (Sutcliffe, 2002:49). Nor does Bukharin, and both tend to take for 
granted the existence of many states through which the tendencies of concentration and 
centralization of capital come into operation. What Bukharin offers to this thesis is his 
conception of capitalism as a unified, global(ising) system of both economic and 
geopolitical competition: his starting point being the world economy defined as ‘a 
system of production relations and, correspondingly, exchange relations, on a world 
scale’ (1973:26). Bukharin thus highlights how capitalist relations are production 
relations, the transformation of which in a ‘combined’ way (which Bukharin does not 
discuss) may have important international consequences even if the state in question 
(like Jordan) is not a major exporter of commodities. Lenin offers the idea that capitalist 
development is inherently uneven, permanently re-ordering the capabilities of states to 
participate in the division of the world and leading to military conflict as a result of 
these disequilibria. Here we find a certain convergence of Marxist and realist hypotheses 
on the ‘the tendency in an international system for the powers of member states to 
change at different rates because of political, economic and technological developments’ 
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which over time cause ‘of a fundamental redistribution of power in the system' (Gilpin, 
1981:13). However, where this idea helps this thesis is offering an account of the 
imperative⎯brought about by the threat from the ‘unevenly’ more developed capitalist 
states⎯working on the Ottoman empire to transform its social relations in the late 19th 
and early 20th century, which then became the foundation for Jordan’s later social 
trajectory. This idea is explained more fully as Trotsky’s notion of the ‘whip of external 
necessity’ below and operationalised in chapter 3. 
 At the same time as Lenin and Bukharin, who focused on the struggles of the 
main capitalist powers to divide the rest of the world between them, Rosa Luxemburg 
offered an explanation of why and how capitalism expanded into non-capitalist areas 
through the medium of state power and colonial violence. Capitalism, Luxemburg 
argued in an interpretation that has mostly been rejected as teleological by later Marxist 
political economists(Brewer, 1990:63), necessarily requires a non-capitalist ‘outside’ to 
which it can market the surplus of goods created by the insufficient purchasing power 
of the workers (Luxemburg, 2003:330). She filled out Marx’s claims on the expansionary 
nature of capitalism and its primitive accumulation in ‘arguing that capitalism was, in 
fact, surrounded by pre-capitalist economic formations, and that competitive pressures 
drive capitalist firms and capitalist states to trade with these "outside" economies and 
ultimately to break them up’(Brewer, 1990:62). In what Luxemburg called ‘natural 
economies’ (tending to elide the considerable differences amongst the non-capitalist 
areas) the peasant household largely controlled its own means of production and 
therefore had to be expelled by force from the land or access to it (Luxemburg, 
2003:349-51).  
Luxemburg has been criticized for overstretching her argument both in her 
ascription of an overall goal of consumption to capitalist social relations (which are not 
conscious agents but structures that empower and limit agents) and in her elision of all 
pre-capitalist societies to ‘natural economies’. Her relevant contribution here lies in her 
focus on the ‘the mechanisms of primitive accumulation, using force… at the margin 
where capitalist and pre-capitalist economic systems meet’ (Brewer, 1990:73). It is these 
mechanisms that prove useful in analysing the inter-relation of state formation and later 
alignments in states such as Jordan. Her central focus on how the social production 
relations of access to the means of production (most importantly, land) are transformed 
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will be adopted in chapter 4 of this thesis to examine Jordanian state-formation and in 
particular the role of the army in integrating formerly nomadic groups into the state. 
2.3.2 ‘Structuralism’: Dependency and World Systems Theory 
	  
 Luxemburg thus concerns herself with the accumulation of capital via the 
dispossession of the direct producers of the colonial world (Harvey, 2003:138, 
Luxemburg, 2003:328). This question, and in particular the place of the post-
independence states of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia in the 
international system was taken up by a later generation of theorists influenced by 
historical materialism. Under the name of ‘dependency theory’, ‘world systems theory’ 
or ‘structuralism’ this is the branch of Marxist theory that has most readily found a place 
as an accepted paradigm of IR theory (Halliday, 1994:53). The origins of dependency 
theory lie in the work of Latin American economists such as Henrique Cardoso and 
Raul Prebisch. Seeking an explanation for the persistent poverty and subordination of 
Latin American economies, Prebisch argued that the lack of ‘dynamism’ in Latin 
American economies was due to the unequal distribution of land and consequent under-
employment and restricted domestic market (Prebisch, 1971:3-4). Cardoso later revised 
this argument to take account for the degree of industrialization that had taken place in 
Latin America, characterizing this as ‘dependent capitalist development’ (Cardoso, 
1982:121). 
 A more radical version of this argument was popularized by Andre Gunder 
Frank (1971, 1978). Frank identified a system of exploitation of ‘satellites’ (the colonial, 
semi-colonial and post-colonial states) exploited by a ‘metropolis’ (the imperial powers 
of Western Europe and the US).  The means lie in the ‘unequal exchange’ (1978:103)of 
the commodities produced by the satellites: an inequality that is not challenged by the 
ruling class of the satellites who function even under conditions of nominal 
independence as a ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ sharing an interest with the metropolis. The 
satellites are not ‘developing’ or un-developed⎯they are underdeveloped, thrown 
backwards or into stagnation by the exploitative relations benefiting the metropolis. 
Frank uses the example of northeast Brazil to illustrate this point (1971:180-3). Frank 
fundamentally sees the world economy as exchange for the market, with which a 
number of forms of labour relation (e.g. slavery or serfdom) are compatible: ‘[c]apitalist 
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monopoly power reigned supreme from the very beginning’ (1971:48-9). This system 
begins with the expansion of European merchant capital in the 16th century (1978:13)12. 
No transition for the satellite society can be expected within the system: the solution is 
withdrawal from it, possibly by revolutionary means (1978:171). 
 The most influential version of the claims of dependency theory has been the 
World Systems Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein shares a periodization with 
Frank, arguing that ‘in the late fifteenth century, there came into existence what we may 
call a European world-economy’ (Wallerstein, 1974:15). This world economy, unlike 
previous world empires exacting tribute (Rome, China, the Islamic Empires and so 
forth) was ‘a kind of social system the world had not really known before….an 
economic but not a political entity’ (1974:15). The world-economy is thus united with a 
global plurality of states rather than a single empire⎯an outcome enabled by ‘the 
techniques of modern capitalism and the technology of modern science’  ((1974:15). 
This world system is the starting point for analysis of any individual state: there is ‘one 
expanding economy’ that appears as ‘various "national" (and "colonial") economies 
related through international trade’ (Hopkins, 1982:11). 
 This world economy, which is in a constant process of global expansion, is 
structured by an ‘integration of labor processes ("division of labor")’ and ‘a single set of 
accumulation processes, between its always more advanced , historically enlarging and 
geographically shifting core and its always less advanced, disproportionately enlarging 
and geographically shifting periphery’ (1982:11). These processes define three levels of 
states in the world system: the core, the periphery and the semi-periphery. The core 
states dominate the system, possess a strong state machinery and integrated national 
culture and specialize in production that requires ‘higher levels of skill and greater 
capitalization’ (Wallerstein, 1974:350). The periphery comprises ‘that geographical sector 
of it wherein production is primarily of lower-ranking goods (that is, goods, whose labor 
is less well-rewarded) but which is an integral part of the overall system of the division 
of labor’ because it produces basic commodities (1974:301). The peripheral state is 
weak, and at best semi-autonomous of the domination of the core (1974:349). In 
between, and distinguishing Wallerstein’s theory from Frank’s, we find the semi-
periphery. The states of the semi-periphery deflect peripheral anger against the core, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Although in later works Frank suggests a world system may extend back 5000 years. 
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form a kind of transmission mechanism whereby states can move up and down the 
ranks in the system (Wallerstein, 1974:350). 
 World Systems Theory has found a readier acceptance than most other versions 
of historical materialism and remains the form in which most students or scholars of IR 
will encounter Marxist concepts (Halliday, 1994:53). There are many aspects that the 
framework used in this thesis shares with World Systems Theory: such as the focus on a 
globally expanding capitalist economy structurally related to the states system and the 
way that different configurations of labour relations and classes affect the international 
relations of ‘peripheral’ states. Terence Hopkins’ argument that ‘the outward expansion 
of the capitalist world economy’ proceeds through a process of primitive accumulation, 
separating the direct producers from the means of production (Hopkins, 1982:16) is 
central to the notion of uneven and combined development used in this thesis.  
 However, there are also important differences that distinguish uneven and 
combined development from World Systems Theory and therefore suggest the 
possibility of a theoretical contribution by the former. As Fred Halliday argues, the IR 
paradigm of structuralism and the theoretical tradition of historical materialism are far 
from identical (Halliday, 1994:53). Halliday describes structuralism ‘a form of 
determinism, in the sense of denying freedom of action, or agency, to the elements in 
the structure’ and thereby different from the historical materialist emphasis on 
structures as the un-chosen circumstances in which agents make their own history 
(1994:53). This is probably unfair⎯one would struggle to find a statement from 
Wallerstein, Frank or others making such a disavowal of agency⎯ but one of the first 
critiques encountered by historical materialists is that they ignore agency. As the last 
section of this chapter argues, historical materialism rather sees structures as endowing 
the powers, capabilities and interests for action, but the criticism may spring from 
identification with a paradigm called ‘structuralism.’ 
 There is a more concrete difference in the conception of the world economy 
advanced by World Systems or Dependency theory and that of uneven and combined 
development. Wallerstein and Frank see the capitalist world economy as constituted 
primarily by market exchange (Brewer, 1990:163). This is in contrast to the traditional 
historical materialist approach, which has focused on modes of production (Laclau, 
1977:23). The forms of exploitation of labour in World Systems Theory are determined 
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by the core/periphery/ semi-periphery roles in the market but they are all, in sense, 
capitalist relations by virtue of the existence of the global capitalist market (1990:177). 
Such a perspective would seem to miss out from explanation those areas (like Jordan) 
that neither exported primary commodities nor experienced significant industrial 
investment. Are they then part of the periphery or the ‘external area’(Wallerstein, 
1974:333)? If they are part of the periphery then the content of that concept would have 
to change: if they are external to the system then the problematic relation between 
geopolitical and social relations re-emerges because, at least in the Jordanian case, the 
state and its alignments have been geopolitically important even if its economic 
importance to the core has been negligible. 
 The focus of uneven and combined development on the social relations of 
production, I argue can help move beyond this bind. The important factor for the 
version of uneven and combined development presented here is not whether or how 
much a state exports or industrialises but rather the political struggles generated by the 
particular combination of social relations of production. These combinations, varied 
and open in their trajectory, are produced by the interaction of local forms with the 
global capitalist economy through geopolitically mediated processes of primitive 
accumulation. The outcomes of the struggles they generate form the basis of 
geopolitical alignments. 
 This argument about modes of production has been made before, by ‘neo-
Marxists’ such as Ernesto Laclau (1977:34-41) and Samir Amin (1976:16-18). Their 
claim that modes of production in the periphery are not singular but ‘articulated’ within 
a ‘social formation’ is very similar to the notion of ‘combination’ used in this thesis. It is 
therefore dealt with in the section that explains that concept, drawing on the most 
sophisticated application of the concept to Arab states, that of Nazih Ayubi (1995:4). 
 2.3.3 The revival of Marxist IR and uneven and combined 
development 
	  
 How is the importation of the concept of uneven and combined development 
into IR related to this intellectual context? Its origins lie, as explained in the next 
section, in Trotsky’s writings but the idea has been extended beyond his original 
boundaries. Uneven and combined development has been re-instated in part as a 
rejoinder to those, historical materialists and others, who argue that economic 
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‘globalisation’ has led to new forms of global governance superseding the state and 
inter-state competition (see Rosenberg, 2005). In particular, uneven and combined 
development formed an intervention into the debate on the post-Cold War and 9/11 
conjuncture. On one side stood those historical materialists who saw the unprecedented 
military and economic dominance of the US, together with the expansion of global 
capital under the banner of free-market neo-liberalism, as heralding a new kind of 
system in which the ‘logics’ of capital and state were divorced: perhaps indicating even 
that Marxists had been wrong to treat them as united in the first place (Harris, 2004, 
Lacher, 2002, Lacher and Teschke, 2007, Robinson, 2007). On the other stood those 
historical materialists still concerned to defend some version of the unity of social and 
geopolitical explanation through a modes of production framework, albeit with some 
degree of autonomy in the inter-linking of these ‘two logics’ (Ashman and Callinicos, 
2006, Callinicos, 2007, 2009, Harvey, 2003). Uneven and combined development was 
taken up by Justin Rosenberg as a way of uniting these forms of explanation, arguing 
that: 
within the increasingly worldwide socio- historical process initiated by the 
emergence of modern capitalist society, relations and interactions between 
societies have been the site of distinctive causal dynamics whose operation has 
deflected the movement of events, both domestic and international, substantially 
away from anything which could have resulted from a unilinear path of 
endogenous development alone. (Rosenberg, 2005:8) 
Uneven and combined development has thus emerged⎯or re-emerged⎯ within the 
context of a debate on the relations between geopolitical and social forms of 
explanation. It is necessary to discuss here a particularly influential version of that 
relationship (and one with which the most prominent advocate of uneven and 
combined development, Justin Rosenberg, has been associated) known as ‘political 
Marxism’13. 
 The political Marxists (known as such not because of their political activism but 
because of their stress on political or ‘superstructural’ factors) base their arguments on  
Robert Brenner’s (1977) critique of Immanuel Wallerstein. Brenner argued that 
Wallerstein, and others’ explanation for the rise of capitalism imputed a ‘capitalist 
rationality [i.e. responding to expanded opportunities for capitalist exchange] in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The following section draws on Allinson, Jamie C, and Alexander Anievas. (2010a) Beyond Political 
Marxism: Their Politics and Ours. In Marxism and World Politics: Contesting Global Capitalism, edited by 
Alexander Anievas. London: Routledge. 
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situation where capitalist social relations of production did not exist’(Brenner, 1977:45). 
Brenner identifies certain ‘rules of reproduction’ in ‘social property relations’ that 
determine the pattern of economic development of any society’. They set both the 
‘possibilities and limits for economic action by individuals and collectives’ whilst 
inducing ‘the adoption by these agents of specific strategies as the best way to pursue 
their interests’ ((Brenner, 1986:26, Brenner and Harman, 2006:137). The aggregate result 
of the carrying out of these strategies constitutes the logic of the mode of production. 
One of the important implications of Brenner’s argument is to re-formulate 
the Marxist notion of the state. The main thrust of this argument has been to reject the 
traditional models of Marxist theory ‘which, explicitly or implicitly, treat the economic 
‘base’ and the legal, political, and ideological ‘superstructures’ which ‘reflect’ or 
‘correspond’ to it as ‘qualitatively different…separated spheres’ (Wood, 1981:68). 
Rather, the state is constitutive of the mode of production: in the pre-capitalist feudal 
order the lordly ruling class reproduce themselves not by organizing and managing 
production but in their ability to organise themselves politically to extract the surplus 
from the direct producers (Brenner, 2001:178, 1986:28).Capitalism is different because, 
as ‘in every class society …there are two related but distinct “moments” of class 
exploitation: the appropriation of surplus labour and the coercive power that sustains it’ 
but in capitalism the coercive power is ‘uniquely separate’ from surplus appropriation 
(2005:16). The state separate from the relations of production is therefore are an aspect 
of capitalism as a mode of production. 
These claims have important consequences for the Marxist theory of 
International Relations, although Political Marxists differ on the nature of those 
consequences. The most thorough-going application of Political Marxism to IR is the 
previously cited work by Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society, in which he argues 
that because capitalism produces the separation between the political and economic and 
hence an anarchic system of sovereign states at a global level (Rosenberg, 1994:123). 
Benno Teschke and Hannes Lacher argue rather that the states system is a contingent 
“historical legacy” of the absolutism that preceded the rise of capitalist relations in 
Europe and that capitalism may indeed tend to overcome this system (Lacher 2002, 148; 
2006, 60; Teschke 2003, 145–46).  Ellen Wood argues by contrast that capitalism 
requires the fracturing of political space, and therefore international relations, because 
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of the ‘global capital requires many nation states to…sustain the system of property and 
provide the kind of day-to-day regularity, predictability and legal order that capitalism 
needs more than any other social form’ (Wood, 2005:141) 
What is the contribution of this discussion to the theoretical framework of 
this thesis? The renewal of interest in uneven and combined development has emerged 
from this Political Marxist school and in particular from Justin Rosenberg’s work: 
however, the particular relevance of their arguments here lies in the definitions Political 
Marxism offers of modes of production and the capitalist world economy. As the earlier 
section of this chapter on Marx suggested, this thesis gives a qualified acceptance to the 
definition of the capitalist mode of production as one in which extra-economic and 
economic compulsion are separate. The world economy is then seen as the historical 
expansion of this relationship from its European origins through both ‘economic’ and 
‘geopolitical’ pressure. Benno Teschke provides a very useful summary of this point: 
[The] developmental potential of regionally differentiated sets of property 
régimes generates inter-regional unevenness, which translates into international 
pressures that spark sociopolitical crises in ‘backward’ polities. These crises 
activate and intensify the domestic fault lines in regionally pre-existing class 
constellations— processes that lead to power struggles within and between 
polities that renegotiate and transform class relations, territorial scales and state 
forms. These social conflicts result in highly specific combinations of the old 
and the new. The dynamics of domestic trajectories are thus accelerated, their 
sociological composition transformed, and their directionality deflected in 
unforeseen ways, while their results react back on the international scene. 
(2003:19) 
What Teschke refers to here as ‘property regimes’ are defined in this thesis as 
social relations of production. This distinction relates to the qualification of this thesis 
in accepting the Political Marxists’ arguments. The key tenet of the Political Marxists 
that the ‘base’ of forces of production is unimportant seems difficult to sustain once we 
recognize the ‘regional differentiation’ of social relations of production. Therefore there 
will be some accumulation of forces of production at a certain rate in a given place, 
endowing those states in which the new social relations of production prevail with 
greater capabilities to compete with or conquer other states. It is this that gives the 
imperative for so-called ‘backward’ states to attempt to change their societies in order to 
be overcome in geopolitical competition. Again, this process is recognized in Trotsky’s 
idea of the ‘whip of external necessity’ that forms a key part of uneven and combined 
development. 
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The purpose of this overview of Marxist approaches to International Relations 
has been to explain the basic concepts that are used in uneven and combined 
development and the contribution that previous Marxist thought has made. In 
particular, it provided the following substance for uneven and combined development: 
the definition of capitalism and the capitalist world economy as an inherently 
expansionary set of social relations based on the ‘dual freedom’14 of the direct 
producers; the resultant special character of those social relations in separating the 
economic and the political; the expansion of the states system reflecting this separation 
through the process of primitive accumulation. The next section presents uneven and 
combined development as a theoretical framework that synthesizes these insights and 
allows us to trace back the trajectories of particular international alignments through 
certain political struggles to the limits and opportunities provided by the uneven 
expansion of capitalist social relations. 
2.4 Uneven and Combined Development: History and 
Structure 
	  
What is uneven and combined development, then, and how does it work? As the 
explication of Marxist approaches to International Relations above has indicated, 
uneven and combined development is a part of the broader Marxist tradition and relies 
upon it for its assumptions and basic concepts. However, it does add something in 
reconfiguring those concepts for a world in which capitalist social relations are 
embedded in a system of multiple states and other kinds of society. Uneven and 
combined development offers this contribution in part because of its origin in the 
debates around such a society: Tsarist Russia. 
2.4.1 Origins of Trotsky’s Idea 
	  
The idea of uneven and combined development is most closely associated with 
the work of Leon Trotsky on Russia, although it has close parallels in Alexander 
Gerschenkron’s non-Marxist idea of ‘Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective’ 
(1965). Uneven and combined development as the corollary of the argument for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 That is, the freedom not to provide surplus but also the freedom from the means of production by 
which to be self-sufficient. 
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‘Permanent Revolution’ was Trotsky’s contribution to debates among Russian Marxists 
before and after the October Revolution. It is a revealing contribution because these 
debates, like the case of the Southern state dilemma discussed in the first chapter of this 
thesis, reflected the fact that the Russian Marxists had to orient themselves towards the 
social effects of a hierarchically organised but competitive inter-state system 
(Kagarlitsky, 1988:23). 
Trotsky’ argument contra both Lenin and his Menshevik opponents, was that 
the Russian working class could lead an internationalist socialist revolution, despite its 
small size in relation to the peasantry. The reason for this was the uneven and combined 
development of capitalism in Russia: implanting a large and militant working class in the 
midst of the ‘feudal’ society and thereby linking that society to the world economy 
(Trotsky, 1997:31).  The Russian bourgeoisie by contrast was nurtured (in the face of 
foreign competition) and protected (against the working class) by the state. 
Consequently they were led to support Tsarism. This different constellation of collective 
powers and interests did not match the expected scheme of many Marxists but rather 
the concrete history of capitalist development between the French and Russian 
revolutions (Knei-Paz, 1978:45). 
2.4.2 Unevenness 
	  
Trotsky’s argument was thus concerned to support a particular political strategy. 
However, he later generalized and extended his conception of uneven and combined 
development after the Russian Revolution and his exile from the Soviet Union in 1927. 
What did he use the terms to mean, and how can they offer insight to research on the 
International Relations of states such as Jordan? Trotsky tends to take the idea of 
‘development’ for granted: the earlier parts of this chapter therefore substantiated the 
concept based on the arguments of Marx and later historical materialists. That is, that 
what is developing is the human productive relationship with the environment and the 
associated distributions of control⎯the social relations of production, particular 
patterns of which form modes of production. 
About unevenness, Trotsky had more to say. Trotsky claimed that unevenness 
was ‘the most general law of the historic process’ (1997:27).  Put so baldly as this, the 
concept is likely to mislead⎯particularly in the use of the word ‘law’. Unevenness 
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would be better defined as a descriptive generalization rather than a covering law of the 
‘if x then y’ kind. If we can find unevenness in all things, we will be unable to explain 
anything in particular. It is the particular, historically existing ‘combination’ (discussed in 
a further section below) aspect of uneven and combined development that gives the 
concept explanatory weight in specific cases. Unevenness is the precondition of such 
combinations. Treating unevenness in this way allows us to avoid the criticism that 
uneven and combined development is an ‘analytical tool with a very restricted 
usefulness’ (Linden, 2007:160) or ‘rather vapid’ without ‘any positive contribution’ 
(Elster, 1986:54). 
If something is uneven, then there is more of it in one place or time than in 
another. We have already identified development as meaning patterned change in the 
social relations of production. In what sense can there be more of this somewhere or 
sometime than another and why would it matter? Trotsky argued that, in the case of 
Russia at least, ecological and topographical conditions⎯‘the gigantic and austere plain, 
open to eastern winds and Asiatic migrations’⎯led to the ‘ slow tempo’ of Russian 
development (Trotsky, 1997:25). This seems initially to suggest a quantitative view, of a 
larger amount or greater pace of production resulting from more favourable natural 
conditions. Yet, as Justin Rosenberg points out, Trotsky’s outline of the peculiarities of 
Russian development is very far from an ecological or technological determinism 
(Rosenberg, 2006:324).  The argument rather presupposes an interaction between the 
natural conditions that humans encounter in their collective efforts at production and 
the ‘social-historical milieu’ (Trotsky, 1972a:38)that emerges from those efforts. 
The original bases of unevenness, then, lie in the ecologically given conditions 
that originally confronted the human species and render some places more potentially 
productive than others. These ecological variations across geographical space, in turn, 
work to promote further processes of internal differentiation. However, as the social 
relations of production change, these geographical determinations become progressively 
less fundamental. Even more importantly, the character of one particular subset of the 
unevenly distributed sets of social relations⎯capitalism⎯changes the ‘overall nature of 
historical change itself ’ (Rosenberg, 2007:456). Capitalist relations emerge and become 
dominant in a particular place and time but within and through these antecedent 
processes of unevenness. From this ‘starting point’, it ‘gains mastery only gradually over 
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the inherited unevenness, breaking and altering it, employing therein its own means and 
methods’ (Trotsky, 2008:19). Reiterating Marx’s view of capitalism as inherently 
expansionary explained above, Trotsky argues further that capitalism tends towards 
both universalization and equalization, on the one hand, and differentiation and 
fragmentation, on the other. Thus: 
In contrast to the economic systems which preceded it, capitalism inherently 
and constantly aims at economic expansion, at the penetration of new 
territories, the surmounting of economic differences, the conversion of self-
sufficient provincial and national economies into a system of financial 
interrelationships.(2008:19)  
 
In doing so, however, the expansionary tendency of capitalist relations leads to 
‘developing some parts of world economy, while hampering and throwing back the 
development of others’. Trotsky goes on to note how it is ‘[o]nly the correlation of 
these two fundamental tendencies’, organically emerging from the ‘nature of capitalism’, 
that ‘explains to us the living texture of the historical process’ (2008:19). 
 Trotsky is unclear about the extent and nature of specific kinds of unevenness, 
having over-defined the concept as the ‘most general law of the historic process.’ 
However, we can distill from these passages two inter-related aspects of unevenness. 
We may refer to these as quantitative and qualitative types of unevenness. The quantitative 
kind means the accumulation of products or the capability to produce (i.e., technique, 
infrastructure and so on) in greater amount in one place or at a greater rate in one place 
rather than another. It is this simple comparison⎯by which we could say, for example 
that Baghdad in the second Hijri century was more developed than Scotland in the same 
period⎯that Trotsky could justly refer to as the ‘most general law of the historic 
process’. It represents simply the cashing out of the general abstraction of ‘production’ 
into an empirical reality where the conditions of that production are more favourable at 
other times and places than others. Even as relations of production come to re-
constitute those conditions themselves, the quantitative aspect of unevenness remains 
important. Thus capitalist relations of production in particular exert a disruptive force 
on space, ‘which establishes discrete places differentiated from each other and at the 
same time pressures these places, across borders, into a single mould’ (Ashman, 2006, 
Smith, 2006:180, see also Smith, 1990). 
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 Qualitative unevenness refers to the uneven distribution of types of social 
relations of production. How can a quality be unevenly distributed? The uneven 
distribution of social relations of production (such as tributary or capitalist relations) is a 
historical phenomenon. Certain types of these relations emerge in certain places rather 
than others. These relations have different pre-conditions, and generate different 
powers and interests. In particular, our interest lies in capitalist social relations of 
production because these provide the analytical tool for understanding the Jordanian 
case in the form of the concrete process of the attempt to impose or imitate capitalist 
social relations and the consequences of those attempts.  These attempts result from the 
enormous competitive gulf⎯the quantitative unevenness⎯opened up between 
capitalist and non-capitalist production units (Carling, 2002:110). These are important 
distinctions to draw because it is on the basis of quantitatively greater productive 
capability, resulting from the qualitative transformation of social relations that Trotsky 
integrates the social and the geopolitical through the idea of the ‘whip of external 
necessity’. 
2.4.3 The Whip of External Necessity15 
	  
How are we to understand why it is that the history of most Southern states (as 
independent states or, as in Jordan’s case through their imperial antecedents) have been 
dominated by some attempt at social ‘catch-up’ determined by the need to survive in a 
competitive international system? The influential idea of ‘revolution from above’ 
(Trimberger, 1978) has been used in the Middle East to describe and account for this 
phenomenon. However, one of the key contributions of Trotsky was to account for 
precisely this kind of attempted mimetic modernization with his account of the ‘whip of 
external necessity”, or what Colin Barker calls the dynamic of ‘coercive comparison’ 
(Barker, 2006: 78).  The ‘whip of external necessity’ is inflicted on those societies which 
have not experienced the qualitative transformation to capitalist social relations to adopt 
such transformations in response to the military-geopolitical and economic pressures 
emanating from the capitalist powers. This is a mechanism operating through the state 
system but reflecting the differences (‘unevenness’) in social production relations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This section draws on Allinson, Jamie C, and Alexander Anievas. (2010b) The Uneven and Combined 
Development of the Meiji Restoration: A Passive Revolutionary Road to Capitalist Modernity? Capital and 
Class. 
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Although Trotsky touched on other societies, such as China, he only provided 
one fully worked example, as it were, of this mechanism of uneven and combined 
development. This was, of course, Russia (Trotsky, 1997:27-35, 1972a:29-51, 1972b:5-
6). Although Davidson ((2006b:212)argues that combination may refer to social and 
cultural forms, Trotsky’s use of the concept in his account of the ‘peculiarities of 
Russian development’ derives its efficacy from the interaction of the social relations of 
production. ‘Historical backwardness (sic)’, Trotsky writes16, engenders an entirely new 
‘combined’ social formation in which the latest conquests of capitalist technique and 
structure root themselves into the pre-existing relations, transforming and subjecting 
them and creating peculiar relations of classes (1997:33).  
In the case of Russia the mode of production capitalism encountered was (in 
Trotsky’s words) feudalism. The political apparatus of that mode was simultaneously 
strengthened and undermined by the penetration of capitalism. The exigencies of 
Russia’s self-preservation ‘under the influence and the pressure of its more 
differentiated Western milieu… transmitted through the military-state organisation,’ 
compelled Russia to develop military technologies that would come to have manifold 
socio-economic implications and consequences in the longer term (1972a:41). It was 
under such geopolitical pressures that the Russian state explicitly imitated capitalist 
social relations of production (i.e. the ‘dual freedom’ of the labourer from both the 
compulsion to produce and the means of production) with the abolition of serfdom in 
1861. Additionally, Russia’s subsequent policy of industrialization was a direct response 
to the external threats to Russia’s existence coming from the West (Knei-Paz, 1978:73).  
It was strengthened in that foreign and domestic capital supported and armed the 
autocracy. It was undermined by the fact that the price of that support was reliance 
upon a concentrated and combative working class produced by the adoption of 
advanced technique as part of the ‘advantage of backwardness’: the possibility of seizing 
ready-made the most up-to-date methods. As Knei-Paz notes, the so-called ‘backward’ 
countries ‘may be said to change not from within but from without, not by evolving but 
by “grafting on”, appending, new ways of life’ (1978:91). The outcome, according to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 No stranger to the pejorative terms of his time, Trotsky’ writings often present a plethora of early 
twentieth century usages that we would rightly consider Eurocentric. However, as this chapter argues, the 
content of uneven and combined development (and, one might add, Trotsky’s entire political practice) 
work against this tendency. 
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Trotsky, was to generate the conditions for the political crisis of the revolution⎯a crisis 
then amenable to resolution by a proletarian seizure of power on the basis of the 
previous history of uneven and combined development (Lowy, 1981:1). 
The reader familiar with debates in International Political Economy will note 
here a marked similarity between Trotsky’s conception of uneven (and combined) 
development and Alexander Gerschenkron’s ‘Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective’ (1965). Although he did not acknowledge any influence, Gerschenkron 
seems to have read Trotsky and his essays bear an ‘uncanny’ similarity to Trotsky’s 
(Selwyn, 2011:423). Gerschenkron’s major proposition, which has influenced later 
political economists of development (Chang, 2002:7, Sen, 1984:9, Wade, 2004:351) is 
that:   
in a number of important historical instances industrialization processes, when 
launched at length in a backward country, showed considerable differences, not 
only with regard to the speed of development (the rate of industrial growth) but 
also with regard to the productive and organisational structures of industry 
which emerged from those processes. Furthermore, these differences in the 
speed and character of industrial development were to a considerable extent the 
result of application of institutional instruments for which there was little or no 
counterpart in an established industrial country. In addition, the intellectual 
climate within which industrialization proceeded, its "spirit" or "ideology", 
differed considerably among advanced and backward countries.(1965:6)  
 
Gerschenkron thus identifies, in a far more detailed manner than Trotsky, 
particular institutional and technical outcomes that can be mapped onto a chronological 
pattern of late development (Rosenberg, 2007:25). Gerschenkron also acknowledges a 
version of ‘combined development’ in arguing that ‘in every instance of 
industrialization, imitation of the evolution in advanced countries appears in 
combination with different, indigenously determined elements’ (Gerschenkron, 
1965:26). However, where Trotsky can be more useful Gerschenkron  is in his 
expansion of focus from the techno-industrial to the uneven and combined 
development of social relations as a whole (Selwyn, 2011:431). Gerschenkron does 
consider such relations⎯for example in his argument that serfdom and the lack of a 
unified jurisdiction were obstacles to Russian industrialization but simultaneously 
strengthened by it (Gerschenkron, 1965:18) ⎯ but for the most part his is a model built 
‘around the effects of this structure without fully conceptualizing the structure itself’ 
(Rosenberg, 2007:22). In extending the analysis to state that did not undergo significant 
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industrialization drives, I suggest it is possible to use Trotsky’s Russian-based model 
more widely.  
 How might we do this? One starting point is to clarify the relationships in 
uneven and combined development. If we can adopt a procedure so foreign to 
Trotsky’s method as drawing a graphical summary of his thought, it might look 




Figure 3 Model of Uneven and Combined Development in Russia 
 
The advantage of representing Trotsky’s account of the Russian revolution in 
this way is in order to be able to extend it beyond that example. Trotsky argued for this, 
and his writings on China (Trotsky, 1969:3-8) and elsewhere suggested are informed by 
the ideas above but never in a coherent framework. However, the content of such a 
framework could be put thus: unevenness produces combination, which produces 
distinct trajectories of social conflict in late-developers and consequently the 
international management and effects of these crises in ‘countless mini czarisms’ 
(Rosenberg, 1996:12). Thus uneven and combined development represents a feed-back 
loop of determinations that are neither purely ‘social-internal’ nor ‘geopolitical-external’ 





Figure 4 General Model of Uneven and Combined Development 
 
The body of this thesis uses the theoretical framework in this diagramme to 
analyse the case of Jordan, with the help of the definition of development and world 
economy provided by the overview of historical materialist approaches earlier in this 
chapter. That is, the investigation begins in Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the processes of 
primitive accumulation in Jordan brought about by the Ottoman attempts to ‘catch up’ 
with the West and then by British colonialism itself. The framework is then used to 
trace back the geopolitical alignments examined in chapters 5 and 6 not through some 
teleological determination but through political struggles on the bases provided by the 
particular ‘combined social formation’ of Jordan. What does this ‘combination’ mean? 
 2.4.4. Combination 
	  
Unevenness, then, produces combination. Trotsky refers, rather generally and 
elliptically, to the ‘drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining 
of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms’ (1997:27). As I 
explain below, the notion of combination bears a strong similarity to the idea of the  
‘articulation of modes of production’, which has also been used to analyse the Arab 
state (Ayubi, 1995:24-8, Brewer, 1990:225-40). These two approaches should not be 
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seen as contradictory: rather the ‘articulation’ approach, especially in the works of 
anthropologists in the ‘economic anthropology’ such as Pierre Phillipe Rey and Claude 
Meillasoux provide examples of how to fill in Trotsky’s global account.  
 In advancing such an analysis I am extending Trotsky’s notion of uneven and 
combined development somewhat beyond the boundaries of what he considered 
combination to be and the level at which it functions. Knei-Paz argues that Trotsky 
considered uneven and combined development applicable only to a set of countries 
similar to Russia: independent states adopting ‘catch-up’ industrialisation in order to 
compete militarily with others such as Germany, France or Britain (1978:63-4). Neil 
Davidson, for example, argues that a mere ‘articulation’ of two or more modes of 
production (I expand on the distinction between combination and articulation below) is, 
by itself, insufficient to be considered a ‘combined’ society. Rather, ‘[t]he detonation of 
the process of uneven and combined development requires sudden, intensive 
industrialisation and urbanisation, regardless of whether the pre-existing agrarian 
economy was based on feudal or capitalist relations’. In this reading combination is the 
internal effect of global uneven development (Davidson, 2006a:23). Jordan, being a 
colonial creation rather than a historically independent state and bereft of a large, new 
industrial working class in the period under discussion, would then be of little relevance 
to discussions of uneven and combined development and vice versa. 
 The implications of Trotsky’s idea may usefully extend, however, beyond the 
boundaries of its most famous instance. This task of theoretical extension has already 
been undertaken by Justin Rosenberg in three distinct, but interconnected ways. First, 
combined development refers to the coexistence and interactive development of all 
societies throughout history⎯that is, at a level between as well as within societies. 
Second, through these processes of inter-societal development, there results an 
interdependence of ‘the structures of social, material and cultural life’ (Rosenberg, 
2006:324). This combination integrates the state and society into ‘regional political 
orders, cultural systems and material divisions of labour ’(2006:324). Finally, through 
this, more extended version of combined development, there occurs the interlacing and 
fusion of different modes of production in Trotsky’s original sense.   
This discussion is relevant because it suggests how uneven and combined 
development can be used to understand the Jordanian case. Jordan⎯or rather the area 
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that became Jordan⎯did not use the ‘advantages of backwardness’ in order to leap 
ahead in quantitative development. However, it was integrated into a particular global 
order, a world economy based on capitalist social relations. The attempts to mimic or 
impose those relations (primitive accumulation) ‘combine’ certain social relations (the 
tribes of the tributary mode discussed below and in chapter 3) within the social 
formation and between it and the capitalist world economy through a particular 
mechanism of combination. This kind of combination need not be a market mechanism 
(e.g. the export of cash crops, industrialization drives and so-on). Indeed the value of 
using the idea of combination is that it allows us to see non-capitalist or non-market 
social relations of production as combined with the capitalist world economy. The idea 
of combination was not used by Trotsky in this way, but it was nevertheless implicit 
(Barker, 2006:72).   
This idea that two or more modes of production can coexist and interconnect in 
a single social formation17 has already been put to use in the extensive analysis of the 
state in the Arab world by Nazih Ayubi (1995). Ayubi’s work draws on an extensive 
debate in the Marxist literature (Alavi et al., 1982, Foster-Carter, 1978, Laclau, 1977, 
Wolpe, 1980). The basic idea is that ‘that modes of production in the Middle East are 
often not singular and uni-dimensional but rather are articulated (i.e. two or modes can 
often coexist and interlink); and (b) that in many Middle Eastern social formations there 
is little correspondence among the various “instances” or manifestations of structural 
power in society’ (1995:26). The distinction between ‘combination’ and ‘articulation’ is 
thus a very slim one, and they may indeed be seen as the same phenomenon. The 
advantage of using the term uneven and combined development is that it directs our 
view to the origin of the combination in the unevenness of capitalist development and 
allows us to specify the particular mechanisms of combination. 
Ayubi follows Laclau and Mouffe in defining articulation as ‘any practice 
establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of 
the articulatory practice’ (1995:28). This is a rather broad definition: in an earlier work 
Laclau refers to ‘economic systems’ as ‘constituted by the ‘articulation of modes of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This is quite a different view from, for example, Hamza Alavi, who sees modes of production as only 
ever being in contradiction within a social formation, requiring therefore the concept of a ‘colonial mode 
of production’ to characterize the coercive processes of primitive accumulation in the Global South. See 
Alavi, Hamza. (1982) The Structure of Peripheral Capitalism. In Introduction to the Sociology Of "Developing 
Societies", edited by Hamza Alavi and Theodor Shanin. London: Macmillan. pp187-9 
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production’ (Laclau, 1977:42). One of the criticisms of the notion of articulation is that 
it is vague about the nature of the dominance or predominance of one mode of 
production over another (Wolpe, 1980:36). Ayubi specifies this relationship by referring 
to Althusser’s idea of different "levels" or instances of the social whole’, such as the 
ideological, economic or coercive, which may then be in a state of  ‘dislocation’ (decolage) 
between each other (Althusser and Balibar, 2009:110). Ayubi adopts this approach to 
argue that the Arab state modes of production, coercion and consent are dislocated or 
non-correspondent18. Therefore one finds ‘ an articulation between… cultural elements 
of pre-capitalist mode of production and certain social and cultural elements of pre-
capitalist (e.g. feudalist, even slavery) modes of coercion and persuasion’ (1995:27). As a 
result the state is unable to mobilise a ‘historic bloc’ (Ayubi taking the term from 
Gramsci) and on the one hand becomes fierce but brittle in its relations with internal 
society and ‘circulationist’ (in the sense of redistributing rents acquired from outside) in 
its external relations (1995:25).  
Articulation may thus characterise all epochs and social formations, registering 
the difference between a mode of production conceived in the abstract and the concrete 
social formation in which certain relations of production operate (Amin, 1976:16-17, 
Brewer, 1990:223-31, Foster-Carter, 1978). Combination, however, is a particular subset 
of articulation in which one of the modes— and it seems only capitalist relations 
possess this characteristic—impels the simultaneous transformation and reconstitution 
of the other. Uneven and combined development thus builds on Ayubi’s use of 
articulation by specifying a particular dynamic of capitalism that gives us as a starting 
point for analysis. That starting point, as I argued above, is the attempted imitation or 
imposition (with varying results) of the primitive accumulation process. The resulting 
combined formation displays a particular mechanism of combination between the pre-
existing social relations and the global capitalist system mediated through the 
contradictory results of primitive accumulation. This sketch is based on Trotsky and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 There seems to be a close resemblance here between Ayubi’s articulation and non-correspondence and 
Kamran Matin’s pioneering application of uneven and combined development to the pre-modern Iranian 
state. Matin sees a combination of different forms of authority (corresponding to different modes of 
socioeconomic organization) ruling over a particular geopolitical space within which they related to the 
(pre existing) social reproductive texture without (necessarily) transforming … the actual process and 
organisation of labour and/or the basic forms and mechanism of surplus extraction’ Matin, Kamran. 
(2007) Uneven and Combined Development in World History: The International Relations of State-
Formation in Premodern Iran. European Journal of International Relations 13:419-47.p.429 
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Ayubi, but how would its content work for Jordan? Suitable tools to fill in the 
‘combined’ part of the Jordanian picture are to be found in the work of anthropologists 
working within the articulation approach, such as Claude Meillasoux and Pierre Phillipe 
Rey. 
 These ‘new economic anthropologists’ put the idea of articulation of modes of 
production to work in their research in West Africa. The results provide insights for a 
way to analyse Jordan. The main argument first of all of P.P. Rey in relation to Congo is 
that the relations of a pre-capitalist ‘lineage’ mode of production were interlocked those 
of the capitalist mode of production according to the epochs of the expansion of 
capitalism (Dupre and Rey, 1980:141).  
The lineage mode, Rey claims comprises two classes⎯juniors and 
elders⎯largely carrying out production within their own households but extract a 
surplus via the exchange of dependent women and slaves (Dupre and Rey, 1980:142-3, 
Meillassoux, 1981:81). The preconditions for capitalism in the form of labourers free 
both from the coercion to produce and the means to do so are therefore not generated 
by this mode. As capitalist relations of production expand there follows ‘an initial link in 
the sphere of exchange, where interaction with capitalism reinforces the pre-capitalist 
mode’ and then a phase in which capitalism ‘takes root’, subordinating the pre-capitalist 
mode but still making use of it’(Foster-Carter, 1978).  The colonial period of forcibly 
changing the lineage relations in order to be able to recruit labourers, and the increasing 
penetration of European goods led to two phenomena: the reconstitution of the elders 
as interlocutors for the colonial power on the one hand and the monetarization of the 
dowry (the means of the circulation of un-free female labour, the circulation of male 
labour being destroyed by the abolition of slavery) (Brewer, 1990:250). This, Rey argues, 
lies behind the ‘tribalization’ of Congolese politics. 
The important thing here is not the content of Rey and Meillassoux’s claims 
about the Congo and West African societies but the structure of the argument. Rey 
identifies a particular historical form of the circulation of economic surplus under the 
lineage mode of production⎯the bride price⎯that is transformed and reconstituted by 
the process of primitive accumulation. That process is managed by the elders of the 
lineage mode integrated into the colonial state, with later consequences for its political 
trajectory. The claims about the lineage mode of production in Africa and its 
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transformation may or may not be true: the contribution of French economic 
anthropology to this thesis is in offering a map of how combination can work. 
Following Rey’s example, I look therefore for the main extractive mechanisms of a pre-
capitalist mode that are reconstituted, transformed or replaced by the primitive 
accumulation process. This is what leads to the propositions examined in chapters 4 and 
5: that the end of raiding for khuwwa tribute transformed social relations in the 
Jordanian steppe and that the integration of the former khuwwa  takers into British 
colonial state established a combinatory mechanism through the British subsidy. This 
subsidy was then the subject of the later struggles around Jordanian international 
alignment, fought out on the basis of the social forces produced by the foregoing 
history of combined development. I am here borrowing from Rey to fill in the boxes of 
the generalised model of uneven and combined development presented in figure 3.  
 Ayubi is also influenced by Rey and Meillassoux in his characterization of pre-
capitalist relations in the Arab world amongst nomadic groups as a lineage mode of 
production(Ayubi, 1995:53-4). In the following chapter I propose that these relations 
are better characterised in the areas I analyse as tributary, but of a particularly fractured 
nature because of the topographical and climactic conditions of the area in question. 
However, an excursus into the contrast with the idea of a ‘lineage mode of production’ 
is useful here because it addresses a question about a major term both in this thesis and 
that of other literature on the subject: ‘tribe’. One must be able to describe the named 
social organisations such as the Huwaytat or Bani Sakhr which appear at the decisive 
moments discussed in the historical parts of this thesis and which would generally be 
referred to in Arabic as qaba’il orʿashaa’ir (tribes). Yet doing so runs the risk of spiraling 
off into acceptance of the categories of colonial administrators, inflected with a 
generous dose of assumptions about the inherently ‘tribal’ nature of the Arab mind (see 
Layne, 1994, Massad, 2001, Shyrock, 1997). One may also end up conflating the practice 
of pastoral nomadism, the form of social organisation of the ‘tribe’ and the cultural 
marker of ‘bedouin’ identity (Eickelman, 2002:66). To add to the difficulty, the 
discourse of tribe and tribal identity is both readily used by the actors concerned in this 
thesis and is a fairly common phenomenon across the Arab world: raising questions of 
whether a historical materialist approach that is not based on such categories is 
appropriate for our analysis. 
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 The first point to note is that although the tribe is a language of kinship in social 
organisation: it is not largely a genetic or biological relationship. Meillassoux’s use of the 
concept of the lineage mode of production in the African context is explicitly designed 
to remove the ‘pretext for exotic fantasies’ about tribes (Meillassoux, 1981:x). Ayubi’s 
claim that the lineage or kin-ordered mode of production is articulated with capitalist 
relations such that ‘coercive and/or persuasive aspects of the “lineage mode of 
production” may continue to survive even when the economic (e.g. pastoral) base of 
such a mode might have declined or even disappeared’ (1995:28) is important because it 
is very close to my own argument.  Ayubi characterises the lineage/kin-ordered mode as 
one in which social roles are defined by notional blood relations and hence the tribe 
(1995:51). Rey and Meillasoux recognize that kinship and lineage are not biological 
relations but rather an ideological structure of social relations into which it is perfectly 
possible to integrate people not biologically related to one another. Rather, ‘kinship 
expresses the social relations which form the basis of social cohesion but is not the basis 
itself’ (Dupre and Rey, 1980:142). The clan, lineage or tribe, Rey argues, functions as a 
‘production unit’ over land that is not alienable by exchange or war (1980:144). The 
same is true of the tribes discussed in this thesis. As Ayubi recognises people belonging 
to the same tribe are not all actually descended from a common ancestor and their 
claims to co-sanguinity are rather a particular way of laying claims to a ‘share of social 
labour’ (1995:53).    
              The tribe is thus best conceived of as a ‘unit of subsistence’ regulating access to 
certain productive resources such as pastures(Marx, 1977:344). The kinship relations 
that are claimed as the basis of the tribe are part of this regulatory infrastructure, 
assigning certain groups to positions as the takers or givers of tribute (1977:353-6).  
Most often the tribute givers are sedentary communities of direct producers and the 
takers nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists who practice both animal husbandry 
within individual households and the taking of tribute (Eickelman, 2002:71, Rogan, 
1994:48, Tell, 2000:35). These are not the relations of a mode of production sui generis	 
but rather a particular example of how tributary relations fray out and fracture into 
smaller segments where the unity of coercive power on which they are based is 
frustrated by topography or difficult climatic conditions. The addition of this 
conceptualization of the pre-capitalist relations in Jordan, based upon Rey and 
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Meillassoux’s approach directs our attention to the combination of these relations with 
the capitalist world economy in particular through the breakdown of khuwwa and its 
replacement by British subsidy. 
Where is all this happening? The common concept of the concrete unit of 
analysis for uneven and combined development and articulation-based approaches such 
as that of Ayubi or Samir Amin is that of ‘social formation’ (Althusser and Balibar, 
2009:231, Amin, 1976, Ayubi, 1995:16, Wolpe, 1980:34). Samir Amin defines a social 
formations as ‘ concrete, organised structures that are marked by a dominant mode of 
production and the articulation around a complex group of modes of production that 
are subordinate to it’ through analysis of which ‘ we discover how one mode of 
production predominates over the others, and how these modes of production are 
interconnected’ (Amin, 1976:16-17). Jordan, the concrete object of this thesis represents 
such a formation. Why use this term rather than simply talk about ‘Jordan’? Of course, 
as a short-hand, ‘Jordan’ is used throughout the rest of this work but the advantage of 
considering the object of analysis as a social formation rather than simply the juridicial 
and political abstraction denoted by the name of the state is that it allows to consider 
why there is a ‘Jordan’ and what kind of thing it is.  
2.5 States, Ideas and Agents in Uneven and Combined 
Development 
	  
 The concept of a social formation brings us closer therefore to the named 
entities and people who appear as agents in the rest of thesis: the states of Jordan, 
Britain, Egypt and so on; the Jordanian National Movement and Arabist ideologies; 
King Hussein, Nasser and John Glubb. Where do the links run between these features 
and dramatis personae of the research and the historical materialist framework of uneven 
and combined development presented so far? 
 2.5.1 The Problem of the State 
	  
 One of the most long-standing and toughest problems in Marxist theory has 
been the issue of the state and its relationship to the class struggle and social relations of 
production. The problem has not been resolved, although there is now a great deal of 
Marxist work on the state (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978, Jessop, 1982, Therborn, 
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2008). One of the great criticisms of historical materialism is that it lacks a coherent 
theory of the state, oscillating between visions of the state as ‘an epiphenomenon 
(simple or complex) of an economic base … an instrument of class rule…[or]a factor of 
cohesion performing socially necessary as well as class functions’ (Jessop, 1982:20). It 
may be noted that these debates refer to the capitalist state, thereby sharpening the 
criticism that Marxism lacks a theory of the state that would apply to non-capitalist 
societies and thereby to the particular nature of interactions between states. 
 Yet, might it be possible to turn a perceived weakness into an advantage for 
research? Historical materialism may not base its claims on a theory of states in general, 
and thereby the assumption that states will behave in certain ways across time periods, 
cultures and geographical areas. However, Marxist theorists have developed a historical 
perspective on the state and particularly on the distinction between states under 
capitalist and pre-capitalist relations. Making such distinction allows us to grasp that the 
state as ‘an abstract construct [of]…the ensemble of institutions and personnel that 
possess the exclusive right to public power (or to the legitimate use of force) within a 
certain territorial society’ (Ayubi, 1995:30) is actually a fairly recent arrival in the Middle 
East, with consequences for the inter-relations amongst these ‘ensembles’ in the region.  
 Although historical materialist perspectives on the state differ greatly in many 
respects, they have settled on a key distinction of the capitalist state, one to which 
reference has been made in the previous sections of this chapter. This is that because 
‘the form which exploitation takes under capitalism does not depend on the direct use 
of force but ‘un-comprehended laws of reproduction’ (Holloway and Picciotto, 
1978:31). The relations of force are ‘abstracted from the immediate process of 
production and located in an instance standing apart from the direct 
producers…constituting discrete "political" and "economic" spheres’ (Holloway and 
Picciotto, 1978:31, see also Jessop, 1982, Rosenberg, 1994). So, where organised 
coercion is united with exploitation of the direct producers in pre-capitalist modes, 
under capitalism these are separated and the name given to the institutionalized 
command over coercion is the ‘state’, and to exploitation, ‘the economy’. 
The contribution of uneven and combined development is to see this form as 
adopted, through imitation or conquest, in places where different social relations of 
production had previously held: social relations in which coercive power and economic 
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extraction were unified⎯resulting in a combined formation with its own dynamics and 
trajectories. Chapters 3 and 4 make use of this aspect of the framework in explaining the 
Jordanian case. 
 Doing so offers an advantage over the theories of omni-balancing reviewed in 
the previous chapter. In these theories, the post-colonial state is placed on a continuum 
of ‘stateness’ (Nettl, 1968:562) whose model	 is the Euro-Atlantic model of a legitimate 
power centre. From the post-colonial state’s inadequate achievement of this model and 
hence its dissociation from the society it rules flows the necessity of ‘balancing’ amongst 
enemies foreign and domestic (David, 1991:235). State behaviour is thus explained by a 
negative comparison with a more ‘advanced’ example⎯as Arab states’ institutions gain 
more autonomy and legitimacy they conform increasingly to a ‘neo-realist’ model of 
external behaviour (Mufti, 1996:8). My theoretical framework rather looks to explain 
state behaviour by examining how the postcolonial Arab (in this case study, Jordan) 
state is embedded in a society that differs substantively rather than negatively from the 
European example but in a patterned and therefore comprehensible way.  
 2.5.2 Agents, Ideas and Classes 
	  
 Of course, what is examined in the rest of this thesis is not just the structural 
character of the state but state policy as a site of struggle between people holding 
different ideas. When looking, for example at the response of Ottoman administrators 
to the growing gap with Western European states in the 19th century, at the efforts of 
British colonialists to pacify the Transjordanian steppe seventy years later or the 
reactions of King Hussein to the geopolitical events of the 1950s, we are looking at 
agents and their decisions. It is important to understand what the structures of social 
relations in the theoretical framework of this chapter represent. These are not agents, 
but rather the ‘rules and resources’ that both provide and limit agents’ ‘ability to bring 
about some alteration in the course of events’ (Callinicos, 1987:85). As the first chapter 
of this thesis indicated, there are many accounts of Jordanian alignments in the 1950s 
that rely, as one might expect, on King Hussein’s role as the primary decision maker. 
These are not necessarily wrong but they have omitted the role of structures, which 
omission this thesis seeks to make good. In doing so, however, it should be borne in 
mind that to ‘say that social structures have explanatory autonomy is to say that they 
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cannot be eliminated from the explanation of social events…not…that individuals and 
their attributes, can or should be eliminated’ (1987:83). The structures involved might be 
those of international anarchy or the symbolic system of Arab nationalism. The concrete 
argument of this thesis, which can only be judged by the evidence brought forward in 
later chapters, is that in seeking to alter events for geopolitical reasons, agents had to 
attempt to change social relations of production or rely on the mobilisation of 
collectivities produced by those relations. 
 What would make such collectivities conscious of themselves as such and 
amenable to mobilisation? The decisions examined later in this thesis were made in the 
context of the struggle over a particular collectivity, the ‘Arab nation’ and Jordan’s place 
within it (Anderson, 2005:5-6). This might seem grounds to adopt approaches such as 
those of Michael Barnett (1998) or Marc Lynch, who see Hussein’s foreign policy as 
reflecting a ‘relationship between identity politics and the definition of interests’ that 
‘necessarily rests on a definition of Jordanian identity in relation to the Arab order and 
in relation to Palestinian nationalism’ (Lynch, 1999:21). Indeed, one cannot analyse the 
period under discussion in this period without reference to the development of Arab 
nationalism as state doctrine and popular force. However, particular kinds of Arab 
nationalism (for we should perhaps speak of Arab nationalisms in the plural) appealed 
to certain social groups at certain times and not to others, and Jordan in the 1950s 
represented an especially sharp clash between two such versions. The Hashemites had 
their own version of Arab nationalist discourse, counter-posed to that of the Jordanian 
National Movement and the Left (Anderson, 2005:2). Understanding why this was the 
case, and the resulting consequences for geopolitical alignments, requires us to step 
outside the discourse itself and to the social classes to which particular discourses might 
appeal. 
Is it legitimate, however, to use analytical categories such as ‘class’ here? The 
historical agents themselves only rarely articulate their own identity and the wellsprings 
of their action in such terms. More specific to the Arab world and to Jordan is the 
problem that class is not easily identified in the region and vertical divisions of tribe or 
sect more salient – in particular ‘the arid marches of Southeastern Syria that evolved 
into Trans-Jordan’ in which ‘pastoral nomadism loomed large in agricultural production 
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and “security groups” based on localized loyalties to village and clan overwhelmed any 
wider consciousness of class’ (Tell, 2008:7). 
 It is not easy to define class in a way that is completely distinct from such status 
groups, occupations or the particular organised units of a given political system. Marx 
often used the word in this way, amongst others. Nonetheless, the extension of 
historical materialist research to non-capitalist societies in works (see Batatu, 2004, 
Croix, 1981) has clarified the term, however. Class is a relationship, rather than a thing, 
referring to: ‘the collective social expression of the fact of exploitation, the way in which 
exploitation is embodied in a social structure’ where exploitation means ‘the 
appropriation of part of the product of the labour of others’ (1981:43). This 
appropriation divides the population into groups ‘identified by their position in the 
whole system of social production, defined above all according to their relationship 
(primarily in terms of degree of ownership or control) to the means of 
production’(Croix, 1981:43). Thus the patterns of social relations of production, 
discussed at length above, generate class.  
However, in the actual conjunctures of history present a far messier picture, 
especially in those societies in which two ‘polar classes’ of workers and bourgeoisie are 
difficult to identify much less map to particular ideologies and outcomes (Ayubi, 
1995:175). It is useful to turn to Ayubi’s re-reading of Gramsci and Althusser in the 
Arab context, which can add much-needed dimension of the explanation of ideologies 
to uneven and combined development. Ayubi, drawing on Gramsci and Althusser, sees 
ideologies (such as Arab nationalism) as attempts to ‘interpellate’ a ‘historic bloc’ of 
classes around a particular conception of the state, society and individual: the result of 
which, if successful, is the ‘integral state’ which is ‘not confined to the government but 
includes certain aspects of the civil society and is based on hegemony and leadership’ 
(Ayubi, 1995:8). Seeking to represent the interests of all classes under the leadership of 
one, or a fraction of one, such ideologies address or ‘interpellate’ members of various 
classes as part of a greater collectivity: a ‘national-popular’ form (1995:28). For this 
reason, different ideological discourses⎯or versions of the same one⎯can share almost 
all significant elements but represent different social classes and their conflict. One 
might point to the symmetry between Hashemite and radical or Nasserist versions of 
Arab nationalism as a case of this: both stressing the original unity of the Arab nation 
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and the need to defend it against foreign plots but with diametrically opposed 
determinate content in their definition of who the enemy is (atheistic Communism in 
the Hashemite version, Israel and Western imperialism in the radical one) and what the 
nation should look like (a conservative monarchy versus a broadly egalitarian, often 
republican vision).  
 Ayubi traces the particular flexibility and fluidity of ideologies such as Arab 
nationalism to the ‘articulated’ (or in the terms used here, combined) nature of the social 
formations of the Arab world and the consequent ‘lack of class hegemony in society’ 
(1995:173). Although one should avoid assuming that class hegemony is a normal 
characteristic, the lack of which would explain certain outcomes, this thesis does adopt 
Ayubi’s approach of seeing conflicts expressed in ideological terms as linked to struggles 
for hegemony in a ‘variegated and fluid…class structure’ (1995:175). In particular, Ayubi 
offers a useful characterization, expanded on in chapter 5 of this thesis of the 
‘intermediate class categories’ produced by the ‘overdevelopment of the peripheral state’ 
(1995:177). These groups, often called the ‘new effendiyya’, to distinguish them from the 
old notable class of the Ottoman Empire, who would most often form the leadership of 
nationalist movements (1995:136). The rank and file of such movements, however, was 
most often composed of diverse urban milieu, which Ayubi colourfully characterizes as 
‘the pseudo-proletariat, the sub-proletariat, and the lumpen-proletariat’ (1995:178). The 
mobilisations of these ‘social groups and fragments’ most often consist of ‘spontaneous, 
street politics…food riots, violent demonstrations and challenging “mass prayers” 
…that can bring together elements of the middle strata and elements of the proletaroid 
groups’(1995:179). This perspective will be used in Chapters 5 and 6 where the thesis 
examines the instances of political struggle that came to determine Jordan’s alignments 








The purpose of this chapter has been to elaborate the theoretical framework of 
uneven and combined development and how it will be put to use in the empirical part 
of the thesis. Introducing such a concept – unfamiliar to most international relations 
scholars and undergirded with a further analytical and ontological apparatus from 
outside the discipline – runs the risk of confusion, however. Let us then recapitulate in 
summary form the main elements of the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter: 
Development: This refers to patterned change in the social relations of production. Those 
social relations are best conceived through the abstraction of ‘modes of production.’ 
Modes of production consist of a particular arrangement of control – i.e. a structure of 
social relations – that brings together labour and the means of production. 
Unevenness: This refers to the chronologically and geographically unequal distribution of 
the patterned change in social relations defined above, and of the production resulting 
from those relations. Unevenness is therefore both qualitative and quantitative. In this 
thesis I am interested in the results of quantitative unevenness – the military superiority 
of Western powers leading to threat or conquest – resulting in the distribution of 
qualitative unevenness in the form of the imitation or imposition of capitalist social 
relations of production. 
Primitive Accumulation: This is the precondition of the operation of capitalist social 
relations. It means the separation of the labourer both from the coercive power of the 
taker of surplus and from the means by which to carry out independent production. It is 
the long term, historically visible process of imitation or imposition that constitutes 
qualitative unevenness. It does not necessarily reach the ideal type of perfectly free 
labour in a capitalist market but interacts with existing social relations to produce a 
combined social formation. This is the basis for the arguments of chapters 3 and 4 
about the land and military in Jordan. 
Combination: This is the effect of unevenness. It means the causal interaction of different 
kinds of social relations of production, which can be classified into modes of 
production. It operates both within the social formation and between it and the global 
capitalist system. It directs us therefore toward particular, concrete historical 
mechanisms of combination, which I hypothesise in the Jordanian case lie in the British 
subsidy to the armed forces and therefore to the pastoralists whose tribute based 
economy broke down by the mandate period.  
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The task of the rest of this thesis is to see if the theoretical framework elaborated in the 




3. Ottoman Transjordan and the Emergence of a 
Combined Social formation 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to begin the application of the theoretical 
framework outlined in the previous chapter by elucidating the origins of a combined 
social formation in the lands that became Jordan. My claim here is not that the Ottoman 
reforms of the mid-nineteenth century determined geopolitical alignments of a state not 
then formed. Rather I seek to trace the processes by which a social base, both 
empowering and constraining, was established for Hashemite rule and consequently for 
the geopolitical alignments necessary to maintain that rule within a wider regional 
context itself deriving from processes of uneven and combined development. The main 
argument of the chapter is that the Ottoman programme of mimetic reforms 
undertaken as a response to what corresponding to the ‘whip of external necessity’, 
beginning thereby the process of combination by which tributary surplus extraction was 
eventually transformed into the circulation of British subsidy. 
 
To use uneven and combined development to understand this—or any—
concrete social formation we must specify what is uneven, what is combined and why 
this combination matters. This chapter does so by analysing the beginnings of 
‘Jordanian’ social formation as a case of liminal social relations on the edge of a tributary 
state. The first section of the chapter thus defines the nature of these relations and how 
they worked in practice in the sub-Syrian steppe. Then the argument proceeds to 
explain how the broader Ottoman social formation, a predominantly tributary state, was 
rendered ‘uneven’ in its contest with the European capitalist states. I attempt to 
establish how this geopolitical dynamic, rooted in the consequences of the competitive 
gap opened up by capitalist relations, led to Ottoman and mandate efforts to implant 
capitalist property norms in the Transjordanian steppe. The chapter thus substantiates 
the claim of the theoretical framework that uneven and combined development 
comprises, as I have characterised it, a process by which the uneven development of 
social relations is mediated through geopolitical competition to produce combined 
social formations which then themselves feed back into the geopolitical system that 
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produced them. The next section then provides an analytical history of the Ottoman 
attempt at mimetic modernization through the 1858 Land Code and the extension of 
state power into areas dominated by fragmented tributary relations. In the final part of 
the chapter I explain how the legacy of this process affected the emergence of the 
combined social formation of Jordan and in particular how the central extractive 
relationship of the taking of ‘brotherly’ tribute (khuwwa) changed without polarizing the 
tribe. 
 
3.1 Understanding the Ottoman Period: Tributary Social 
Relations  
 
   The purpose of this thesis, it will be recalled, is to offer an explanation for the 
geopolitical alignments of an Arab state that does not rely on the method of explanation 
by absence of Western characteristics. The uneven and combined development of social 
relations of production, I propose, offers such an explanation. To investigate this claim 
we must reach back into the pre-colonial history of the lands that became Jordan in 
order to establish exactly what was ‘uneven’ and what was ‘combined’, in the sense 
established in the previous chapter. As was briefly mentioned in that section, the 
prevailing social relations of production in the sub-Syrian steppe—later combined with 
the global system via the British subsidy—are best characterised as fragmented tributary 
ones. What does this claim mean, however, and where is the evidence to support it? 
 3.1.1 Tribes, Power and Tributary Social Relations of Production 
 
The tributary mode of production represents, in the terms of the theoretical 
framework established in the previous chapter, one of the limited set of abstractions of 
how social relations of production are structured. Its key distinguishing attribute lies in 
the specific form ‘in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers’ 
(Marx, 1978:927). As we saw from the argument of the previous chapter, tributary 
relations are those in which the direct producers control the means of production but 
do not appropriate the surplus themselves. Therefore, the relations between the (usually 
agrarian) direct producer and the exploiter are ‘political’ rather than ‘economic’ in that 
they are based on ‘non-economic compulsion’—contrasted by Marx with the free 
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bargaining between capitalist and wage-worker in a capitalist economy’ (Hilton, 1990:5). 
In this contrast and within the schema of Marxist economic categories, workers 
exchange their labour power for wages in a market relation because only through doing 
so can they access the means of production and thereby reproduce themselves: the 
agrarian direct producers of the tributary mode (peasants, villeins, fellahin, reaya19 or 
however they may be known) generally have the means to reproduce themselves but 
render some portion of the surplus to a ruling class that exercises  ‘actual or potential 
violence, that is… physical force and ideology’ (Haldon, 1993:77) to appropriate this 
surplus. The transition from the latter to the former type of relationships constitutes the 
primitive accumulation process discussed in the previous chapter, and whose particular 
history in Jordan and its predecessors forms the substance of uneven and combined 
development that underlies the later geopolitical trajectory of the state. 
 
   Conceiving of the tributary mode in this way allows us to overcome certain 
problems in the historical sociology of the Middle East: one is the supposedly sui generis 
nature of European society contrasted with a stereotyped vision of stagnant Eastern 
despotism into which Europeans expanded; and the other is the nature of the ‘tribe’ as 
an apparently ‘super-structural’ organisation that modifies supposedly more basic 
economic relationships. These two inter-linked problems distill a number of theoretical 
confusions and cul-de-sacs that await any historical sociological discussion of pre-
capitalist communities outside of Western Europe. These derive from the most part 
either from adherence to or zealous rejection of the notion of an ‘Asiatic mode of 
production’ comprising a despotic state (perhaps encumbered with the obligation to 
irrigate wide, arid lands) ruling over autarkic village communities that held land in 
common as a vestige of a ‘tribal’ mode. This picture is then contrasted with the model 
of free towns and decentralized sovereignty in feudal Europe, which then accounts for 
the rise of European capitalism to later dominance. This story has been enthusiastically 
and repeatedly debunked (Anderson, 1980:465-95). Autarkic village communities often 
turn out to have been neither autarkic nor communal.  Contrary to the claims of 
scholars such as Mustafa Hamarneh (Hamarneh, 1985:77) historical studies of the lands 
that became Jordan show that hamlets and bedouin tribes traded with each other and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The Arabic and Ottoman Turkish words for settled cultivators. 
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with Palestinian and Syrian towns and show evidence of private ownership (certainly of 
private cultivation) in land (Fischbach, 2000:38, Mundy, 1994:78).  Nonetheless, if we 
strip away the intellectual chaff about ‘idyllic republics’ forming a ‘solid foundation for 
stagnant Asiatic despotism’ we find a rational kernel.  
 3.1.2 Tribes, Tribute and Coercive Power 
 
 That kernel lies in seeing (‘Western’) feudalism and (‘Eastern’) tribute-paying 
societies not as different modes of production rendering the respective geographical 
areas dynamic or stagnant but rather to place these empirically observable relations 
along a continuum generated by the dynamic of tributary mode itself. This then also 
allows us to understand the tribe as a ‘unit of subsistence’ (Marx, 1977:344). To explain: 
I follow Samir Amin (1976:14) and John Haldon (1993:64) in accepting that European 
feudalism was a variant of tributary social relations. Whether surplus is appropriated by 
(feudal) rent or (tributary) tax is not a fundamental difference but a variation in the 
‘control exercised by the ruling class, or the state or state class over the community’ and  
‘while this certainly affects the rate of exploitation, it does not affect the actual nature of 
the mode of surplus appropriation’(Haldon, 1993:65). Indeed, the practice of khuwwa, 
the taking of tribute by pastoral nomads from settled cultivators, occupies a crucial place 
in the argument of this thesis and represents a further variant of tributary surplus 
appropriation.  The variation in control by the appropriators of surplus is the important 
distinction and it derives from the basic dynamic of tributary relations. 
 
 An analogy with Robert Brenner’s characterization of the dynamic capitalist 
relations is useful here.  Brenner sees capitalist relations, and their periodic crises, as 
driven by two fundamental divisions: the horizontal division between capital and labour 
and the vertical one between competing units of capital (Brenner, 2006:6-7). We may 
identify two similar basic divisions within the tributary mode. The first of these is the 
horizontal one between direct producer and the appropriator of the surplus: the 
appropriation ‘resisted more or less strongly and in many different ways, ranging from 
labour service inadequately performed to open rebellion…[that is] the conflict of 
classes, central to Marxist theory’ (Hilton, 1990:5). The tributary mode’s unity of 
economic and extra-economic coercion, however, means that the vertical division lies 
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not between units competing via the market but between central and local control of the 
coercive power by which surplus is extracted. This explains the constant tension in 
tributary systems between a central node of ‘despotic power’ and its functionaries who 
seek to transform their local control over the tribute into longer-lasting claims to 
exploitation. The gamut of despotic empires, feudal suzerainties, prebendal tax farmers 
and, I argue, nomadic dominion over settled communities, represents the range of 
different settlements of this dynamic. 
 
     Here we may register a zone of agreement between Weberian treatments of the 
relations between tribes and empires—in the work of scholars such as Ernest Gellner 
and Michael Mann—and a historical materialist conception compatible with uneven and 
combined development. The ‘despotic’ state, of which the Ottoman Empire serves as 
an example, in Mann’s scheme projects power into the society it rules only insofar as its 
functionaries, and most especially its coercive force, can reach. Complementing this 
view of the central state, Gellner and others see the tribe as a solution to the problem of 
security in those areas to which the central power does not extend (Gellner, 1990:109, 
Lapidus, 1990:42, Tapper, 1990:65). The concept of the tributary mode of production 
allows us to integrate these insights without collapsing the concepts of ‘tribe’, ‘bedouin’ 
and ‘pastoralism’ into the hackneyed clichés of colonial vintage, likely permanently to be 
undermined by empirical evidence (Eickelman, 2002:67, Mundy and Musallam, 2000:3-
4). Given that tributary relations of production unite economic and extra-economic 
moments of exploitation, these can only operate within a radius of the reliable 
imposition of coercion—buttressed, to be sure, by various ideological configurations 
ordaining the tributary arrangements. 
 
 Where this radius of coercion dissipates, the tribute taking power would tend to 
fracture into smaller units: the lordly demesne, the Japanese han or, most relevant for 
our purposes, the tribal domain known as the dirah. Topography is one readily 
observable reason for this fracturing of tributary power and a particularly important one 
for the consideration of the steppe-lands of Southern Syria. One must not reduce 
history to geography, however. The outcome of the crises between centralization and 
locality in the tributary mode were never fixed in advance, producing therefore the 
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waves of settlement and ‘bedouinization’ visible in the history of the Levant and its arid 
hinterland. On this basis then, the theoretical framework presented in the previous 
chapter suggests that the system ‘combined’ with global capitalism in late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century Transjordan was a tributary one, but characterised by the 
fracturing of tributary power at the edges of the Ottoman state, into the taking of 
khuwwa. The story of the Ottoman attempt, in response to what Trotsky called the ‘whip 
of external necessity’, to transform these relations into tax-paying private property 
begins the trajectory of uneven and combined development in Jordan, leading to the 
particular conjuncture of the 1950s. Where is the empirical substance for this claim? 
 
3.2 Tributary Relations in Late Ottoman Transjordan 
 
  The clear theoretical distinctions drawn above become rather more muddied the 
closer we get to concrete historical investigation. Nonetheless, the Ottoman state in 
both its juridical form and practical content confirms a picture of circles of coercive 
power exercised to extract tribute from the direct agricultural producers. This was 
expressed in the division between the cultivating and tax-paying masses (reaya) and the 
tax-taking holders of coercive power (asker) (Gerber, 1987:12). Throughout the 19th 
century, and perhaps even from its 16th century zenith, the dynamic of the tributary state 
manifested itself in the perennial tendency of the Ottoman Empire to descend into tax-
farming of various sorts. The basis for the tributary system before 1858 was a division 
of land tenures into miri, agricultural land theoretically owned by the state, and mulk, 
private land in orchards, urban space and so on (Amadouny, 1999:xxviii). Cultivators 
did not pay tribute directly to the state, however. The state held title to the land but 
granted prebendal rights to intermediaries who extracted revenue from the cultivators, 
which was then fed upwards (minus the subtractions of these various intermediary 
officials) to the Sublime Porte. In the period of expansion from the 14th to the 16th 
century the intermediaries gained these rights as the spoils of victory and the reward for 
rendering military service (such as the sipahis, timariot, Jannisaries). Although this 
structure served the Ottomans well in their expansion into a Europe dominated by a 
more-fragmented version of the same system, its disadvantages became marked from 
the 18th century onwards. As the later sections of this chapter argue, this decline 
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reflected the process of uneven and combined development as the new, expansionary 
capitalist social relations became embedded in Western Europe, forcing the Ottomans 
into a game of ‘if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em’. 
 
 3.2.1 Sedentary and Nomadic Communities: Similarities of Structure 
 
   The general operation of tributary relations in the Ottoman Empire followed a 
recognizable pattern, then. What of our case of interest, the areas south of Syria which 
were to become the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan? We must note, of course, the 
distinction between settled and nomadic pastoralist communities but also a continuum 
of degrees of sedentarism or nomadism between them (Marx, 1977:344). The common 
observable pattern lies in the fracturing of tributary authority as Ottoman administration 
was stretched thin over inhospitable terrain. This idea of fractured tributary authority 
captures well the two social practices that both Ottoman and British modernisers 
sought to transform: the landholding system of mushaʿa and the paying of khuwwa tribute 
to pastoral nomads. In settled communities, most common in the rain-fed and 
defensible redoubts of the North-Western hill country, a sheikh or zaʿim typically 
dominated the cultivators and extracted tribute from them though demonstrations of 
his authority: an authority dependent on his having enough surplus to entertain or 
intimidate others (1977:350). The sheikh might function, or be the descendant of men 
who had functioned, as an Ottoman tax collector.  For example, the Majali overlords of 
Kerak—one of the families whose presence in the Jordanian ruling class has remained 
continuous to the point of monotony—extracted tribute from the cultivators of the 
town, of which they retained nine-tenths before rendering the remainder to the Sublime 
Porte (Hamarneh, 1985:85). Where topography and numbers allowed nomads to 
threaten such communities, the sheikh would often function as a conduit for tribute 
paid as khuwwa, possibly forming a chieftancy in alliance with the nomads (Mundy, 
1994:78). The nomadic and settled communities therefore shared a similar structure as a 
unit of subsistence (Fischbach, 2000:39). The organisation of the bedouin nomads 
mirrors that of the fellahin—or possibly the other way around (2000:40-6). What 
distinguished the two was the predatory unity of coercive and economic extraction 
exercised by the one over the other, in the liminal zone of a society structured in general 
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by that principal. Within the respective communities, there seem to have been practices 
of differential property rights to moveable and immoveable means of production which 
lent substance to the —largely fictive—claims of agnatic descent through which access 
was organised to these means. In the settled communities this was the practice of mushʿa  
agriculture. 
 
 The practice of mushʿa, although not universal and co-existing beside practices 
interpreted by later scholars as simple private property (2000:38), necessarily involved 
some communal control over production. In mushʿa villages the individual household 
cultivated its lands as a private unit but the quality and quantity of that land was 
periodically redistributed through the community—which is to say the heads of 
households—to ensure a rough equality across time. The idea that mushʿa represented a 
hang-over of some tribal egalitarianism (Hamarneh, 1985:77) has been undermined in 
favour of an interpretation that sees the system as an adaptation to tax demands 
(Mundy, 1994:78).  This interpretation supports, rather than undermines, the conception 
advanced in this chapter of communities structured by tributary extractive relationships.  
 
The cultivators in mushʿa villages at least did not hold absolute, alienable rights 
over their land, this being subject to a moral economy negotiated at the level of the 
community as a whole and producing a surplus accruing eventually to the sheikh, the 
state or the local bedouin. Certainly there were wide variations in this system in the 
amount and method of partition (Fischbach, 2000:39) and in the spread of the system 
itself. For example the prevalence of mushʿa seems to have varied with topography and 
therefore agricultural practice: areas of rain-fed cereal cultivation, most common in the 
north around ʿAjlun, almost always practiced mushaʿa whereas further south through the 
Balqa’ valley and down through Kerak and Ma”an private plots of so-called mafruz land 
(often orchards or groves less amenable to mushaʿa partition) were more common 
(2000:40). Even given this variation, it is difficult to see how any partition could operate 
under conditions of absolute private property. Claims of patrilineal descent functioned 
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to organise the partition. In this regard the settled communities shared a structure with 
the nomadic ones: yet also fell prey to their demands for khuwwa tribute. How could this 
be the case? What was common and what was different between the takers and givers of 
surplus via khuwwa? 
 
3.2.2 Sedentary and Nomadic Communities: Relations of Tribute 
 
  Both sedentary and nomadic communities thus seem to have displayed a 
structure in which the immovable means of production were held and managed 
communally but the moveable (tools, seeds, livestock) were held and used by 
households. In both a hierarchy seems to have prevailed, organised by essentially 
ideological ties of agnatic lineage which supported the claims of certain sheikhs to 
authority in negotiation over production, reproduction and distribution. Thus, the tribe 
organised differential access to the means of production. Amongst the bedouin nomadic 
pastoralists the land—the tribal territory known as the dirah—was controlled by the 
tribe; the herd animals themselves by individual households (El-Masri, 2008:9, Marx, 
1977:355). The tribe and its sub-units, structured on lines of notionally agnatic kinship, 
negotiate the terms of access to pasture for these herds (El-Masri, 2008:9, Marx, 
1977:356). These similarities both in the structure of the communities and the broader 
cultural affinities should not obscure the tribute taking relationship, however. The 
absolute bi-modalism presented by Hamarneh (1985:77) has been undermined by a 
body of evidence that demonstrates that in many cases ‘relations between farmers and 
the Bedouin straddled the desert line’ and that ‘conflicts that broke out may not have 
been a case of desert versus sown but rather inter or even intra-tribal 
battles’(Amadouny, 1999:xxviii). However, this historical scepticism may miss the 
overall important point. Settled cultivators paid tribute to bedouin: bedouin did not pay 
tribute to settled cultivators. 
 
The reason for this relationship may be found in the core dynamic of the 
tributary mode of production. The nomadic pastoralist tribe functioned as unit of 
subsistence limiting and organizing access to the productive resources of a 
circumscribed area, the dirah (Marx, 1977:345). The bedouin thus occupied a particular 
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space, but in a different way to that of fully settled agriculturalists. The dirah is 
determined by the productive cycle of the tribe: the passage between different seasonally 
determined grazing lands (El-Masri, 2008:8). Vertical divisions did exist within the 
bedouin tribe—as one sheikh of the Huwaytat bedouin of southern Jordan put it 
‘naturally’ some tribesmen had more livestock than others and the sheikhs would usually 
have the most. Yet the corporate organisation of the tribe imposed some limit on the 
polarization of wealth and, most especially, control over the means of production 
(Marx, 1984:3). More important, however, was the horizontal division between the tribal 
subsistence units. Here we see the utility of identifying the core extractive relationship in 
any given social formation, at least in offering us an instructive analogy. Robert Brenner 
has usefully identified a process of ‘political accumulation’ in feudal Europe. Extractive 
authority being fractured in medieval Europe, as in the sub-Syrian steppe lands, tribute 
takers had an incentive to compete with one another to extend their coercive reach and 
thereby their access to surplus as tribute (Brenner, 1990:26-33). The lord, holding both 
“economic” and “political” over their tenants, could accumulate more surplus by only 
two methods: to make greater demands of the peasants, up to the point of threatening 
their subsistence, or to extend the area under his extractive control thereby coming into 
conflict with other lords also in possession of the means of coercion.  
 
We may observe a similar dynamic in the regions in which the Ottoman 
tributary writ did not effectively run. In the desert and steppe of Southern Syria and 
Northern Arabia, tributary authority was fractured to an even greater degree than that of 
Western Europe. The various units of subsistence interacted with one another in a 
fashion resembling the famous anarchy of Realist international relations theory: each 
tribe required therefore to be organised so as to protect its grazing lands (immovable 
means of production) and herds (moveable means of production) from the threat of 
other tribes (Al-ʿAbbadi, 1984:98, El-Masri, 2008:21, Gellner, 1990:109, Hamarneh, 
1985:51). This structure generated a logic of ‘political accumulation’ similar to that 
identified by Brenner, for the only means by which tribes could increase (or even 
protect) their surplus was military competition—raids and wars—with other tribes. 
However, unlike the struggles between European feudal lords, these conflicts only rarely 
congealed into central authority. Where chieftancies emerged these typically took the 
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form of alliance with or domination over settled communities which might then mutate 
into imperial tributary states such as the Ottomans became. Conflicts over pasture, or 
more often the reciprocal raiding of herds, were more fluid and inconclusive than those 
of agricultural land requiring long-term, fixed cultivation. The bedouin tribal unit was 
thus both more mobile and more attuned to military conflict than most settled 
communities: in a social formation based on coercive surplus extraction the bedouin 
therefore possessed a strategic advantage over settled cultivators, which advantage they 
used to obtain surplus in the form of khuwwa.  
 
The taking of khuwwa by nomads from settled communities (as well as anyone 
seeking to pass through their territory) therefore reflects the ‘form in which unpaid 
surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers’. A technologically advanced 
standing army, of the sort that the Ottomans later brought to bear, may be able to 
defeat mobile warriors (even then only in certain areas). A smaller settled community of 
cultivators, unprotected by hills or rivers, would be no match for the mobility of the 
nomads. The greater the range of the nomads, based on the hardiness of their type of 
livestock, the greater the strategic advantage they derived: hence the predominance of 
the camel (Hamarneh, 1985:49). The relationship, in other areas contiguous with our 
area of interest, was reversed only when a settled community was wealthy and 
established enough to send a permanent military force against the bedouin (Marx, 
1977:349). Thus, sedentary cultivation was most advanced in those communities in 
ʿAjlun, happily protected by the mountainous landscape from bedouin raids (Rogan, 
2002:24) or in Salt where the Jordan River valley offered similar protection (2002:27). 
Even though the Saltis may have obtained a slightly better deal, as it were, they still had 
to give tribute to the ʿAdwan tribe (Hamarneh, 1985:49). The Karakis had a similar 
arrangement with the Bani Sakhr (1985:75). In the 1840s the Syrian Majlis Al-Shura (the 
assembly of notables in Damascus) took up the problem of peasants in the ‘Ajilun 
district fleeing bedouin demands for khuwwa (Rogan, 1994:35). Nor was the threat of 
coercion an idle one: travelers’ accounts of the 1870s refer to the destruction of at least 
two villages by the ʿAdwan and Bani Sakhr for refusing to pay tribute, and this even as 
the Ottoman central authority was regaining strength in the region (Hamarneh, 1985). 
The extraction of tribute could grow close to a market exchange, depending on the 
 91 
defensive strength of the cultivators; but in every interaction between the two lurked 
potential compulsion (Gellner, 1990:111). There may have been scope for the 
cultivators to negotiate the terms of extraction or even to become clients of a different 
tribe—but clients they would remain. 
 
 Where has this examination of the social relations of Ottoman southern Syria 
taken the broader argument about uneven and combined development and Jordan’s 
geopolitical alignment? It was important to establish the nature of the basis of 
combination in Jordan, which we have now done. The pre-capitalist social relations 
were tributary, but fragmented, and reflected in two social practices— mushaʿa and 
khuwwa—the transcendence of which would represent a process of primitive 
accumulation initiated by Ottoman and later British authorities. However, the results of 
this process was not the replication of an ideal-type of capitalist social relations but 
rather, as Trotsky outlined for Russia, a combined social formation whose trajectory to 
certain alignments can be traced back through these social processes. The remainder of 
this chapter and the next provide the empirical substance of this process, beginning with 
the story of the attempted Ottoman reforms due to what Trotsky called the ‘whip of 
external necessity.’ The following sections outline why the Ottoman Empire undertook 
these reforms in the late 19th century, the actual measures undertaken in the lands that 
became Jordan and the results produced. 
 
3.3 The Origins of Ottoman Mimetic Reform: the ‘Whip of 
External Necessity’ 
 
The integration of the Ottoman Empire as a ‘zone of dependent support’ into a 
‘single capitalist world’ (Migdal, 1994:10), which was to transform the coercive social 
symbiosis of settled and nomadic communities around the Jordan river, was embodied 
in the body of reforms and extension of the Empire’s central coercive power in the later 
19th century (Quataert, 1994:762). This body of measures, collectively discussed under 
the heading of the ‘Tanzimat’ represented a similar process to that of the Russian 
emancipation of the serfs or the Japanese Meiji Restoration: attempts by tributary ruling 
classes to catch-up and compete with the capitalist states. In terms of the mechanisms 
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identified in the previous chapter, this was the ‘whip of external necessity’ produced by 
unevenness leading to the attempt to ‘turn foe in tutor’ that then led to combination. 
The unevenness in the Ottoman case refers to the productive and therefore military gulf 




3.3.1 How Uneven Was Ottoman Development? 
 
Recent scholarship on Ottoman economic history has conscientiously 
questioned the idea that the Empire’s economy stagnated in the 19th century (Quataert, 
1994:843) and furnished us with evidence of the development of a native Ottoman 
bourgeoisie. Although these qualifications are important, the reform of the Ottoman 
land code and administrative re-organisations of the tanzimat represent an instance of 
how [i]nternational relations intertwine with ‘internal relations’ to bring about ‘new, 
unique and historically concrete combinations’ (Gramsci, 1971:182). In this section I 
seek to demonstrate how the feedback loop of uneven and combined development 
worked on the Ottoman Empire: I show how the competitive advantage of European 
states produced by the uneven development of capitalist social relations manifested 
itself in the disintegration of the outer provinces, fiscal crisis and consequently the 
compulsion to emulate capitalist social relations.  
 
The Ottoman Empire under Sulayman the Magnificent was not merely a 
successful tributary state in a world of tributary states: it was the pre-eminent power 
West of the Himalayas, its revenue double that of the bloated Habsburg domains 
(Anderson, 1980:365). Yet by the late 19th century the Empire had slipped into the 
clichéd status of “the sick man of Europe”. Even if we now know contemporaries to 
have over-stated the malady, the overall diagnosis was correct. A gulf had opened up 
between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, erstwhile site of its predatory expansion 
(Issawi, 1980:1). The ‘internal’ aspects of this gulf—the degeneration of Ottoman 
tribute taking structures into local tax-farming rackets throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries—cannot be separated from its “external” aspects such as the 
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imposition of unequal trade concessions, the secession of outer provinces under 
European protection or control (1980:1-3). As a result, the Empire was engaged in near 
constant defensive warfare of some kind: being at war for fully 53 of the years between 
1800 and 1918 (Quataert, 1994:789). This feedback loop between geopolitical and social 
relations provides us with the beginning of the trajectories in Jordan taken up in later 
chapters: a process of attempted transformation engendered by the collapse of Ottoman 
manufacture in the face of Western European competition; the diminishing tax 
revenues gained through the tributary system and the loss of the Empire’s most 
productive territories. The attempt to extend—or rather to invent—the Ottoman state 
as an ‘infrastructural’ state, the buttress of an autopoetic system of capitalist property 
relations was thus a conscious response to this crisis. 
 
3.3.2 Ottoman Reform as Response to the Whip of External Necessity  
 
Where is the historical substance for this claim? One may trace a trajectory of 
decline in Ottoman fortunes closely correlated with the shift in trade away from the 
cross-Anatolian routes to the trans-Atlantic and Indian Ocean transport of specie and 
commodities (Issawi, 1980:2). It was the second quarter of the nineteenth century 
however, when the ‘influx of European goods began in earnest—hand manufactures 
made in labor-intensive Western workshops as well as the more familiar machine-made 
cotton yarn and cloth’ (Quataert, 1994:762).  The Anglo-Ottoman trade convention, 
signed in 1838 in partial recompense for British aid in the campaign against Muhammad 
Ali prohibited the granting of state monopolies and provided a model for the favourable 
treatment of merchants (Keyder, 1987:29) The Empire was increasingly dependent on 
an agricultural tribute losing out in the ‘coercive comparison’ (Barker, 2006:78) with 
those states in which capitalist social relations of production prevailed. As a result the 
central state sought desperately to remove or marginalize ‘its domestic rivals—urban 
guilds, tribes and provincial notables—while maintaining its place in the new world 
order’ (Quataert, 1994:762).  
 
 This attempt was not highly successful. The military superiority of Western 
capitalist powers such as Britain and France over the Ottoman Empire both reflected 
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and fed back into the crisis of the tributary system.  As Eugene Rogan writes, using 
Michael Mann’s concept of ‘infrastructural power’: 
 
 [T]he penetration of society which infrastructural power permits allowed for an 
even greater share of production to be collected in taxes, which was essential for 
the maintenance of large-standing armies. While such changes were more 
characteristic of the nation-states of Western Europe, even multi-national 
Empires such as Russia and Austria had developed the infrastructural power to 
finance the modern armies which menaced Ottoman domains (Rogan, 2002:2) 
 
Throughout the 19th century the Empire lost its most productive agricultural provinces 
to the twin forces of modernity—either directly to European imperialism or to local 
secessionist movements aspiring to emulate the French revolutionary model. The 
earliest and most instructive example may be found in the Napoleonic invasion of 
Egypt in 1798 (Mitchell, 1988:17). The struggle between Britain and France, Europe’s 
two post-revolutionary states, resulted in the French occupation of Egypt: an experience 
whose puncture in the Ottoman social body was as deep as its duration was brief. The 
French troops left but French ideas did not. They found fertile ground in the head of 
Muhammad Ali, a local military commander of the traditional Balkan stamp, whose 
leadership combined the centrifugal tendency of tributary extraction with the aspiration 
to build a new mimetic order. Ali seized the Syrian provinces from Ottoman control, 
only to be frustrated by the Western powers (Rogan, 2002:2). Algeria was lost to French 
invasion a few years afterwards.  
 
  The worst of Ottoman fortunes was yet to come as the most productive 
European provinces were lost from the 1820s onwards. These provided the bulk of 
Ottoman revenues and their loss was ‘devastating’ to the Empire’s economy (Quataert, 
1994:768). The Empire was sucked into a degenerative spiral: losing the provinces most 
productive of the agricultural tribute upon which the entire structure was based, and 
therefore losing further the capacity to govern other provinces. Revenue did actually 
increase from 1809 to 1885 but certainly not at the rate of increase in expenditure, 
leading to the crippling effective loss of fiscal sovereignty to the consortium of Western 
powers organised through the Public Debt Administration in 1881(Issawi, 1980:361). It 
was this cycle of the loss of revenue that stimulated the Ottoman drive to extend taxable 
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cultivation, and therefore ‘infrastructural’ state power, in the sub-Syrian steppe (Rogan, 
2002:45). This would inevitably bring a clash with the system of khuwwa, which we have 
identified as the central relationship of the fragmented tributary relations of production 
that prevailed in the lands that became Jordan, and as the basis of the later combined 
social formation. The process of Ottoman reform, instigated to ‘turn the foe into tutor’ 
was embodied in the Gulhane Rescript of 1839, the revised land code of 1858 and the 
expeditions to re-assert authority over the steppe and desert of southern Syria.  
 
 
3.4.The process of Ottoman Mimetic Reform 
 
The 1839 Gulhane Rescript and the 1858 Land Code were two faces of the 
same coin—or rather they represented the unfolding of unified tributary power into the 
division of economic and extra-economic coercion characteristic of those societies 
which had trounced the Ottoman Empire in geopolitical competition. The Gulhane 
Rescript established the general prospectus of change that would be carried out in the 
1858 Land Code (Mundy and Smith, 2007:14). The 1839 Rescript established the 
principle of individual liability, equality before the law and security of private property 
(Anderson, 1980:389). The Land Code introduced a version of such principles into the 
economic base of the Empire, which would also require the extension of effective 
governance into those areas beset by fragmented tribute taking authorities such as the 
khuwwa -taking nomads. The Land Code and subsequent transformations of agrarian 
relations have formed a point of departure for most scholarship in the historical 
sociology of the Middle East (Baer, 1982, Gerber, 1987, Hinnebusch, 2003) and this 
thesis is no exception. The social dynamics of the later Jordanian state are rooted in the 
reforms of the late Ottoman period (Fischbach, 2000:7). 
 
3.4.1The Land Code 
 
Interpretations of the Land Code vary as to whether it was a success, whether it 
derived from a process of agrarian change or served to impose it and whether it actually 
altered practices on the land (Mundy and Smith, 2007:3-4). Our purpose here is not to 
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intervene in such arguments about the Ottoman Empire as a whole but to examine the 
origins and impact of the law on the lands that became Jordan: wherein the 
implementation of the code and concomitant re-assertion of central authority set the 
trajectory of uneven and combined development in the later social formation. Although 
scholars such as Michael Fischbach and Martha Mundy maintain that the land tenure 
structure remained quite similar before and after the Code, this neglects the significant 
change in who held extractive power and how—the partial decline of khuwwa whose full 
trajectory was only to be established in the mandate period. This occurred because the 
different principles of registration and taxation introduced to increase revenue along the 
lines of the successful capitalist states were in conflict with the khuwwa system.  The 
extension of infrastructural power and the registration of private land thus occurred at 
the same time as co-dependent processes.  
 
 The Land Code itself mandated changes to the Ottoman tenure system which, it 
will be recalled from the earlier part of this chapter, distinguished between various rights 
to land. Most land was miri: land to which cultivators held usufruct rights but rendered 
tribute to the state as the nominal owner (Issawi, 1988:283). Mulk land was freely held 
but rarer than miri and most often in plots in towns (1988:283). There were other 
distinctions, such as the sultan’s personal lands and the awqaaf properties of religious 
endowments (1988:283) but, although they were very important in other contexts these 
were not so significant in Jordan. The 1858 Land Code established the right of 
individuals as legal owners of miri lands provided they could demonstrate their 
registration in a tapu deed (Rogan, 2002:13). The individual, not the community, was 
responsible for the payment of taxation (2002:13). Designed to maximize revenue 
through taxing every piece of cultivable land (Issawi, 1988:286) the code established a 
means under which uncultivated land reverted to state control. This implied of course 
that productively cultivated land and its fruits, after tax, were the alienable property of 
the registered owner. This is a different conception of property to that of the dirah or 
indeed the mushaʿa village, evidence of continuity with the pre-Land Code period 
notwithstanding (Fischbach, 2000:35). Donald Quatert’s apt characterization of the 
Land Code as bearing a ‘capitalist trunk and a mercantilist foot’, therefore reflecting ‘the 
transitional nature of the state itself’ (Quataert, 1994:857) indicates the utility of 
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considering this period as the starting point of a combined social formation. 
 
 3.4.2 Breaking Tributary Power  
 
 The Ottomans adopted a two-fold strategy to promote taxable cultivation by 
breaking the unity of economic and extra-economic coercion. Although the Ottoman 
administrators may not have expressed themselves in such terms, their twofold 
approach to the problem perfectly reflected this requirement. One the hand, the 
Ottomans sought to inflict exemplary defeats on the Bedouin tribes: on the other to 
induce settlement by stipulating that land registration (under the terms of the 1858 
code) would be permitted only to those who actually cultivated their lands and by 
introducing communities—mainly Circassians and Christians—who would not pay 
khuwwa. The settlement and registration of land by these communities led bedouin 
tribes such as the Bani Sakhr to register their own dira (Fischbach, 2000:46). 
 
 To assert control over the steppe meant a change of personnel and policy only 
reached some years into the Tanzimat reforms. As part of the reforms, the Porte 
appointed the efficient Mehmet Rasid Pasha to the position of wali (provincial governor) 
in Damascus (Rogan, 2002:48). Rasid’s remit was to extend the re-organised governance 
of the Ottoman state in its sub-Syrian hinterland, and he set about this work with 
vigour. Damascus sent military expeditions south to break the power of the Bani Sakhr 
and ʿAdwan tribes (2002:51). That military power, of course, formed the precondition 
for the extraction of khuwwa. Rasid Pasha reversed the strategic imbalance that had 
hitherto guaranteed extractive rights to the pastoral nomadic tribes. In the campaigns 
against the ʿAdwan, the Ottoman forces were aided by the their adversaries’ attachment 
to recently founded areas of cultivation and short-range livestock pastures, undermining 
the advantage of easy flight in to the Eastern desert (Hamarneh, 1985:62). The Pasha 
moved his forces gradually southwards, from the most extensively settled and cultivated 
zones (which submitted to central authority more easily) down into the Balqaʾ valley 
(Rogan, 2002:49). The expeditionary force was more sizeable and technologically 
advanced than previous Ottoman attempts, comprising three infantry battalions, nine 
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cavalry squadrons and several artillery pieces (2002:49).  We may judge the 
impressiveness of the force by the reaction of the people of Salt, who soon submitted to 
the Pasha, and rendered to him three million piastres in tax arrears (2002:50). Having 
established a base in the only town of the Balqaʾ, Rasid thrust at the ʿAdwan 
encampment, killing 50 of their number, driving them from their tents and livestock and 
capturing their paramount chieftains (2002:52). This marked a serious blow not just for 
the ʿAdwan and their allies but for the practice of khuwwa as a whole. 
 
The khuwwa-takers could not simply tolerate this turn of events. The Bani Sakhr 
reversed their traditional rivalry with the ʿAdwan—demonstrating perhaps the 
consciousness of a systemic threat to their practices of surplus extraction—and allied 
with them to raid Ramtha in 1869, re-asserting their rights to khuwwa under Rasid’s nose 
in the cultivated district of the Hawran (2002:51). Rasid could no more accede to this 
bedouin provocation than the Bani Sakhr could willingly give up their extractive rights: 
two systems of surplus extraction were in conflict. Weakness on the Pasha’s part could 
have endangered the entire project of the new Ottoman power in the steppe (2002:51). 
Accompanied by the British and French consuls, Rasid’s 4000 Ottoman soldiers bested 
the Bani Sakhr, obtained their submission and 225,000 piastres to pay for the expedition 
‘[i]f the first Balqaʾ expedition introduced direct Ottoman rule to the district, the second 
campaign confirmed that the Ottomans were in Jordan [sic] to stay’(2002:51-2). 
 
Rasid Pasha’s campaigns were not the end of khuwwa, however. The 
topographical division between Southern Hawran and Northern Hijaz revealed itself in 
the limits to Ottoman power. Sharply conscious of the threat posed by the increase of 
British interests in Egypt, culminating in the 1882 occupation of the country, the 
Ottomans engaged in a number of schemes to establish an administrative centre in 
Maʿan ruling over the sparsely populated steppe surrounding the Haj route (2002:54). 
The choice of Maʿan reflected the intertwining of geopolitical and sociological factors 
that characterized the Ottoman modernization project as a whole—‘motivated by 
economic and strategic concerns: the sedentarization of the tribes, the extension of 
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cultivation, linkage with the Arabian peninsula and, after 1882, from potential British 
incursions’ (2002:54). Yet the Ottomans found themselves still circumscribed by the 
limits of a despotic rather than infrastructural power. Maʿan was too remote, and its 
inhabitants too used to making their own bargains with the local bedouin, to be 
governed let alone become a centre of governance (Rogan). The Damascene pashas had 
somewhat more success when they shifted focus to Karak. However they were only able 
to establish themselves thanks to a rift between the local Bani Sakhr and the Al-Majali, 
the ruling clan of Karak. Even then the Ottomans entered Karak in 1893 only after a 
week-long siege and an agreement to make the Majalis governors of the new Karak 
district (2002:55). The frailty of central Ottoman power was demonstrated by the Karak 
revolt of 1910. The further south and east the Ottomans proceeded, the more frustrated 
their schemes tended to become. 
 
The scope of Ottoman re-engagement was therefore geographically 
circumscribed as its ‘despotic’ predecessors had been. Nonetheless the Ottoman efforts 
in the Balqaʾ and northward districts were no mere repetition of the temporary raids of 
the pre-Tanzimat era—tentative jabs of the tributary state into its hinterland. Rather the 
pashas sought to make productive tax-paying cultivable land out of the steppe and 
desert. This meant abolishing khuwwa relations (implying the military operations 
described above) and installing communities which could bear tax-paying market 
relations. The second track of Ottoman policy in doing so was to settle or re-settled 
such communities in the more fertile areas of the territory: a common policy across the 
Empire (Quataert, 1994:849). 
 
The Ottomans settled Circassian refugees from the Balkans and the Caucasus in 
the Balqaʾ valley, heartland of the Bani Sakhr, in two waves; between 1878 and 1884 and 
again between 1901 and 1906 (Rogan, 2002:73). The authorities granted them land, tax 
free, to settle and farm around Amman. The Ottoman motive was to use these sturdy 
farmer- fighters to put an end to khuwwa relations. The Circassians, culturally remote 
incomers to the region, would have no truck with paying tribute to bedouin—on whose 
dirah, moreover, they had settled—resulting in frequent clashes and occasional alliances 
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between the two (2002:75-6). They also introduced cut roads and wheeled transport. 
Such settlements had a knock-on effect, leading the khuwwa taking tribes to register their 
land in the Balqaʾ within the terms of the 1858 Land Law (Fischbach, 2000:46). The 
settlement of Christians, fleeing an inter-clan dispute in Kerak, produced a similar effect 
around Madaba (Rogan, 2002:82). These Christians engaged in permanent agriculture 
and paid taxes but not khuwwa. Against the protests of Sattam al-Fayiz, the paramount 
chief of the Bani Sakhr whose men had mounted raids for khuwwa  against the Madaba 
Christians, the Ottomans awarded the lands to the Christians. The award further alerted 
the ‘the powerful tribes of the region that they risked losing lands held by customary 
rights unless these were registered with the government land offices, put under 
cultivation and taxes regularly paid’ (2002:81). 
 
3.5 Results of Ottoman Mimetic Reform  
 
The preceding survey of the orgins and process of Ottoman reform, undertaken 
to render that tributary empire fit to fend off the ‘whip of external necessity’ indicates 
the beginning of the trajectory of Jordan as a combined social formation, whose 
international alignments we will examine in later chapters. What were the important 
results of this process for these later developments? One can identify the following 
aspects that were later deepened by the British mandate, providing the social basis on 
which certain alignments were chosen and implemented: a topographical division in the 
campaigns against khuwwa-taking: a relatively more egalitarian land-holding structure in 
parts of the territory; and the emergence of division between khuwwa takers, or former 
khuwwa-takers, and the actual cultivators of lands they registered. These are all aspects of 
the transformation of one form of surplus extraction into another but without the 
decisive replacement of the older form—this would come only with the British subsidy 
and militarization and nationalization of the bedouin, a process analysed in the next 
chapter. 
3.5.1 Geographical Extent of the Impact of Ottoman Reform 
 
One must first note the geographical, or rather topographical, division. Land 
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registration in the Tapu registers under the terms of the 1858 Land Code was only fully 
carried out in ‘Ajlun: in the Balqaʾ the Bani Sakhr and others participated in the 
competitive registration detailed above. Further south the Ottomans did not intervene 
strongly although a market in land does seem to have existed (Rogan, 2002:92). 
Elements of the tribe as economic unit were preserved—by social distinction of the 
kind described above or by the persistent geographical division above and below the 
valley of Wadi Mujib at the lower end of the Dead Sea. Khuwwa continued to be taken in 
these areas and the sharecropping arrangements on Bani Sakhr ‘plantation villages’ 
retained elements of coercive subordination (2002:89). In the areas under full Ottoman 
control the taxes on the newly registered lands, although regularized and set at a 
maximum (Quataert, 1994:846), were still collected by tax farming. The Ottomans tried 
repeatedly to abolish tax farms but were without the infrastructure to replace them 
(1994:854).  
 
The renewed attempt at tax collections undertaken in the later nineteenth and 
early twentieth century provoked a series of revolts, the most serious of which occurred 
at Karak in 1910 (Hamarneh, 1985:87). These revolts may be said to have reflected the 
‘moral economy’ consciousness of direct cultivators under a tributary system: they 
would pay tribute either to the central state or to nomadic incursion but not to both 
(Rogan, 2002:185). A reasonable inference from the Karak revolt ‘is that the effective 
boundary of direct Ottoman rule in Syria in 1910 was the massive canyon of Wadi 
Mujib, which divided the districts of Salt and Karak’ (2002:215). This distinction took 
on even greater relevance under the British mandate as officials sought to govern both a 
‘tribal zone’ characterised by what the colonial administrators saw as a warlike 
backwardness, and an area potentially at risk of infection by excessively modern 
doctrines of equality and anti-colonialism. The solution to this problem established the 
mechanism of combination between the Jordanian social formation and the global 
capitalist system: this story is told in the next chapter. 
 
 Within these distinct zones, further aspects of the transformation of the agrarian 
political economy distinguished the lands that would become Jordan. The first of these 
was the confirmation of a relatively egalitarian balance of landholding: this was not an 
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inevitable outcome but it did affect the later trajectory of the state in its relations with 
the populist Arab nationalism of the 1950s. In the areas registered and subject to the 
Tapu land registers according to the Land Code of 1858, the resulting distribution was 
fairly egalitarian: a marked contrast to other future Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq, and 
Syria in which the late nineteenth century saw a marked polarization between landlord 
and cultivator (Issawi, 1982:138). Land was for the most part ‘owned …by the 
cultivators who lived on it’ (Fischbach, 2000:55). There were some large land-holdings, 
certainly, such as the ‘entire village’ in the northern Jordan Valley ‘owned by a man from 
Tiberias and the Beni Sakher sheikh who settled there with his clan’ with ‘[t]he 
tribesmen…reduced to sharecroppers’(Hamarneh, 1985:89). Thus effendis and absentee 
landlords were present but not dominant (Fischbach, 2000:54-5). Mushaʿa lands were 
not for the most part forcibly partitioned but voluntarily divided into fractions (Rogan, 
2002:54). Norms of partition and cultivation varied, particularly between hill and plains 
villages (Mundy and Smith, 2007:236). This distribution can only be described as 
relatively egalitarian, however. It was common for one group (shuyukh, or some such 
term) to gain at the expense of the fellahin (Fischbach, 2000:52).  Nonetheless, this 
inequality in land did not extend to the domination of the countryside by effendis, the 
resentment of which formed the social context for nationalist officers’ movements in 
Egypt, Iraq and Syria (Be'eri, 1970:456). Again this process was reinforced in the 
mandate period discussed in following chapter.  
 3.5.2 Beginnings of a Combined Social Formation 
 
 Perhaps the most significant feature of the late Ottoman period for the 
emergence of the Jordanian combined social formation was the change in social 
relations of production amongst the pastoral nomadic tribes.  The Ottoman re-
extension of the state produced a tendency—only that—for the fractured tributary 
relationships of the previous period to be replaced by something closer to capitalist 
social relations but with a crucial distinction that the horizontal ties of the tribe 
remained. This partial move from khuwwa to waged or semi-waged exploitation on the 
land was embodied in the so-called “plantation villages” that emerged in particular 
amongst the Bani Sakhr and ʿAdwan. The plantation village was an agricultural 
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settlement registered in the name of the tribe but worked by share-cropping tenants, 
often fellahin fleeing Palestine or Egypt (Rogan, 2002:90). 
 
 These developments represented something of the ‘combining of separate steps’ 
as the ‘material content’ of uneven and combined development (Trotsky, 1997:27). The 
ʿAdwan and the Bani Sakhr were the predominant tribes in the centre of what would 
become Jordan. A few decades previously both had practiced pastoral nomadism and 
khuwwa taking fairly extensively. The ʿAdwan, as mentioned previously, had taken up 
settled agriculture to a greater degree than the Bani Sakhr but their domains, even in 
1880, were reported to hold countless droves of camels covering the plains (Hamarneh, 
1985:61). The Bani Sakhr were ‘fully nomadic camel herding bedouin’ at the beginning 
of the 19th century (Lewis, 1987:124). Their dirah (territory) stretched mainly from 
summer grounds in the Eastern Balqaʾ in the central area of Jordan roughly from 
Amman to Karak, to winter grounds in the Wadi Sirhan around the ‘right angle’ in the 
present day Saudi-Jordanian border (1987:124). They lived by camel herding, khuwwa 
from Salt and Karak and from the passage of the Haj through their territories—the 
pilgrims with camels and guides and were paid by the Ottomans to give Haj caravans 
safe passage (1987:124). As discussed below, although the 1858 land code allowed the 
Bani Sakhr and their paramount chiefs to become significant landowners, they were not 
fully settled cultivators even in the 20th century. The plantation village was part of the 
solution to this conundrum. By the 1930s many of the Bani Sakhr (and other tribes such 
as the Huwaytat) migrated with camels for part of the year while also controlling 
cultivated land (Bocco and Tell, 1994:123). They were no longer deep desert camel 
herders but neither were they settled yeomen. Even as late as 1952 the Department of 
Lands and Surveys found that of 2404 Bani Sakhr households, 1935 (i.e. 81%) lived in 
goat hair tents, 352 in stone houses, 87 in wooden or other houses and 30 in caves 
(Lewis, 1987:140).  
 
 These tribute-exacting pastoral nomadic confederacies adapted to the mimetic 
modernization drive of the Ottomans by means of sharecropping plantations. The 
ʿAdwan and the Bani Sakhr did register lands but partitioned them: in the case of the 
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Bani Sakhr in a geographical division of Mushaʿa land into southern, northern and 
central sections (Hamarneh, 1985:59). The area east of the Balqaʾ valley, extending into 
the Wadi Sirhan, was left as common dirah pasture, allowing the tribe’s members to 
continue their pastoral nomadic lifestyle (Hamarneh, 1985:61). The settled lands were 
mostly farmed by Palestinian or Egyptian sharecroppers. Title was assigned to named 
shaykhs in a fairly consensual process involving heads of household within the tribe—
by contrast, the relationship with the fellahin sharecroppers was based on the 
sharecropper providing a fifth or more of the crop as rent, usually increasing as time 
passed (Lewis, 1987:130). A British traveler in 1876 reported that: 
 
The bedouins] send across the Jordan, or to the few villages in the Gilead hills, 
and hire Christians to till their lands for them. Some Moslems [sic] go out for 
this purpose. ...These laborers are called fellahin. We should call them small 
farmers, or more properly, peasants. The farmer, at the beginning of the season, 
or when the contract is made is given four, five, or six dollars as the case may 
be. He receives also a pair of shoes, and has seed furnished him. But, besides 
these things, he receives nothing. He must provide his own men, cattle and 
implements. He must pay his own help and do all the work from ploughing to 
threshing (Merrill in Hamarneh, 1985:90). 
 
 This form seems to have spread quite rapidly. By 1883 there were nine tax-
paying bedouin villages in the Salt district, traditionally the domain of the ‘Adwan, and 
by 1908 there were 19 such villages around Madaba in the orbit of the Bani Sakhr 
(Rogan, 1994:45). There were reported to be nineteen villages around the district of Jiza 
in the 1880s and twenty five in the 1890s—by the formation of the state of Jordan most 
of the land between Amman and Madaba and some beyond the Hijaz railway seems to 
have been cultivated (Lewis, 1987:131). This phenomenon is important because it 
established a pattern that was later reinforced and transformed by the military subsidy of 
the British mandate: the decline of tribute taking but its replacement by another form of 
surplus extraction that did not lead to the breakdown of the pastoral nomadic tribe 
seen, for example, in Iraq. 
 
    The mimetic reforms of the Ottomans generated contradictory dynamics, 
however. These led to further problems of governance under the mandate and might 
have produced a different trajectory for the combined social formation in Jordan were it 
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not for the fertile ground that they also provided for the militarization of the bedouin 
related in chapter 4. The extension of cultivated land and the suppression of khuwwa had 
begun to tell against bedouin livelihoods. Rogan delineates the effects of the Ottoman 
reform period thus:  
 
The documentary evidence supports a working hypothesis that the poorer, more 
sedentarized tribes, whose members drew a greater share of their subsistence 
from agriculture, tended to communal tenure of tribal properties. Their shaykhs 
were less likely to hold vast, individual tracts of land because the tribesmen 
could ill afford such concentration… It is only among the wealthier, more 
powerful tribes that the sheikhs accumulated vast individual holdings. The 
tribesmen of the Bani Sakhr, with their great herds, drew ample subsistence 
from pastoralism and preserved their disdain for agricultural pursuits. This freed 
their shaykhs to register vast tracts of land without dissent from the rank-and-
file, whose livelihood was not adversely affected so long as they enjoyed access 
to good pasturelands.’ (2002:188) 
 
These dynamics seemed to return with the period of disorder in the post-WWI era, and 
could have led to the primitive accumulation of rural landed property and impoverished 
labour seen elsewhere, but this was only a potential outcome: the make-up of the 
Jordanian combined social formation owed much of its origin to the way in which the 
strategic relationship of surplus extraction was transformed in the late Ottoman period. 
 3.6 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has sought to explain the origins of the Jordanian combined social 
formation in the late Ottoman response to the threat posed by Western capitalist 
powers. To be sure, the tributary social relations prevalent in the Ottoman Empire 
possessed their own dynamic—outlined in this chapter as the unity of economic and 
extra-economic coercion. As such, it was prone to crises of centralization and de-
centralization, and to the fraying and fracturing of the system in areas beyond the 
penetrative reach of the central authority. These did not result in different social 
relations of production but rather a fragmented version of tributary relations. The lands 
that became Jordan were dominated by relations of this kind and most especially by the 
payment of tribute in the form of khuwwa by settled cultivators and weaker pastoralists 
to the large and powerful pastoral nomadic tribes. 
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 The tributary system was not a static one, but where uneven and combined 
development offers us an insight is into how the ‘whip of external necessity’ brought 
about an attempt at mimetic modernisation by the Ottoman Empire: a strategy with 
significant legacies for the state of Jordan. These were primarily in the geographically 
distinct distributions of social relations on the land; the relatively egalitarian distribution 
of that land amongst cultivators: and the replacement in some areas of relations of 
tribute not directly by wage-labour and profit but by a form of share-cropping that 
allowed pastoral nomadism to continue. It was this form of social relations—the 
replacement of khuwwa by an alternative that was neither capital accumulation nor wage 
labour—that underlay the combined social formation established under the British 
mandate and in particular the importance of the British subsidy. The following chapter 
takes up that story. 
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4.Land and the social origins of the Jordanian Military 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate further the specific mechanism by 
which the social formation of ‘Transjordan’ became combined with the global system of 
capitalist social relations, following on from the account of Ottoman mimetic 
modernization in the previous chapter. I identify the Jordanian military, the core of the 
state apparatus and chief conduit for the British financial subsidy that maintained the 
state, as that mechanism. This conduit was established in the British mandate period 
albeit reinforcing and interacting with the legacies analysed in the previous chapter, of 
the Ottoman reforms undertaken to fend off the ‘whip of external necessity’. The case 
studies of chapters 5 and 6 present the claims both that the dilemmas of Jordan’s 
international alignments were fundamentally concerned with this mechanism of 
combination and that the process of uneven and combined development provided the 
social bases on which these dilemmas were fought out and resolved. The struggles 
around Jordan’s social and geopolitical orientation fought in the 1950s were, as in other 
Arab states fought out in part through and within the military (Be'eri, 1970:3, 
Hinnebusch, 2006:377, Krause, 1996:329). Jordan presents a distinct outcome however, 
undergoing the process of mass movements and nationalist mobilisation within the 
officer corps that the country’s neighbours also witnessed in the 1950s but with the 
distinct outcome of the King’s maintenance in power and a decisive return to Western 
tutelage. 
 
This chapter therefore analyses the evolution of the Jordanian social formation 
under the British mandate, and in particular the relationship between the changes in 
agrarian social relations and the formation of the core of the state in the military. In so 
doing, the chapter substantiates the insightful aside by Haim Gerber that in Jordan ‘the 
agrarian and class structure was more balanced, and possibly this is why the army did 
not become a mirror of class struggle as in other Arab countries’ (1987:159). This 
argument is echoed by later scholars (Tal, 2002 , Tell, 2008). Tell adds to this the idea 
that the building of the military under the British mandate offered a form of ‘militarized 
social provision’ to impoverished bedouin (2008:10). Building upon these claims and 
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offering evidence to support them, I argue that these phenomena were part of the 
uneven and combined development of the Jordanian social formation, as previous 
forms of surplus extraction broke down but were replaced, not by the antagonisms of 
landowner versus landless labourer or wage-earner, but rather through the imperial 
subsidy that represented a mechanism of combination. This was layered on top of a 
legacy of relatively egalitarian land-holding, providing the basis for Jordan’s distinct 
political outcomes of the 1950s. The history in this chapter is thus the intertwined story 
of how the military was formed as the core of the Jordanian state and how the process 
of ‘primitive accumulation’ ‘which dissolves the different forms, in which the labourer is 
an owner and the owner labours’occurred.   
 
The chapter therefore outlines the narrative history of the Jordanian military and 
the foundation of the state, and how this process has been understood in previous 
studies. In what follows I therefore provide a critique of those interpretations and then 
investigate the Gerber thesis by a comparison of Jordan’s military and agrarian history 
under the mandate with that of its neighbour with the most analogous experience (a 
British mandate administered in some cases by the same personnel such as Glubb) but 
divergent outcome: Iraq. I argue that this comparison supports Gerber’s claim. The 
polity built upon these social relations is, I argue, best understood as resulting in a 
combined social formation with consequences for the later political and geopolitical 
trajectory of Jordan. This combined social formation emerged in the mandate period as 
British officials sought simultaneously to create and control a society reflecting what 
they believed to be sound administration: a geographically bounded entity in which 
coercive and economic power was separate and therefore property-owning individuals 
could securely conduct market relations. This project disrupted, incorporated and 
reconstructed the agrarian social relations of Transjordan, creating a social basis for the 
Hashemite regime through the British subsidised armed forces but whose reproduction 




4.1 Context: the origins of Transjordan and its military 
 
 Before we analyse the place of the military and agrarian social relations in 
Jordan’s uneven and combined development, some historical context is necessary.  The 
history of the Jordanian armed forces in some ways predates that of the state itself. The 
region that became ‘Transjordan’ and then ‘Jordan’ was divided across several 
administrative districts under the Ottomans. The Transjordan mandate was created as a 
result of the First World War.  The Arab Revolt, proclaimed by Sharif Hussein of the 
Hijaz and led by his son Faisal passed up through these areas in 1917-18 aiming to join 
up with British forces in Syria and create a united Arab kingdom ruled from Damascus. 
‘Transjordan’ became part of this short-lived kingdom. Faisal’s rule was short-lived 
because the post-war settlement at San Remo allocated Syria neither to its inhabitants 
nor to Faisal but to the victorious French.  Palestine, Iraq and the lands east of the 
Jordan were apportioned to Britain.  The British offered the throne of the new kingdom 
of Iraq to Faisal and sent military emissaries, such as the Frederick Peake and the 
brothers Kirkbride, to the fractious ‘governments’ based mainly around local shaikhs, 
that had emerged east of the Jordan after the collapse of the Ottomans and the dispersal 
of Faisal’s followers (Kirkbride, 1956:20).  
 
  These ‘governments’ swiftly dissipated, however, as Faisal’s brother Abdullah 
struck north from the Hijaz in an attempt to reignite the Arab Revolt and re-stake the 
Hashemite claim to Syria. Upon reaching Amman and negotiating with Winston 
Churchill, Abdullah was at least temporarily disabused of this idea and agreed to 
become the ‘Amir of Transjordan’ subject to Britain’s overall direction and financial 
support. The Amirate – the ‘native’ administration with which Britain could deal– was 
founded in April 1921, the British mandate over ‘Transjordan’ declared in July 1922 and 
the first Anglo-Jordanian treaty signed in 1923. The armed forces and land settlement 
under discussion here are those of the mandate thus established: institutions that went 
on to form the core of the (notionally) independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as 
the Amirate was declared in 1946. 




 4.1.1 The Birth of Transjordan 
 
How and why was this entity created? The view of Jordan as an entirely a 
colonial product conjured out of terra nullis may be something of an exaggeration but the 
regularity of the state’s borders gives some idea of their contingent origins. In the 
aftermath of the Ottoman defeat the situation was fluid. The British had no particular 
concern with the area that became Transjordan, but they were fundamentally concerned 
with what lay around it. To the East, the bountiful oil fields of Iraq had to be secured 
and exploited. To the West, the Mediterranean pipeline at Haifa would export the 
product. The Palestine mandate, with its special conditions of Zionist immigration, was 
more often the British priority than the lands East of the Jordan. To the South a state of 
sorts was congealing around the Sauds, bitter enemies of the Hashemites, and favourites 
of the British. Abdullah’s thrust north for Amman provided an opportunity for Britain 
to fill this gap and divert conflict with the French over Syria: the Cairo Conference of 
1921 therefore confirmed Abdullah as the ruler of an Arab government in an area 
carved out of the Palestine Mandate taken by the British under the Sykes-Picot 
agreement (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2001:20). 
 
  In the period between the Ottoman collapse and Abdullah’s arrival there was no 
centralized force in the areas that were to form the Amirate. Various Ottoman left-overs 
attached themselves to Faisal’s Damascene government (particularly the istiqlali , or 
‘independentist’, officers who had defected from Ottoman service to join the Hashemite 
cause) or the local entities that surfaced in the post-war interregnum. More important 
were the British efforts to establish an armed force that would defend and govern 
(within a certain conception of these practices) a bounded polity in which economic and 
coercive structures were separated. These efforts passed through two main phases, 
based both on the⎯often relatively ad hoc⎯responses to circumstances encountered by 
the British and on their conceptions of the society they come to oversee and the society 
from which they came.  
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The first phase of the evolution of the Jordanian military extended from the 
establishment of the first ‘mobile reserve force’ in 1920 and continued in its essence 
under Peake’s command until the arrival of John Glubb as Peake’s deputy in 1930 
(Dann, 1984:24). Two forces were thus established in this period: the Arab Legion, 
raised by Abdullah as he proceeded north in 1921, and the Trans Jordan Frontier Force 
recruited by Peake in 1926. The mobile force was re-established by Peake as the core of 
the Arab Legion (Vatikiotis, 1967:53). Abdullah brought with him a ‘regular battalion’ 
(al-katiba al-nidhamiyya) of about 200 men and 100 camel cavalry (al-Luqyaani, 1993:18). 
A number of rebellions against mandate authority (discussed in a later section) led Peake 
in 1923 to merge all the forces loyal to the mandate (Abdullah’s men, the remnants of 
the local Ottoman gendarmerie and the mobile force) into a single army under his 
command, henceforth known as the ‘Arab Legion’ (El-Edroos, 1980:213). The 
establishment of this force, coming together with the first Anglo-Jordanian treaty in 
1923 set the co-ordinates of the relationship that was to continue at least until 1957: 
Britain subsidised Abdullah by 150,000 pounds a year whereas funding for the new 
Arab Legion was to pass directly through Peake (Vatikiotis, 1967:44).  
 
The Arab Legion was conceived as an internal security force: the British High 
Commissioner in Palestine wanted a border patrol for the mandates both East and West 
of the Jordan to guard against Wahhabi raids from the newly founded Saudi kingdom 
(Glubb, 1948). On this basis, the Transjordan Frontier Force, composed mainly of 
Palestinians, was formed in 1926. The size of the Arab legion was correspondingly 
reduced to 900 men: the TJFF remained in existence until the end of the Palestine 
mandate in 1948, reaching a strength of 700 men two years before that date (Vatikiotis, 
1967). The British were not satisfied with the TJFF’s performance: its replacement by 
the ‘Desert Patrol’ of the Arab Legion as the instrument of  ‘pacification of the tribes’ 
marked the second phase of the building of Transjordan’s armed forces. 
 
As discussed below, the creation of the Desert Patrol in 1930 represented a 
particular conception of the colonial state and its intervention into the political economy 
of Transjordan. Under the command of John Bagot Glubb, recently arrived from 
similar duties in Iraq, the Desert Patrol was intended to ‘secure the co-operation of the 
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beduin by convincing them that the "government" was not always an enemy’ (Kirkbride, 
1956:62). By 1936 the Desert Patrol comprised 106 men with 3 officers out of a total 
force of 1007 (Diya and Saleh, 1997:266).  Following the Palestine Revolt and the 
outbreak of the Second World War, however, the ‘Bedouin Mechanized force’ had 
grown to 800 men out of a total of 1600 in the Arab Legion (Vatikiotis, 1967:73). The 
40 to 50 officers of  the force were mainly ex-Ottoman Arab officers, recruited by Peake 
in 1921-22 when these men were in their twenties ⎯only one new officer was admitted 
between 1922 and 1939 (1967:21).  
 
By the end of  the war the Legion contained some 8000 men, in addition to 1000 
police (1967:75). The Legion itself  comprised a mechanized brigade of  three regiments, 
adding up to 3000 men (made up of  recruits Glubb considered sufficiently ‘bedouin’), 
the Desert Patrol of  500 men (composed of  similar recruits), garrison units adding up 
to 2000 (in Glubb’s eyes hadari townsmen) men, 500 anciliary troops and 2000 trainees 
(Vatikiotis, 1967:75). Formal independence and the Arab-Israel campaign in which 
Glubb himself  played an ambiguous role (Pappe, 2006:119) brought a wave of  further 
expansion. By 1950 the legion’s strength had increased to 12,000, spending an annual 
subsidy of  £6 million (Vatikiotis, 1967:78).  Six years later the force had grown to 
25,000 men staffed with 1,500 officers (Vatikiotis, 1967:23). It was this greatly expanded 
Arab Legion that became a site of  struggle in the 1950s. 
 
4.1.2 Understanding the Arab Legion 
 
 How are we to understand the creation of  this force, its relationship to the 
society upon which British colonial power was imposed and is persistence after 
independence? Three main interpretations present themselves. The most enduring and 
popular interpretation derives from a kind of  colonial folk wisdom which sees the 
bedouin as the archetypal ‘martial race’ whose presence in the Arab legion is sufficient 
explanation for its loyalty to the Hashemite regime and therefore Jordan’s escape from 
the ‘belated infusion of  mass society into Arab politics’ and consequent instability that 
had befallen its neighbours (Vatikiotis, 1967:154).  A second approach, offered by 
Joseph Massad, rejects these colonial assumptions the Arab Legion rather as a process 
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which ‘de-bedouinized’ the bedouin, in the sense of  integrating them into the 
epistemology of  the modern state, and then recreated them as a ‘sublated’ colonial 
version of  their former selves (2001:7). The emphasis for Massad is on a process by 
which a certain national-Jordanian community is imagined and certain kind of  subject 
placed within that community rather than the political economy of  the preconditions 
and effects of  that process. A final set of  interpretations of  the origins and role of  the 
Arab Legion, based around what I have called the Gerber Thesis (Tal, 2002) (Tell, 2008) 
do provide the beginnings of  such a political economy but without extensively 
investigating the main claim about the impact of  Jordan’s agrarian social relations on the 
Arab Legion nor the geopolitical implications of  that impact.  
 
The view of  the Arab Legion propagated by Glubb Pasha, his contemporaries 
and epigones, provides an excellent example of  the colonial tropes of  ‘military 
orientalism’ (Porter, 2009). In this version, best expressed by Glubb himself, the 
predominance of  bedouin units in the Jordanian army secured the King’s position 
because they were composed of  ‘hardy, simple men, with a straightforward and 
unquestioning belief  in God… but little corrupted by foreign influences, [who] still 
regarded the Hashemite dynasty with reverence as descendants of  the Prophet 
Muhamad [sic], and were not fertile soil for Communist propaganda’(Glubb, 1957:436). 
The bedouin appear here as noble warrior figures imbued with a native intelligence but 
unsuited to the modern world except insofar as their warlike nature could be utilized by 
the colonial power. Recruitment to the Desert Patrol and the mechanized forces of  the 
Arab legion would thereby give an outlet to their inherent capacity for courage and 
loyalty and transform their boisterous belligerence into an asset for the state (1948:103). 
Glubb’s broadest definition of  ‘bedouin’ meant  ‘tribes which own land, but themselves 
migrate to the desert for at least part of  the year on camels…[such as] the Beni Sakhr, 
Huweitat and Sirhan’(1938:499).  
 
 The notion of  the bedouin as a ‘race’ naturally given to martial pursuits and 
therefore likely to join the army enjoyed a wide currency even after Glubb’s dismissal 
and the general retreat of  British colonialism in the Arab world. Thus PJ Vatikiotis 
argues that the tribal, warrior culture of  the Bedouin attracted them to the Jordanian 
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Arab Legion: ‘the beduin in a sense, came to the Legion with an anti-individualistic 
ethic, made possible by the primacy of  collective security and responsibility in the tribe, 
clan and family’ (1967:20). Vatikiotis maintains that the bedouin tradition of  loyalty to 
tribal chiefs was simply transferred to the monarchy, along with other martial traditions 
(1967:25). In this respect the order of  battle within the Arab legion the combat and 
mobile units being dominated by bedouin, the logistical units by settled townsmen and 
Palestinians reflected nomadic disdain for settled, technical occupations. Vatikiotis goes 
so far as to claim that ‘‘[t]he beduin apparently is by nature of  his cultural predilection 
averse to the acquisition of  technical skills…even though… he is fond of  driving 
vehicles’ (1967:25). This sort of  claim⎯one that reduces the bedouin to a pre-modern, 
childlike essence⎯reaches an almost libidinal level in Axelrod’s argument that the 
Desert Patrol attracted ‘tribal recruits’ because they were ‘turned on by its weapons and 
handsome uniforms’(Axelrod, 1978:28). 
 
 Joseph Massad (2001:2001) has followed Edward Said’s example in 
deconstructing the assumptions of  Vatikiotis, Glubb, Kirkbride and others. It is 
important to note however that the issue is not whether Glubb and other British 
officials ‘liked’ the Bedouin or not. Beneath the stuffy essentialisms of  the British 
officials lay a particular conception of  global development which, as Toby Dodge has 
amply demonstrated in the case of  Mandate Iraq: 
 
 allowed societies external to Europe to be divided into two broad categories: 
those judged to be immature and those condemned as pathological. The 
immature were perceived to be on a uni-linear historical path whose final 
destination would prove to be a European modernity. Those judged pathological 
were perceived to have deviated from that developmental path or had never 
been fit to join it. (Dodge, 2005:45) 
 
Massad documents how the interpellation of  Arab Legion recruits as soldiers and 
Transjordanians reflected such a conception. He describes a series of  bodily and 
organisational practices:  
embedded in a temporal schema, whose telos is European modernity; a 
geocultural schema, whose core is urbanity at the expense of  the countryside 
and the desert; and a class schema, organised by bourgeois economics replacing 
the previous rules of  property and ownership.(2001:6) 
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These practices included the physical drills, organisational hierarchies and 
uniforms (an idealized version of  bedouin clothing) of  the Arab Legion. The creation 
of  Transjordan’s armed forces under the mandate formed a constitutive/ repressive/ 
disciplinary nexus by which the state sought to ‘constitute and produce the subjects and 
the categories… [it seeks] to discipline and/or repress (Massad, 2001:5).  
 
Massad here draws upon a theoretical tradition that sees colonialism as a new 
epistemological model that divided the world ‘into two, into the material realm of  things 
in themselves, as could now be said, and an abstract realm of  their order or 
structure’(Mitchell, 1988:13). The disciplinary apparatuses through which this 
transformation were effected served the needs of  the colonial state and integration into 
global capitalism, but cannot be reduced to an effect of  that integration because the 
very notion of  such a relationship is itself  an aspect of  this epistemological model 
(1988:18) Massad does not explicitly repeat Mitchell’s argument here but his focus on 
the genealogy of  bedouin-ness means that he does not pursue his suggestive arguments 
that ‘nationalizing the internal space of  the nation state, through the conversion of  
communal property into bourgeois forms of  property, was part of  the same process of  
demarcating its borders in relation to foreign space while simultaneously subjecting that 
space to the law’ and that ‘the centrality of  bourgeois forms of  property to the national 
project could not have been more emphasized by the British’ (Massad, 2001:33).  
 
  Yoav Alon’s extensive study covers some of  the same material as Massad and 
the discussion in this chapter, arguing the main British interest in Transjordan was to 
pacify the country as cheaply as possible (Alon, 2007:5). This was achieved under skilled 
and experienced colonial administrators such as Glubb and Kirkbride by a ‘laissez faire’ 
model of  imperial rule that integrated the tribal population into the state (2007:6). 
Unlike in other Middle Eastern states, this was done mostly without coercion 
(2007:151). Thus Jordan was spared the history and apparatus of  coercive rule from 
which the instability of  other Arab states sprang, resulting in the peculiar but stable 
‘combination of  foreign and colonial regime together with indigenous Arab tribal 
society’(2007:3). This support base, discussed more fully below, was called upon to 
defend the monarchy whenever it was under threat in the post-independence years 
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(2007:153). Where this chapter adds to Alon is in demonstrating how the political 
economy of  this process, interacted with and replaced previous forms of  social 
relations. In the following section therefore, I investigate these claims (closely connected 
to Haim Gerber’s thesis about Jordan’s agrarian property relations) by means of  a 
comparison with Iraq. In so doing, I argue that the constitutive schema of  Massad and 
the close history offered by Alon represent a historical totality in which the ‘unevenness’ 
of  Transjordan (the timing and nature of  its integration into a global capitalist system) 
resulted in a particular combination of  social forces in the army that distinguished 
Jordan from its neighbours.
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4.2 Land Distribution and Primitive Accumulation in Mandate 
Jordan and Iraq 
 
  The central contention that, in Haim Gerber’s words, in Jordan ‘the agrarian and 
class structure was more balanced, and possibly this is why the army did not become a 
mirror of  class struggle as in other Arab countries’ (Gerber, 1987:159) has been echoed 
in a number of  works (Fischbach, 2000 2002:18, Tell, 2008:6-7). Yet this posited 
connection between Jordan’s agrarian social relations and the foundation of  its army has 
not been fully investigated, nor its implications for the sources of  Jordan’s geopolitical 
alignments drawn out. Comparison between the social histories of  Iraq and Jordan is 
instructive. Similar colonial initiatives, carried out in some cases by the same personnel, 
resulted in different social combinations and trajectories for the two states in a later 
phase of  their history. Michael Fischbach (1994, 2000) has provided comprehensive 
evidence in support of  Gerber’s claims about the more egalitarian distribution of  land 
in Jordan. But how did this agrarian political economy relate to the army, and how did 
Jordan differ in this respect from its close (dynastic and geographic) neighbour Iraq? 
What are the implications of  these relationships then for the politics and foreign 
policies of  Jordan in the period of  nationalist revolutions such as those that engulfed 
Iraq? 
 
 4.2.1 Class, Collective Tenure and Land Settlement 
 
In this section I examine the basis for claims that Jordan’s agrarian social 
relations were more egalitarian than those of  other Arab states, and that this reduced 
the impact of  class struggle in the army. How can we investigate the claim that Jordan’s 
agrarian structures, mediated through the army, affected its later trajectory? Further 
specifying the definition given in Chapter 2 of  this thesis, I adopt Hanna Batatu’s 
approach to agrarian social relations in the Arab world, accepting that ‘”property” and 
“lack of  property” form the fundamental elements of  the class… situation’ but ‘at the 
same time, it is beyond dispute that “property” varies in character or significance under 
varying circumstances and could, therefore, be properly understood only in its specific 
historical context’ (Batatu, 2004:7). This is compatible with the definition of  class given 
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in Chapter 2 and expressed succinctly by Geoffrey de Ste Croix: ‘the collective social 
expression of  the fact of  exploitation, the way in which exploitation is embodied in a 
social structure’ where exploitation means ‘the appropriation of  part of  the product of  
the labour of  others’ (1981:43). This appropriation divides the population into groups, 
i.e. classes, ‘identified by their position in the whole system of  social production, 
defined above all according to their relationship (primarily in terms of  degree of  
ownership or control) to the means of  production’(1981:43). In predominantly agrarian 
societies such as mandate era Transjordan and Iraq this definition means primarily the 
distribution of  access to land, whether for tilling or grazing, and claims on the products 
of  labour on that land. Following Batatu’s injunction that ‘members of  a class may not 
be class-conscious in their behavior, but their behavior could nevertheless be class-
conditioned’ how are we to assess the distribution and claims to land in Transjordan and 
Iraq and its relationship to the state-building enterprise in the military?  
 
  The principal mechanism of  British policy toward land in the mandates was 
cadastral survey and settlement. This mechanism, applied throughout the Empire in 
Australia, India and Egypt was premised on a quite distinct understanding of  property 
in land. First, the land was mapped: that is, represented as an abstract grid established by 
officials of  the Department of  Lands and Surveys. This geographical representation of  
land was inseparably bound to a social one. Each parcel of  land had to have an owner 
and that ownership was registered by the colonial state. Land settlement in both Jordan 
and Iraq was recommended by Sir Ernest Dowson (Dodge, 2006:210) but only fully 
implemented in Jordan. Following a visit in 1926 Dowson recommended a survey of  
the country. This survey began in the provinces of  ʿAjlun, Balqaʾ, Karak and Maʿan 
(Fischbach, 1994:88). Land settlement itself  began in 1933 in Jabal ‘Ajilun and Irbid; 
1934 in Jarash and the Bani Sakhr bedouin area; 1939 in Amman and Madaba; 1940 in 
Salt; 1945 in Karak and the Bani Hassan bedouin area and 1949 in Tafila and Maʿan 
(Fischbach, 1994:94). 
 
The essential goal of  mandate land policy was that any form of  collective rights 
in land, such as the mushʿa tenure discussed in the previous chapter, should be 
eradicated. This conception held by mandatory administrators of  ‘native’ society and the 
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solution to its perceived problems reflected a shared notion of  the historical sociological 
process of  development and unevenness. For the colonial officers in the inter-war Arab 
mandates, British society represented the horizon of  human achievement: the 
‘Englishman with a liberal education’ with whose ‘subtle and elaborately developed’ 
(Sykes in Massad, 2001:106) brain the bedouin showed a strange affinity. The mandatory 
authorities saw the basis of  British society as the free intercourse of  rational individuals 
secure in their property: a liberty won through a long process of  historical development 
and the overcoming of  previous, unnatural and therefore tyrannical, ways of  organizing 
society. George Walpole, the head of  the Transjordan Department of  Lands and 
Surveys, found it hard to imagine ‘a tenure more inimical to good farming’ than the 
collective rights involved in mushʿa (Walpole, 1935:55). It was, in the words of  the 1935 
annual report on the Transjordan mandate, ‘a most serious obstacle to development’ 
(quoted in Fischbach, 2000:104).  As mentioned in the previous chapter this form of  
tenure was not uniformly practiced throughout the areas that became Jordan, but it was 
most common in the more intensively farmed and settled areas of  the north and west 
and most of  all where grain was cultivated. Around two thirds of  Jordanian villages 
were mushʿa villages (Fischbach, 1994:83). The task of  land survey and settlement was to 
remove this ‘inimical’ form of  tenure. 
 
4.2.2 The Results of Land Settlement: Land Distribution in 
Transjordan and Iraq 
 
What were its results? In Jordan the settlement reinforced a pre-existing pattern 
of  widely distributed smallholding. This pattern can be viewed in a number of  ways: in 
the distribution of  ownership, of  holdings (i.e. the units in which land was actually 
farmed) and the number of  taxpayers paying higher or lower rates of  the land tax. The 
census carried out in 1939 as part of  land survey and settlement found the average size 
of  owned plots to be 56-78 dunums in well watered areas (such as the north west) and 
120 dunums in drier areas in the south and east (Walpole, 1935:63).  These means do 
not seem to have been skewed by polarization into very large and very small plots. 
According to the mandate annual report for 1938, 66% of  landowners paid the lowest 
rate of  less than one pound a year: 19% paid between one and two pounds, 7% between 
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two and three pounds and 8% more than three pounds (Colonial Office 1939:328). The 
division of  the privately owned cultivated area provides perhaps the clearest evidence of  
Jordan’s relatively egalitarian land distribution, however. In 1952 36.3% of  the privately 
owned area of  land in Jordan was held in plots of  under 100 dunums, 49.5% in plots of  
between 100 and 1000 dunums, 14.2% over 1000 dunums (Baer, 1957:194). In units of  
operation (rather than ownership) ‘in 1952 and 53, 24.9% of  the farm area in the 
Hashemite Kingdom...was covered by small holdings of  10 to 100 dunums, 55.2% by 
medium size holdings (100-1000 dunums) and only 19.9% by large holdings (100-1000) 
dunums’ (1957:194).  
 
The Iraqi pattern of  land distribution during and after the mandate (which 
ended earlier in Iraq than in Jordan, in 1932) differed from this predominance of  small 
holders. Of  course, by definition the owners of  smaller plots are always likely to 
outnumber the owners of  larger plots: thus 72.9% of  proprietors before the 1958 
revolution in Iraq held plots of  under 50 dunums but these covered only 6.2% of  the 
cultivated area (Batatu, 2004:55). 55.1% of  that area was owned in holdings of  over 
1000 dunums, the proprietors of  which comprised under 1% of  the landowners 
(2004:55). The average size of  Iraqi holdings in 1953 was 510 dunums (Baer, 1957:194), 
between five and ten times the Jordanian figure. The land tax in Iraq was levied 
differently and in a manner more partial to large landowners: after 1931 the tax was 
levied only on products brought to market and then only at a relatively low rate of  
12.5% for crops grown on large estates such as dates, barley and wheat (Batatu, 2004). 
Before the introduction of  the consumption tax, the mandate retained the Ottoman 
system of  ‘leasing’ miri state lands 61.6% of  the area (Baer, 1957:189) to landlords. In 
the district of  ʿAmara, which was particularly dominated by large landlords, 16 landlords 
paid rent over 25,000 rupees a year (Sluglett, 2007:234). There were no individual 
smallholdings whatsoever in the district (2007:242).  The state was chronically unable to 
collect sufficient revenue from agriculture, the shortfall being replaced only later by oil 
revenues (Tripp, 2000:69). 
4.2.3 Landlessness and Wage Labour  
 
 The distribution and terms of  access to land form the basis of  differentiation 
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amongst classes in agrarian societies such as mandatory Transjordan and Iraq. The 
figures above have demonstrated the comparatively egalitarian distribution of  land in 
Jordan. But what of  those who do not themselves own land? They must find some 
other way of  accessing its products by offering their labour to those with more land. 
Although it was probably untrue to say of  Transjordan that the ‘number of  persons in 
the villages entirely without land is negligible’ (Konikoff, 1946:38) comparison with Iraq 
again reveals a different structure to agrarian social relations. According to the 1953 
census examined by Fischbach of  272,737 East Bank males (a figure that includes 
minors) there were 90,206 landowners that is around a third of  households and 
probably more given the distortion introduced by including under-age males (Fischbach, 
2000:157). In the northern areas of  ʿAjilun, Jarash and Irbid 60-80% of  men owned 
lands (2000:157). An American survey of  1931 found that on average between only 10- 
20% of  the men in Transjordanian villages were landless labourers (Fischbach, 
2000:157).  
 
 There was landlessness and wage labour in Transjordan but these tended to be 
displaced from the geographical and social centres of  state building. Given the small 
size of  many plots, it seems likely that many cultivators leased their land to the holders 
of  slightly larger plots while continuing to work them themselves: a kind of  reverse 
sharecropping suggested by the discrepancy between the sizes of  units of  production 
and units of  ownership (Baer, 1957:193). Some members of  the Bani Sakhr from 
around the central Balqaʾ valley had apparently taken up wage labour in the Zionist 
colonies west of  the Jordan. Perhaps more extensive and more interesting was the 
extension of  the form of  the  ‘bedouin plantation village’, discussed in the previous 
chapter. Here we seem to find a pattern at first sight similar to that of  Iraq: sheikhs of  
large tribal groups registering land in their own name under the Ottomans and then 
being confirmed in that position by the British mandate. In particular the al-Fayiz, the 
dominant clan of  the Bani Sakhr acquired swathes of  the country around Madaba 
(Rogan, 2002:87). In the late Ottoman period the Bani Sakhr sold 4000 dunums to 
Christian merchants from Nablus who then employed sharecroppers to farm the land. 
However the Bani Sakhr shaykhs continued to extort rent from the new owners 
(Abujaber:77) and therefore indirectly from the Egyptian and Palestinian sharecroppers 
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who had come to work the land. In the words of  the colonial administrator Frederick 
Peake : ‘[t]o post his slaves around the harvesters with loaded rifles is about the extent 
to which the Sakhr owner may be called a farmer, and the actual work is done only by 
fellahin from Jebel Quds [i.e. near Jerusalem] and Nablus’ (Lewis, 1987:130). The Bani 
Sakhr lands still held in mushʿa seem to have been partitioned out fairly consensually 
amongst households in 1945 (Alon, 2007:133). There were undoubtedly considerable 
differences of  wealth and status amongst the transhumant groups but division over 
landholding and wage-labour seems to be have been ‘exported’ outside of  them, 
continuing the legacy described in the previous chapter.  
 
 In Iraq the extent of  landlessness, sharecropping and plantation agriculture was 
much greater. Indeed the proportion of  landholders to non-landholders was the reverse 
of  that in Jordan: ‘four-fifths of  the families of  Iraq owned no land’ (Batatu, 2004:55). 
As we have seen, certain districts such as ʿAmara were dominated by large landowners 
whose estates were worked entirely by sharecroppers. Up until 1958, peasant 
landholders in Iraq were an ‘exceptional phenomenon’ (2004:76).  As in Jordan, and in 
Gaza, prior to the Tanzimat reforms the settled cultivators were often distinguished 
from transhumant or fully nomadic pastoralists by ideologies of  kinship⎯ and often 
brutally direct⎯ relations of  tribute (2004:70-1). As in the areas that became Jordan, the 
Mesopotamian domains of  the Ottoman Empire became subject to Ottoman‘ direct 
pressure to break his [the sheikh’s] position’ reflecting ‘the indirect but far more potent 
influence of  remoter forces – those of  the world market – brought near to him by the 
new river communications’ (2004:74). However, the result was different to that seen in 
Jordan. Sheikhs were able essentially to expropriate their followers and clients by means 
of  registering hitherto collectively held domains as their own, ‘substituting for the life-
renewing patriarchal and blood relationships – where these existed – the new subversive 
relationships of  production’ (2004:78). 
 
 These relationships brought about a particular combination reminiscent of  the 
‘second serfdom’ imposed in Eastern Europe to meet the demands of  the grain market. 
The estates (muqataʿa) that predominated in the most fertile riparian provinces were in 
some cases worked by the sheikh’s own tribal affiliates and sometimes by outside 
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sharecroppers or historically subject lineages (2004:79). The actual work of  the estate 
was generally supervised by an intermediary group absent in Jordan known as the 
sarkals. The sarkals were sub-tenants of  the sheikh and usually the heads of  sub-units of  
his tribe who contracted the actual labour of  sharecroppers or occasionally free 
peasants (Sluglett, 2007:163). The degeneration of  sheikhly authority over the sarkals is 
indicated by the constant struggle of  the British to enforce the sheikh’s right as tax 
gatherer against them (Dodge, 2005:111). 
 
 The sheikhs reinforced their power over the cultivators by legislative means. The 
1933 Land Law marked a particularly repressive low point, to the extent that some 
legislators were concerned it might infringe the International Convention against Slavery 
(Sluglett, 2007:180). The law made the cultivators responsible for the condition of  the 
crop up almost up until its sale, and also bound them to work off  any debts they thus 
incurred. Agriculture being subject to various natural and market calamities, the net 
result of  this law was to reduce many of  the direct cultivators to debt bondage (Sluglett, 
2007:180). Thus, although Jordan was not without agrarian discontent or distress 
amongst the poorer cultivators and therefore some degree of  organisation among them 
in areas such as the Jordan Valley the country did not produce the pool of  agrarian 
misery present in Iraq.  
 
4.3 Combination and the integration of tribes into the 
mandate state 
 
 The changes wrought in the social formations of  Jordan and Iraq under the 
mandate occurred not only at the bottom, amongst the cultivators and the exploited, but 
perhaps more importantly at the top amongst sheikhs, landlords and the state. Here 
again the British policy tended to reverberate between two conceptual limits, deriving 
from their own notions of  the course of  global development which had placed them in 
the position of  imperial overlords. These differences played out in the varied attempts 
to found a social basis for the Hashemite monarchical regimes the British established to 
legitimate their control.  
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4.3.1 The Dilemmas of Mandate Rule: Governance and Shifting Social 
Relations 
 
British conceptions and policies tended to vary between two views. At one pole, 
Mandate officers identified such rural social phenomena as ‘tribalism’, collective 
property or the large landed estates of  the sheikhs with features of  Britain’s own history 
that had to be overcome; it was ‘axiomatic that the tribesman is a bad citizen, 
unproductive subject and potential breaker of  the peace’(CO 696/2:719). This view 
emphasized the building of  a stable society of  property owners, secured against the 
depredations of  the ‘tribal’ sector.  
 
Yet the mandate authorities were also aware that they could not rule (cheaply at 
least) these territories without co-opting some local force. Hence they sought to also 
work through what they perceived as indigenous Arab social practices and institutions 
such as the ‘tribe’, re-trenching or even creating relationships of  power and patronage 
on that basis. Army officers such as Glubb (who served in both Iraq and Transjordan) 
took the so-called ‘Sandeman system’ of  subsidy and co-optation as their model (Bocco 
and Tell, 1994:120) The explicit or implicit aim of  such policies was to secure the base 
of  the regime against any threat of  organised, anti-colonial mass politics; a threat 
embodied in the chief  fantasmic villain of  the colonial imagination, ‘the semi-educated 
townsman’ (Batatu, 2004:88). The result was the creation of  states, and therefore 
interaction between those states, in which ‘capitalism neither evolved mechanically from 
the modes of  production that preceded [it]…, nor did it completely dissolve those 
modes’ but ‘sometimes coexisted with such modes and sometimes buttressed and 
prolonged certain of  their aspects’ (Ayubi, 1995:41). In both of  the mandates policy 
eventually settled on integrating and supporting willing sheikhs and establishing parallel 
(tribal) legal systems. However, Jordan and Iraq differed in how sheikhly power was 
integrated into the state. In Iraq they were bound into a larger landowning ruling class at 
the expense of  their tenants and notional kinsmen. In Jordan the armed forces formed a 
channel to reinvigorate the vertical loyalties of  such groups as the Huwaytat and the 
Bani Sakhr at a point when their political economy was in crisis in the early 1930s. This 
process reinforced the ‘export’ of  the development of  horizontal divisions within these 
groups described above. 
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4.3.2 Iraq: The Making of the Sheikhs 
 
 In both Jordan and Iraq the British authorities faced the task of  imposing their 
will on newly-won territories without the financial or human resources upon which they 
had relied in earlier colonial endeavours. In the nineteen twenties in both mandates the 
British found the authority of  their Hashemite protégés highly limited. In Iraq the 
mandate administrators were concerned to ensure that the king (whose wider Arab 
ambitions had not been forgotten) was stronger than any individual sheikh but not than 
the sheikhs in general. (Batatu, 2004:90). Faisal was particularly reliant on British forces 
in the form of  the RAF to suppress any opposition and the British themselves favoured 
aerial bombardment as a method of  tax collection, while drawing the rather fine 
distinction between ‘collecting’ revenue and punishing ‘defiance of  government orders’ 
(Sluglett, 2007:189). In fact, British rule faced resistance from the very beginning of  the 
mandate. Between 1919 and their official withdrawal from the mandate in 1932 the 
British faced a significant national uprising (the revolt of  1920), a two week general 
strike in 1931 and five local uprisings mainly concentrated in the Kurdish areas: between 
the first military coup under Bakr Sadiqi in 1936 the notionally independent kingdom 
saw five further localized rebellions (Batatu, 2004:467). 
 
 The ‘Revolution of  1920’ began in the cities essentially among former Ottoman 
civil servants, officers and parts of  the Shiʿa clergy (Zubaida, 2002:207). The revolt 
quickly developed into a mass movement against the mandate organised through both 
Shiʿa and Sunni mosques in Baghdad (Tripp, 2000:42). Sheikhs and their tribes from the 
lower Euprhates joined the revolt, often from resentment at British favouritism towards 
certain sheikhs and clans or out of  fear that the new government might curtail their 
privileges of  taxation and tribute (Zubaida, 2002:210). The revolt was suppressed but 
the British adminstration learned a lesson from it.  The large landowning sheikhs of  
provinces such as Kut and ʿAmara, having been recognized and cultivated by the British, 
stood with them against the revolt (Tripp, 2000:44). For the rest of  the mandate the 
British sought to bolster the larger sheikhs in any way possible. Possessed of  the notion 
that these men exercised a benevolent patriarchy over their cultivators, the mandate 
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authorities went around forbidding people to mix outside of  their ‘tribal’ areas, 
assigning headmen of  various sorts to the position of  paramount sheikh and preventing 
cultivators from escaping their sheikhs’ lands (Batatu, 2004:94). The upshot of  this was 
to entrench and extend the social relations detailed in previous sections of  this thesis.  
 
 This policy was embodied in the structure of  the state in Iraq. From the first 
days of  the British occupation the cities and the countryside were governed by different 
legal systems. Again borrowing from colonial practice in India, the Tribal Disputes 
Regulation made sheikhs responsible for administration of  the law amongst their 
tribesmen  (Dodge, 2005:95). Sheikhs were over-represented in the central state bodies. 
The Ottoman assembly of  1914 contained only one sheikhly delegate of  the 34 
representing Iraq: the 34 of  the 99 members of  the Iraqi Constituent assembly of  1924 
were sheikhs or (the Kurdish equivalent) aghas (Batatu, 2004:95).  Dobbs, the British 
high commissioner had originally sought an assembly made up entirely of  sheikhs 
(Dodge, 2005:90).  The sheikhs could, and often did, rely upon British armour and air 
support against their own tribal subordinates while also maintaining their own retainers 
(the hushiyya) who could be used to discipline any recalcitrant cultivators (Batatu, 
2004:85). 
 
 Here we may register an important difference between Iraq and Jordan. Sheikhly 
power was not, in general, integrated into the state through the Iraqi army. The large 
landholding sheikhs were already posed against the cultivators who were often members 
of  their own tribe. Such forces as they employed, borrowed from the British or paid for 
using British subsidies, were directed toward this division. The army itself  was a 
secondary development. The first forces employed by Britain in Iraq (aside from British 
and Indian troops themselves) were the so-called ‘Iraq Levies’, a force of  around 4000 
men commanded by British officers and composed mostly of  members of  the Assyrian 
minority (Tarbush, 1982:76). Although Britain preferred to rely upon the RAF to police 
Iraq and its borders, the mandate authorities did found an army based around the ex-
Ottoman and Sharifan officers who had congregated in Baghdad (1982:77). New 
officers were recruited but they were usually from towns- three quarters of  those 
recruited by 1936 (1982:78). The enlisted ranks were in the view of  the British colonial 
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administrators 70% ‘tribal’, a category they counter-posed to ‘townsmen’ (Colonial 
Office No.4 670) 
 
The British sought to maintain parity between the army and the Iraq Levies and 
hence based both on voluntary recruitment (Tarbush, 1982:78) but the Iraq 
government, crucially, introduced conscription in 1935. As a result ‘unlike other state 
institutions such as the Parliament or the Cabinet, which were enclaves of  privilege, the 
bulk of  the officer corps was drawn from the middle classes’(Batatu, 2004:764). These 
officers were overwhelmingly Sunni but ‘shared, to a lesser or greater degree, the 
popular discontent, especially those who…hailed from small provincial towns such as 
ʿAnah or Takrit, whose old local economies had been disrupted by the flow of  
European industrial goods or under the impact of  the new communications.’(2004:765). 
The Iraqi army thus included in its main ranks a mass of  men connected to the 
generally miserable condition of  the Iraqi cultivator, a junior officer group reflecting the 
displacement and dissatisfaction of  the urban and semi-urban middle class and an 
upper-ranking group composed of  ex-Sharifan officers increasingly integrated into the 
landowning ruling class around the monarchy. 
 
4.3.3 Jordan: The Army and Primitive Accumulation on the Steppe 
 
  The establishment and expansion of  the Jordanian armed forces under the 
mandate entrenched a quite different set of  social relationships. In the early stage of  the 
mandate, between 1922 and 1930 the British struggled to exert control over the territory 
of  Transjordan on behalf  of  Abdullah. The first engagements of  the Transjordan 
Armed forces under Peake were directed against recalcitrant communities that refused 
to pay tax or recognize the mandate authority. Almost as soon as the Amirate was 
founded its ‘Reserve Mobile Force’ was sent to suppress a revolt in May 1921 in the 
district of  Kura near Irbid (El-Edroos, 1980:215) . The revolt, which was not fully 
suppressed for a year, was in essence a refusal to pay taxes.  The Force was more 
successful in its confrontation with the Balqa’ revolt of  1923 (1980:212). The Balqaʾ 
revolt was an uprising led by the ‘Adwan sheikhs, marching into the Emir Abdullah’s 
encampment at Amman and demanding more favourable treatment (Alon, 2006:6). The 
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cause of  the revolt, which was defeated relatively quickly, seems to have been ‘the 
changing balance of  power in the Balqa’ region” by which ‘the ʿAdwan and their allies 
found themselves weakened vis-à-vis both the government and their traditional rivals 
for hegemony in the region, the Bani Sakhr’ (2006:11). These incidents took place in the 
north and west of  the country: the area which the British felt more able to secure.  
Peake, the commander of  the Arab Legion (as the unified armed forces of  the mandate 
became known in 1923) sought to base the armed forces on these regions, reflecting the 
belief  that the more arid south and east of  the country formed an only semi-governable 
tribal zone (Kirkbride, 1956:62). In particular the Transjordan Frontier Force, assigned 
to guard the porous and problematic border with Saudi Arabia, was to be composed of  
recruits from Palestinian towns. 
 
 The desert pacification policies adopted by the British mandate authorities and 
therefore the legacy they left to the later Jordanian state may seem merely ad hoc—but  
both the conceptual projects of  the officers who implemented them and in the 
acceptance they found amongst the inhabitants of  the desert themselves reflected the 
broader process of  uneven and combined development that this thesis is concerned to 
trace. In this period we find therefore the establishment of  the mechanism of  
combination between the Jordanian social formation and the global capitalist economy 
that would be so important to the later alignment decisions of  the 1950s. This 
mechanism lay not in exports of  commodities onto the world market nor in the heavy 
industrialisation of  the country but rather in the embroilment of  the colonial power in 
primitive accumulation: the ‘historic process which dissolves the different forms, in 
which the labourer is an owner and the owner labours’. 
 
 The preceding sections of  this chapter have discussed one aspect of  Jordan’s 
distinctiveness from its neighbours in this regard: the relatively egalitarian distribution 
of  land-holdings. The following section takes up a more direct intervention in the 
process: the replacement of  the practices of  surplus extraction in the form of  khuwwa 
amongst nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists with a subsidy from the colonial 
power, administered through the armed forces. Just as Pierre Phillipe Rey and Claude 
Meillassoux identified the sublation under colonial power of  pre-capitalist (‘lineage’) 
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relationships in the circulation of  slaves and dowries (Brewer, 1990 1981:81), so one 
finds in this period of  Jordanian history the replacement of  khuwwa, raiding and herding 
by external subsidy rather than by polarization into owners and labourers. The policies 
of  the British were of  course worked out at a day-to-day level but their lasting results 
derived from the context to which they were applied: the breakdown of  the tributary 
practices in the steppe outlined in chapter 3 and the new combination of  the tribute-
takers with colonial subsidy. 
4.3.4 Glubb, ‘Humane Imperialism’ and Subsidy as Combination 
 
 What were the details of  this process? Between the late 1920s and the early 
1930s the Bedouin of  Trans-Jordan, as we may now refer to the pastoralist nomads and 
semi-nomads for the sake of  brevity, experienced a two-fold crisis in their livelihoods 
(2007:93-4). The first aspect of  the crisis lay in a familiar, but especially harsh, dearth in 
subsistence caused by poor grazing but exacerbated by the changing market conditions 
for livestock. The second aspect derived more directly from the British project of  
creating a uniformly governable space in the mandated territories. As far as the 
subsistence crisis is concerned, the British mandate reports noted several years of  poor 
winter rains in the 1930s which led to a ‘severe setback to schemes for Beduin 
cultivation’ (Colonial Office No.129, 1937:349). 
Camel herding desert dwellers are accustomed to harsh dry weather, of  course. 
The dry years of  the early 1930s were exceptionally bad however and were made worse 
by the simultaneous impact of  global depression and the new borders. Only 15 of  60 
permanent wells were left within Transjordanian control. To make matters worse, the 
bedouin lost camels to Saudi raids and were unable to replace by the traditional method 
of  raiding in response (Bocco and Tell, 1994:120). Certain of  the Bani Sakhr sheikhs 
were reduced to wage labour in Palestine; overall bedouin (understood as those 
identified by the British as sheep or camel pastoralists) income halved, their livestock fell 
by 70 % and Mandate medical officers estimated that 84% of  the Bani Sakhr, Huwaytat 
and Sirhan confederations were malnourished (1994:121). The number of  camels fell 
from 17,985 in 1932 to 6,150 (roughly half  of  those being held by the Bani Sakhr) in 
1935 (Lewis, 1987:134). Glubb estimated that amongst ‘entirely nomadic’ bedouin each 
household held only seven or eight camels amongst the more economically diversified 
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perhaps only two (Bocco and Tell, 1994:134). This was a perilous state indeed, given 
that a precondition of  mobile pastoralism is that the herders outnumber the animals 
(Anderson, 1974:220). The 1930s saw an ecological crisis in the Transjordanian 
steppe—ancient in its causes but both exacerbated and solved by the integration of  
Trans-Jordan into the global system of  sovereign states and capitalist social relations.   
 
The most immediate response of  the Bani Sakhr and Huwaytat to the crisis was, 
if  they had the means, not to replenish the camel herds but to switch to sheep and 
motorized transport (Lewis, 1987:135-6). Here we find the interaction of  colonial policy, 
conceptions of  development and the immediate effects of  ecological crisis. As we have 
seen in the preceding sections of  this chapter, the British sought to create a uniformly 
governable space, demarcated by clear borders. Within such a space cultivators would be 
free to bring the products to the market without extra-economic compulsion. This was 
quite a different model to that embodied in practices of  raiding in the steppe: what I 
have argued in chapter 3 constituted a fractured tributary mode of  production. These 
practices recognized neither the international borders nor the legitimacy of  generalised 
punishment (rather than retribution) for acts of  raiding to re-distribute the surplus. The 
post-Ottoman international settlement in the Middle East—establishing and policing 
borders that cut through the traditional movements of  pastoralists and camel herders—
was having a disruptive effect on the areas of  Transjordan dominated by tribes such as 
the Bani Sakhr and the Huwaytat. They faced a colonial power determined to curb their 
traditional basis in raiding and taking tribute and they were deprived of  free access to 
their traditional winter grounds in the Wadi Sirhan which became part of  Saudi Arabia 
(Epstein, 1938:229). These factors exacerbated the impact of  drought and the 
introduction of  motorized transport on camel herding (Lewis, 1987:136). 
 
Raiding seems to have been part of  the normal operation of  economic life for 
these groups. The withdrawal of  Ottoman power and the interregnum of  British 
administration under a Hashemite monarchy mostly-well disposed to its south-eastern 
allies from the Arab revolt seems to have led to something of  a revival of  raiding. 
Raiding to replace livestock was also a strategy to deal with poor grazing and the dying-
off  of  sheep, cattle and camels. Moreover, as the power struggles in the Nejd remained 
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unsettled, raiders spilled across the desert from the Ikhwan20 who had served with Ibn 
Saud and from Iraqi bedouin (Glubb, 1948:70). These raids would provoke retaliatory 
raids in return. Surviving inhabitants of  the time from the Huwaytat emphasize both the 
poverty of  the tribe’s existence and the ever-present potential for raids that would rob 
them of  security and subsistence. Peake, the first British resident, reports a devastating 
cross-frontier Ikhwan raid in 1925 against the Sirhan of  the central plain that saw ‘nearly 
all their flocks… looted’ and caused many of  them to abandon nomadism, and now 
perhaps not more than half  the tribe move into the desert in winter’ (Peake, 1958:221). 
The mandate reports of  the late 1920s make annual reference to raids as a problem but 
one that was being resolved—only for similar paragraphs to appear in the report for the 
following year (Colonial Office No.40, 1929:99, Colonial Office No.47, 1930:138). At 
the beginning of  1929 ‘a military force was sent against a sheikh of  the Beni[sic] Sakhr 
who had carried out a raid into Nejd…[i]n May a column was despatched to break up a 
concentration of  Beduin who were preparing for a similar raid’ (Colonial Office No.47, 
1930:138) . By 1930 the British authorities had simply to admit that ‘[r]elations between 
the Beduin of  Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd remained…unsatisfactory, in spite of  
the constant vigilance exercised by the British Forces and Trans-Jordan authorities in the 
punishment and prevention of  raiding’ (Colonial Office No.59, 1931:195). The reason 
for this impotence, according to the British reports, was that:  
The Wadi Sirhan, which is the winter grazing ground of  certain of  the nomad 
Trans-Jordanian tribes, is situated within the territory of  Nejd. The Trans-Jordan 
nomads who cross the Nejd frontier in winter are beyond the protection of  the 
British and local forces which are available in Trans-Jordan. It is impossible to 
disarm them, since, if  in this annual migration the Trans-Jordan tribes were to 
go unarmed, they would speedily be stripped of  their possessions by the hostile 
Beduin of  the Hejaz (Colonial Office No.59, 1931:196). 
 
The creation of  state boundaries in the established extractive space of  the 
Bedouin—their dirah—thus introduced a different logic, contradictory to the fractured 
tributary system. As the British sought to enforce the conception of  uniform 
governability necessary for their vision of  prosperous, market-oriented yeomen, they 
created a self-sustaining dynamic of  conflict with these tribes: confirming their 
original view of  the steppe an desert nomad as an inherently ungovernable, if  noble, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The Ikhwan al-Muslimiin, or Muslim Brothers, were the force of tribesmen who allied with the Saud clan 
in the Arabian peninsula under the influence of the teachings of Ibn Abdul Wahab⎯not to be confused 




 International boundaries and British policy thus mounted a double blow against 
the south-Eastern tribes and in particular the Huwaytat (Bocco and Tell, 1994:119-20). 
First they suffered from drought and the cross-border raids of  the Saudi Ikhwan and 
Iraqi tribes. Then their means of  redress in the form of  retaliatory raids was prevented 
or punished by the British, who would often exacerbate the problem by seizing livestock 
as punishment in kind (1994:123). It is easy—indeed, correct— to see Glubb as the 
embodiment of  stuffy colonial paternalism replete with fantasies of  how ‘the rural Arab 
has an extraordinary affinity with certain Englishmen’ (Glubb, 1948:103). He did 
perceive very clearly however, the impact of  British rule on the nomadic pastoralist 
system and most especially in the southern desert: writing of  how ‘in practice the whole 
emphasis…[of  British policy] was laid on the importance of  preventing them from 
raiding and not on protecting them' such that ‘[h]arassed by their own government on 
the one side and raided by Ibn Saud on the other, they were rapidly becoming so poor 
that many were already starving and few if  any were properly nourished and clothed’ 
(1948:74-7). The dire situation extended beyond the Huwaytat even to the chiefly 
sections of  the Bani Sakhr, as noted above.  
 
 Glubb offered a change of  policy based on the so-called ‘humane imperialism’ 
practiced by the Scottish officer Robert Sandeman in the North-Western frontier 
provinces of  India (Bocco and Tell, 1994:120). The underlying assumption of  this 
policy—as in Iraq—was that the tribe was in some sense a ‘natural’ unit but the means 
of  its preservation was both to strengthen the sheikhs and the vertical relationships 
binding members of  the same tribe together rather than have them dissolve under the 
polarization of  land into the hands of  the sheikhs on the Iraqi model. It is significant, 
perhaps, that Glubb moved to Jordan from Iraq with this policy just as these 
divergences began to appear. Glubb saw that the basic lack of  grazing lands, water and 
livestock was the immediate source of  Bedouin distress (1994:120). His solution to 
raiding was to replace it as a source of  surplus by subventions, both direct and deftly 
provided as a reward for assuring rather than threatening Britain’s governability of  the 
desert (1994:122). The military, first of  all the Desert Patrol, was the main institutional 
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means for doing this. The soldier’s pay would form an insurance policy against hunger 
(Glubb, 1948:170) just as raiding and khuwwa had done. This apparently ad hoc policy, 
because of  the broader factors delineated above, became the source of  the ‘improbable 
combination of  foreign and colonial regime together with indigenous Arab tribal 
society’ (Alon, 2007:3).  
 
 Glubb began his work with subventions to the chiefs of  the Huwaytat, those 
most affected by drought and raids. These payments ‘[g]iven the workings of  tribal 
clientelism… were undoubtedly redistributed to the base of  the tribe’ with the result 
that ‘[p]ayments by sheikhs to their tribal clients provided for the inability to rebuild 
flocks through raiding’ (Bocco and Tell, 1994:122). Glubb’s initial gambit was to give 
fifty dinars to Sheikh Bin Jazi of  the Huwaytat (a leader of  one of  the two main 
sheikhly lineages of  that tribe) and ten dinars to each subsidiary chieftain (Diya and 
Saleh, 1997:234). Glubb further recommended that the mandate authorities ‘shower’ the 
Huwaytat with funds amounting to six thousand pounds (1997:230). A further channel 
of  distribution was established through the election of  Bani Sakhr and Huwaytat 
sheikhs as parliamentary representatives of  the northern and southern Bedouin 
constituencies respectively, gaining subsidies of  two hundred pounds a year (1997:269). 
The main institutionalized channel of  this subsidy however, was the shrewd integration 
of  the fomer khuwwa-takers into the armed forces of  the state, beginning with the 
Desert Patrol: a vital move, for a ‘jundi’s [soldier’s] pay could sustain several bedouin 
families in the famine conditions of  the 1930s’ (Bocco and Tell, 1994:122).  
 
 Again, Glubb began the work of  ‘nationalising’ the Bedouin with the 
Huwaytat21. At first the recruits, notably, were non-Jordanian nationals but Glubb soon 
succeeded in attracting his first twenty members of  the Desert Patrol from the Trans-
Jordanian Huwaytat (Glubb, 1948:92). These numbers were initially small, but one later 
officer of  the Desert Patrol from the Jazi section of  the Huwaytat reported that several 
hundred members of  his clan—perhaps eight hundred—joined the Arab Legion and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 I am indebted to Nawaf Tell for this characterisation of the process. Interview, Amman,8th of 
September 2008, 
 134 
Desert Patrol combined22. Glubb then turned his attention to the Bani Sakhr to repeat 
his success (Glubb, 1948:102). By 1933 the Desert Patrol force contained 157 NCOs 
and men, of  whom thirty five were Bani Sakhr (Lewis, 1987:104). The Arab Legion and 
Desert Patrol provided a replacement for the collapsing political economy of  khuwwa, 
raids and full pastoralism and in particular an alternative for the next generation of  
sheikhly retainers left without a role: the mandate report for 1936 made mention of  the 
‘problem of  the employment of  sons of  Beduin  sheikhs …unwilling to engage in 
manual work and are unemployed and discontented in the tribes’ who ‘were formerly 
the leaders of  tribal raids and have found no occupation since raiding ceased' (Colonial 
Office No.129, 1937:349).  
 
The systems of  the Arab Legion replicated the mobilisation of  loyalties used 
when the Hashemites first formed the ‘Faisali army’ in the Arab Revolt (Diya and Saleh, 
1997:301). Ali Abu Nuwwar, who joined the mechanized division shortly after this point 
reported that most of  the men were from the Huwaytat, Bani Sakhr or Bani Hassan 
(Nuwwar, 1990:18). Glubb’s favouritism towards those whom he considered sufficiently 
bedouin seems to have percolated the British officer corps, who held a higher opinion 
of  the ‘sons of  the Desert’ (1990:19). Abu Nuwwar reports that ‘the Bedouin officers 
looked upon us as new and for a short time as strange and called us fellahin and 
townsmen’ but with time came to regard him and as fellows as ‘like them sons of  tribes 
even though we lived in stone houses’ (1990:17). Abu Nuwwar’s experience reflected 
the combined social formation emerging from the British mandate in Jordan, its 
conditions concisely summarized by Tariq Tell:  
the military bureaucratic "enclave economy" in the towns kept the country 
financially dependent even as its chief  beneficiaries, the bedouin, grew ever 
more reliant on welfare handouts under Glubb's control. The villages were left 
fragmented and their inhabitants weighed down by debt. On the other hand, the 
economic decline of  the bedouin was balanced by the privileges they enjoyed as 
the praetorian elite of  the regime. Comapred to Syria or Iraq, class anaagonisms 
in the countryside were muted by the prevalence of  smallholdings and access to 
supplementary earnings from outside work (Tall, 2000:95). 
 
This was the social legacy bequeathed to semi-independent Jordan by its 
mandate predecessor, and the basis for the cases of  alignment in the 1950s that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Interview with Sheikh ʿAnbar al-Dahash Ibn Jazi, Amman, 27th of May 2009 
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following two chapters will examine. 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has sought to illuminate the origins of  Jordan’s military as a 
distinct mechanism linking the local social formation and the global system of  interstate 
and capitalist competition. The comparison I have used in this chapter, between two 
Arab mandates with closely linked and similar early political histories but significantly 
different trajectories attempted to unearth the factors behind the course of  the struggles 
in  the Jordanian military in the 1950s, the conduct and outcome of  which that had a 
decisive impact on Jordan’s geopolitical alignments in that period. 
 
  The investigation of  the historical sociology of  the founding of  the mandate era 
militaries and its relationship to agrarian social relations and the histories of  resistance 
and incorporation suggest that Haim Gerber’s basic contention is correct. However, 
there is more to be said than this. The histories of  the mandate militaries in Jordan and 
Iraq reflect the same process. That process is the incorporation of  the Arab provinces 
of  the Ottoman Empire into a global capitalist system. In both cases the British both 
relayed the imperatives of  that system, closely bound up with their own ideological 
conception of  the societies they ruled, and responded to the tensions resulting from 
those imperatives. Yet the differences between Jordan and Iraq provide an example of  
the different trajectories established by uneven and combined development: of  the way 
in which ‘national peculiarities represent an original combination of  the basic features 
of  the world process’ (Trotsky, 1972a). In Iraq the attempts to exercise central control 
first by the British and then by the weakened post-mandate monarchy replicated a wider 
field of  agrarian discontent. In Jordan, by contrast, a pre-existing pattern of  widely 
spread landholding and the ‘export’ of  vertical divisions outside of  the larger 
confederations was reinforced by the timely intervention of  the British in the country’s 
political economy. These differences were to be consequential when mass movements 
articulating both Arab nationalist and social aims arose in Jordan in the 1950s. 
 
5. The Baghdad Pact 
	  
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a case study of uneven and combined 
development worked out through a particular alignment decision: Jordan’s response to 
the Baghdad Pact. The chapter therefore provides what was promised in the 
introduction to this thesis: an analysis that ‘reveals the meaning and interweaving of the 
general and the particular, of interests, states, cultures, rules and structured opportunity 
with individual understandings, capacities, motivations and more or less considered and 
deliberate action’ (Abrams, 1982:199). The particular event of the Baghdad Pact has 
been chosen because of the regional shift it encapsulates: following the injunction that 
‘the challenge of an event is not a matter of grasping its concreteness but of 
apprehending, at an appropriate level of concreteness, the transition it signifies’ 
(1982:195).  
 The decade between the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 and the Iraqi revolution of 
1958 witnessed a schism amongst the Arab states: an emerging ‘Arab Cold War’(Kerr, 
1971) to match the global conflict in which the region was embedded. The protagonist 
on the anti-colonial Arab nationalist side was, of course, Egypt under the rule of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser. On the other stood Britain, facing the breakdown of its hegemony in the 
Middle East. Britain’s major ally in the Arab world was Iraq under the rule of the 
Hashemites and the pro-British Prime Minister, Nuri al-Saʿid.  Jordan and its alignment 
with one side or the other became, between 1955 and 1958, the object of this 
confrontation⎯described by Illan Pappe as a clash between ‘the state and the tribe’ 
(Pappe, 1994). The controversy around the formation of the Baghdad Pact, from 
February 1955 until January 1956 represented a turning point in this confrontation. 
What were the reasons for this division and Jordan’s oscillation between the two sides 
within it?  
 In answering these questions I seek to demonstrate the usefulness of the 
concept of uneven and combined development in international relations theory. The 
chapter argues, based on the conception of uneven and combined development 
substantiated in the previous chapters, that the penetration of capitalist social relations 
into the lands that became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had produced by the 
1950s a particular social formation whose tensions and contradictions produced the 
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differing policy stances toward the Baghdad Pact. The pact became such a crucial issue 
because it concerned the future of the British subsidy to Jordan and therefore the main 
mechanism by which Jordan was linked to the global capitalist system. The chapter 
proposes that in the Baghdad Pact period the still fragile regime of King Hussein 
oscillated between two polarized sets of social forces produced by the process of 
uneven and combined development: that of the effendiyya, the dispossessed Palestinians 
and rural migrants in Amman and the (small) labour movement who formed the base 
for the Arab nationalism on the one hand and the other former pastoralists and semi-
pastoralists integrated into the state through the British funded army together with a 
narrower group of sheikhs and merchants around the Hashemite monarchy. 
 
5.1 Understanding the Baghdad Pact Conjuncture: 
Existing Explanations 
	  
What explains changing Jordanian attitude to the pact and how is it connected to the 
question of the international relations of Southern States? The argument presented here 
is that the struggle over the Baghdad Pact in Jordan represented a crucial moment of 
force in the transition from one phase of the Arab system to another not just in 
involvement of Cold War rivalry but also in the social bases of the Arab states. This 
period saw, in Hinnebusch’s concise characterization, a rule of ‘oligarchic multi-polarity’ 
in which:  
weak, fragmented Arab core barely emerging from colonial control. The Arab 
states were narrowly based oligarchies or dynasties, highly penetrated by the Great 
Powers, above all by Great Britain, which retained bases and treaty relations with 
regimes headed by its clients (Hinnebusch, 2002b:34). 
Weak regimes unable to manage popular discontent, severe polarization of wealth 
and the legacies of still-partial decolonization exacerbated by the nakba ‘used anti-
imperialist rhetoric to shore up their fragile legitimacy … sought protection from the 
Western powers against domestic opposition’ (2002b:34). The post-Baghdad Pact 
system was dominated by Nasser’s Egypt, ‘whose head start in the incorporation of 
popular support made it the only stable Arab state’ and consequently placed it ‘at the 
center of the Arab world, giving it a new cohesion, rolling back Western control, and 
enforcing Arab solidarity’(2002b:35). The nature of this transition was a ‘congruence’ 
between the emergence of Nasser and ‘the destabilization of oligarchic states amidst the 
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political mobilisation of the middle class’ (2002b:35). Fred Halliday echoes this 
argument in viewing the mid-50s as period of transition to a system in which 'Arab 
nationalism, in alliance with Moscow, posed a challenge to Western dominance in the 
region…[and] regional wars…were conducted in east-west terms, the forces of the 
"Arab revolution" being pitted against the allies of the West’ (Halliday, 2005:99). 
The particular struggles in Jordan and the resulting foreign policy must be seen in 
this light. The case offers us the opportunity to analyse uneven and combined 
development as, in Fred Halliday’s words the ‘inescapable context’ of the international 
relations of the Middle East (Halliday, 1999:319). Is it necessary, however to develop 
such a new explanation for empirical phenomena? 
 5.1.1 Realist Explanations 
	  
 It is, because the existing explanations are insufficient. The case has been subject to 
neo-realist (Walt, 1987 ) and constructivist (Barnett, 1998) analyses against which we can 
judge the contribution of uneven and combined development. Stephen Walt’s Origins of 
Alliances (1987 ). Walt views the struggle over the Baghdad Pact as opening a period in 
which Nasser made: 
various efforts to translate his own charisma and Egypt's regional structure into 
permanent hegemony in the Arab world. Relying on propaganda, subversion, and the 
astute manipulation [sic] of the ideology of Arab unity, Nasser repeatedly sought to 
entice or intimidate the other Arab states into accepting Egypt's leadership. These 
efforts ultimately failed because Nasser's targets were able to form alliances against 
him’ (1987 : 50). 
 The Baghdad Pact, for Walt, therefore becomes a further example of his overall 
principle by which states balance or bandwagon against threat⎯the judgement about 
whether to balance or bandwagon depending on the degree of the threat and the 
strength of the threatened state (1987 :32-3). These principles are the invariant rules of 
anarchy⎯ an axiom taken furthest in Elie Podeh’s treatment (1995) of the struggle over 
the pact. Podeh argues that ‘for the Arab states, the Baghdad Pact was not simply an 
offshoot of the Cold War; rather, they viewed it as part of the age-old struggle for 
regional dominance. Historically, the Egyptian-Iraqi struggle for hegemony is an 
extension of the old polarization or rivalry between the Mesopotamian and Nile Valleys 
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for control of the lands lying in between’(Podeh, 1995:1). Podeh argues that the reason 
states such as Egypt and Iraq would struggle for hegemony is that the Arab states form 
a sub-system of a Middle Eastern system itself nested in a global system of states – 
within this system states which rank high in certain indicators of capabilities will attempt 
to win predominance on the Prussian or Piedmontese model (1995:14-37).  L.Carl 
Brown makes a kindred claim: the Arab world is part of the ‘Eastern Question system’ 
deriving from the fracturing of the Ottoman cultural space(Brown, 1984:2). The battle 
of the Baghdad Pact, fought out in and over Jordan, represented an attempt by Nasser 
to re-unite that space and become an Arab Cavour (1984:171). 
What place does Jordan occupy in the neo-Realist narrative of the Baghdad Pact? 
The first point to note is the importance of Jordan’s eventual rejection of the pact, to 
the extent that ‘the whole history of the region might have been altered had Jordan 
joined the pact’ (Merwede Tell quoted in Podeh, 1995:172). Two theoretically significant 
assertions stand out in the realist-inspired treatments of Jordan’s policy towards the 
Baghdad Pact. These are significant because they allow us to explore the general lacunae 
of realist international theory in sundering ‘international’ from social realms of 
explanation and therefore to evaluate by contrast the alternative theoretical perspective 
developed here. The first assertion is that Jordan is important because the country 
(indeed the whole Levant) lies between two ‘natural’ power centres around the river 
basins of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates (Kerr, 1971:2, Podeh, 1995:1). States come 
into being around these rivers; since these states suffer ‘geographic insecurity’ (Podeh, 
1995:14) they compete with each other, given the right leaders and capabilities, for 
primacy in the middle ground between them. It is therefore to be expected that Jordan 
would be suspended between, and perhaps torn apart by, the resulting conflict. 
 5.1.2 Constructivist Explanations  
	  
Realists and neo-realists are, of course, not the only theoretical perspective on 
the Baghdad Pact. As in Walt’s neo-realist treatment, the history of the Baghdad Pact 
has formed the empirical basis for a significant statement of this theoretical approach in 
Michael Barnett’s Dialogues in Arab Politics. Barnett points to the struggle over the pact in 
Jordan as the ‘final battle’ (1998:116) in a crucial phase of the reconstruction of norms 
in inter-Arab politics. This argument draws upon the notion of symbolic interactionism 
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to argue that the “game’ of Arab politics was constructed in the playing, as Arab leaders 
sought to frame events and each other in ways that could then constrain them (1998:48-
9). The Baghdad Pact represented a turning point in this process: 
until that moment the dynastic rulers had largely kept the lid on radical Arabism. 
Iraq's decision to ally with Turkey and the West, however, stoked the embers of 
Arabism, catalyzed a regional debate about the relationship between the Arab world 
and the West, led to the norm prohibiting alliances with the West, marked the 
passage to a more radical version of Arab nationalism and crowned Nasser as the 
unchallenged leader of Arab nationalism.(1998:21) 
Radio broadcasts were the main channels for Nasser’s normative pressure on Hussein, 
leading to the ‘fierce rioting’ that scuttled the pact (1998:116). 
 Barnett’s approach moves beyond the equation of a mass opposition movement 
with military threat and places opposition to Israel and Western intervention at the 
centre of the ‘game of Arab politics’ (1998:8). He therefore brings us much closer to an 
understanding of the Jordanian response to the Baghdad Pact than do the neo- and 
proto- realist interpretations discussed above.  Yet the norms and dialogues presented 
by Barnett⎯albeit plucked from a common ‘cultural storehouse’ of ‘sentiments and 
historical memories’ (1998:41) ⎯seem oddly disembodied. Who were these listeners of 
Nasser’s and ‘rioters’ in Amman’s streets? Why did they take so heartily to the anti-Pact 
message? Why were others prepared to shoot them for that opposition? A footnote in 
Dialogues identifies class and inter-generational conflict as ‘domestic-centered’ 
explanations for ‘the rise and decline of domestic coalitions that support Arab 
nationalist goals’ (1998:275) and then leaves the matter at that. The implication here 
seems to be that ‘domestic centered’ explanations are unnecessary or undesirable. 
Yet, without such explanations we are left with the problematic view that Arab 
nationalism—of the Nasserist or Ba’athist sort rather than monarchical Hashemite 
genus—itself represented an existential security threat to Jordan. This threat emanated 
from Egypt. It was advanced not through conventional military means but, in Glubb 
Pasha’s words of unintentional bathos, ‘murder…and.. pamphlets’(FO371/121540:615). 
The most common trope in this argument holds that the Egyptian radio station Voice of 
the Arabs, through its broadcasts of ‘slander, fabrications and sheer lies’ formed in 
Nasser’s hands a ‘means of psychological warfare’ which had an ‘ enormous’ effect on 
the targeted states (Podeh, 1995:25). The demonstrations in Jordan against the Baghdad 
Pact are transformed in this view from an expression of domestic dissent into a form of 
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geopolitical struggle, subsidised and organised by Egyptian and Saudi officials (Brown, 
1984:171, Podeh, 1995:181). Only if one accepts the premise that Egyptian propaganda 
posed an existential threat to Jordan can one argue, as Stephen Walt does for the neo-
realist conclusion that Jordan refused accession to the Baghdad Pact in an instance of 
band-wagoning with the imminent threat posed by Nasser (Walt, 1987 :68). 
It is this reduction of the Baghdad Pact interlude to a play of ‘third image’ (Waltz, 
1959) factors that leads to very curious empirical statements about Jordanian alignments 
in response to the pact. As we have seen, these arguments turn on the claim that 
Egyptian pan-Arab propaganda posed a security threat to Jordan. This claim allows the 
portrayal of Hussein as the ‘plucky little King’ being ‘bullied’ by Nasser.  This assertion 
reflects directly the accounts of Hussein and the British, up to the ascription of the 
origins of nationalist literature to Egyptian diplomatic post (FO371/121464:607, see 
also FO371/121540:615, Podeh, 1995:25) but is undermined by other evidence. No 
doubt much of the printed material was distributed with Egyptian help and Voice of the 
Arabs was, needless to say, broadcast from Cairo. Yet the illegal Jordan Communist 
Party (which, if not quite the ubiquitous intriguers of the British imagination, did play a 
leading role in organizing popular opposition) certainly did not receive such support: it 
only had one printing press which had to be moved continuously to avoid detection and 
its cadres were recruited for the legibility of their handwriting23. 
To regard the anti-pact movement as a threat to Jordan equivalent to the military 
threats of realist theory, then, is incorrect. Indeed the movement pointed to Israel as the 
threat to national security, however much King Hussein may have fretted about the 
dangers of communist penetration in the region (Diya, 1983:200). Israel, not the Soviet 
Union or Egypt appeared the greater threat to most Jordanians’ national security. The 
majority of Jordan’s population were Palestinian refugees from the Israeli war of 
independence. The locus of any Jordanian bandwagoning or balancing efforts should be 
Israel. Of course the two states were officially at war, but Israel’s greater capabilities and 
potential aggressive intent were equally obvious. Israel mounted regular raids into 
Jordanian territory in the early 1950s, including a particularly bloody raid on the village 
of Qibya, that increased popular anger against the Hashemite regime. The Qibya raid is 
mentioned repeatedly in contemporary documents and memoirs as a catalyst for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Personal interview with Dr. Munir Hamarneh, Secretary General of the Jordan Communist Party, 
Amman 16th of February 2009. 
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movement that eventually emerged against Baghdad Pact, crystallizing the perception 
that Glubb and the British were uninterested in or incapable of defending Jordan (al-
Hourani and al-Tarawneh:121, al-Jamʿani, 2007:58, FO371/121542:628, WO2552C, 
1995:583). 
These arguments equate a mass movement, with its own dynamic and origins, 
with a military threat under the command of an identifiable state. Further, this equation 
presents Nasser’s Egypt as the pre-eminent threat to Jordan in the period a claim that 
can only be sustained by ignoring Israel and the state of legal and actual war between 
that country and Jordan throughout the period. The anti-pact movement certainly was a 
threat to the Jordanian regime and the British imperial power that sustained it. That 
threat was posed from within Jordanian society itself. The Voice of the Arabs appears in 
the memoirs of activists in the Jordan National Movement and the Jordanian Free 
Officers as a symbol of dignity and steadfastness and indeed as a boon to their 
movement (al-Jamʿani, 2007:58, Anderson, 2005:161-66). They were not compelled to 
listen to or read this material, still less to engage in demonstrations on the basis of it. 
There were, however, edicts against so doing and special measures forbidding the 
distribution of media from other Arab states, which were not observed (al-Hourani and 
al-Tarawneh, 1985:141). In a useful contrast, Hussein made a radio address of his own 
on the 18th of December: the protests and strikes continued unabated (Satloff, 
1994:122).  Mass mobilisation in the towns of the East and West Banks certainly with 
Egyptian and Saudi aid and encouragement, characterized the anti-Baghdad pact 
movement. It was the political crisis caused by this movement that led to the Jordanian 
turn-around on the Baghdad Pact. The factors that produced this alignment therefore lie 
not solely in Egyptian intrigues directed against an age-old Mesopotamian rival but 
rather in how ‘societal change wrought political conflict’(Anderson, 2005:6) within the 
Jordanian social formation itself. 
5.2 Social Formation and Historical Conjuncture in the 
Baghdad Pact 
  
What are the particular explanations for the Baghdad Pact conjuncture in Jordan 
offered by uneven and combined development? They are, I argue, best summarized as 
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the oscillation of a new ruler between two polarized sets of social forces produced: that 
of the middle-class effendiyya, the dispossessed Palestinians and rural migrants in Amman 
and the (small) labour movement who formed the base for the Arab nationalism on the 
one hand and the other former pastoralists and semi-pastoralists integrated into the 
state through the British funded army. 
5.2.1 The Effendiyya and the Arab Nationalist Moment 
	  
As I argued in the previous two chapters, this social formation resulted from the 
wider breakdown of the tributary system of the Ottoman Empire which was then 
replaced by largely British colonial domination over the Arab world as a whole. The 
effects of this ‘unevenness’ in the sense of the timing of Western penetration of the 
Arab world, may be divided into two aspects only one of which was present in Jordan. 
The relative lateness of Britain’s Arab colonial acquisitions (1880 for Egypt, 1920-22 for 
Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan) and their inheritance of the Indian administrative rather 
than East or South African settlement model meant the imposition of a state apparatus 
of surveillance, punishment and service largely staffed by “natives”. These civil servants, 
educators and officers would form the nucleus of a so-called “new effendiyya”who 
became the receptive audience of ideas of Arab national revival. This state-related effect 
of unevenness was matched by a directly economic one. Both Egypt and Iraq, prior to 
and indeed a causal factor in, were incorporated into global capitalism as rather 
conventional primary product exporters. In the case of Egypt cotton and in Iraq oil 
formed the main mechanism of combination with global capitalism. Here Jordan 
differed: the main mechanism of combination was the British subsidy to fund the state 
itself and in particular the armed forces. It was this subsidy that was the subject of the 
struggle over the Baghdad Pact. These mechanisms in all three states shared some 
aspects of the ‘rentier state’(Beblawi, 1987:50-1). Nonetheless, these different 
mechanisms of combination resulting from unevenness produced different social forces 
and trajectories. The exigencies of colonial rule, export oriented agriculture and land 
reform favoured a large landholding class (leavened, more in Egypt than Iraq, with a 
portion of industrial capital) tied to the British. A late-coming state apparatus was 
staffed with the offspring of those who had lost out to these landholders and resented 
their national abjection in the face of Israel and the former colonial power. Added to 
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this was an increasingly restive working class in ports and industry and fragments of an 
urban artisanate that had been undercut for at least a century by Western manufacturing. 
The Baghdad Pact tug-of-war between Nuri Al- Said and Nasser represented different 
phases in the breakdown of their regimes as a working out of this social trajectory.  
The Baghdad Pact struggle was thus not pre-determined by uneven and 
combined development but reflected a broader regional transition best understood 
through its terms. The outcomes examined in this chapter were not, of course, 
predetermined by the previous social history outlined in this thesis. Rather the approach 
of examining uneven and combined development shows the options and constraints 
available at each point: the social basis of foreign policy. The options available to 
Jordan—here a short-hand for King Hussein and the decision-makers around him—in 
the middle of the 1950s fundamentally emerged from a transition in the politics of the 
Arab world. What was the nature of that transition and why did it occur? As mentioned 
above, the post-war system of states based on narrow ruling classes of landowners and 
merchants severely circumscribed by the persistence of colonial state apparatuses, was 
giving way to one of self-consciously anti-colonial and Arab nationalist regimes most 
often under military leadership under the banner of ‘freedom, unity and socialism.’ The 
locus of this transition was Egypt, the most populous and economically advanced Arab 
state, but the process unfolded through Syria and Iraq, obtruding then into 
Yemen/Aden and even Saudi Arabia. The conflicts beginning with the Baghdad Pact 
reflected this process. Jordan offers an intermediate case between these two paths, 
providing us with a clearer insight into the regional dynamics as a whole. Jordan in this 
period seemed poised equidistant between these two trajectories with a resulting 
oscillation in geopolitical alignments. The struggle between the populist and nationalist 
movement and the King’s basis of support therefore appears a particularly sharp and 
illuminating case of the broader context of uneven and combined development in the 
region in the 1950s. 
    In what sense, however, can uneven and combined development be cashed out 
to explain the particular options and constraints available to Jordan in this period? I 
argue that it can do so in demonstrating the linked origins of alignment decisions such 
as the Baghdad Pact, and the social bases within Jordan that favoured one or other 
alignment. At the regional level one vector of unevenness operated in the form of 
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British decline and the final results of the ‘disadvantage of historic priority’. Robert 
Gilpin, drawing upon Lenin and Trotsky, identifies ‘the tendency in an international 
system for the powers of member states to change at different rates because of political, 
economic and technological developments’ which over time cause ‘of a fundamental 
redistribution of power in the system' (Gilpin, 1981:13).  
Political, economic and technological change should not be taken as exogenous 
however but rather as results of the opposed but unitary tendencies to spatial 
immobilisation of investment and free circulation of capital in search of higher rates of 
profit (Smith, 1990:xv).  British domination of the Middle East had undergone precisely 
such a course during and as a result of the Second World War. The war itself had 
demonstrated that Britain’s colonial power was far from invincible (Hussein, 1973:65). 
The Second World War rendered Britain finally unable to maintain control of the 
colonial possessions built up in the heyday of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. The state was near bankrupt, having depended upon the financial productive 
clout of the United States (via lend lease) and the freshly industrialized population of the 
USSR (which bore the brunt of defeating the European axis) to survive the war. The 
Second World War thus represented a catastrophic recalibration of the state system in 
line with underlying patterns of uneven development. The most notable symptoms of 
this decline were, of course, the national liberation of India and then the withdrawal 
from Palestine and passing on of the mandate to the UN partition plan. Having been 
forced to recognise the impossibility of maintaining these possessions, however, British 
policymakers did not resign themselves to a gentle passage into second or third-rate 
status. Rather they clutched ever more desperately at their remaining influence in the 
Middle East by asserting control over the states in which they still held military 
installations, aid and the semi-colonial treaty apparatus. Those states comprised Jordan, 
Iraq and Egypt. At each of the decision points examined below the British attempt to 
maintain a weakening influence forms the first consideration. 
What of the other side of the general transition in the Arab world in the 1950s, and 
therefore of the political forces with which Hussein had to deal both inside and outside 
Jordan at the time of the Baghdad Pact? These represented a particular response to the 
traumatic experience of unevenness mobilised within combined social formations, 
chiefly by that group known as the ‘new effendiyya’—a term with a ‘blurred meaning’ that 
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'grew out of daily social praxis' (Eppel, 2009:535) . The effendiyya has something in 
common with the New Middle Class so favoured of Modernization Theorists: but it is a 
category suffused with the trauma of uneven development and embedded in the urban 
environment of combined development. In Eppel’s succinct definition: 
The principal common denominator that linked the members of the effendiyya 
in the first half of the 20th century was modernization: the acquisition of a 
modern education with all of its internal contradictions; the adoption and 
development of political discourse, primarily nationalism, sometimes colored by 
Communism or the Muslim Brotherhood; and an ambivalent relationship 
toward the West. (This ambivalence led them to oppose colonial control while 
adopting some of the ideas, values, concepts, and perceptions of identity that 
developed in the West in the process of modernization) (2009:537) 
The definition of this group forcefully echoes Tom Nairn’s characterization of the 
mobilisational efforts of nationalists intellectuals activated by the ‘painful experience and 
fear of “under-development”(Nairn, 1975). The effendiyya formed the cadre of political 
parties in the Arab world and most especially in Egypt. Some of these cadres—perhaps 
those like Hassan al-Banna with a background in traditional industry and the semi-
professional imamate (Naguib, 2006:16) entered the Muslim Brotherhood. Others—
most often students—the Communist parties (Hussein, 1973:37). There is nothing 
unusual about this kind of leadership in situations of revolutionary crisis, of which the 
French and American revolutions provide ample evidence. What differs in the case of 
Egypt, Jordan and indeed most of the post-colonial world is the historical timing of 
those crises resulting from the unevenness of development. A distinguishing 
characteristic of the effendiyya as the Arab version of this phenomenon was that, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, army officers formed a kind of ‘effendiyya in 
uniform’ (Eppel, 2009:537). Two-thirds of the Egyptian officer corps in 1948 were the 
sons of salaried officials (Trimberger, 1978:152). Amongst the remainder the 
descendants of the upper levels of the peasantry were prominent (Be'eri, 1970:465) 
making the journey into urban life and state service characteristic of much of the 
effendiyya. This was as true of Jordan as it was of Egypt, Iraq (see chapter 4) and also 
Syria. What is interesting about Jordan is the different make-up of its combined social 
formation leading to different responses to the Arabist wave. 
The effendiyya occupied a particular, somewhat weaker, place in Jordan than in its 
neighbours. The annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and the flight of Palestinians 
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greatly increased their number and consciousness24.  As in other Arab states it was this 
group, supported by the young trade unions and people attracted to the towns as 
refugees or economic migrants, that formed the primary milieu of the Arab nationalist 
opposition (Anderson, 2005:119-28). Where Jordan differed was in the primary 
mechanism of its combination with the world economy—neither through agricultural 
exports (cotton, grain) that accelerated a polarization of power and wealth in the 
countryside nor through extractive resources (oil) that would engender a small but 
prospectively powerful working class. Rather the country’s main mechanism of 
combination was through the British subsidy to the armed forces, which had been 
judiciously used to integrate formerly semi-nomadic pastoralists into the state within a 
broader context of relatively egalitarian land distribution. The struggles of the 1950s, 
and especially the Baghdad Pact, revolved around – and were worked out through - the 
maintenance of this mechanism. The concern with the subsidy was repeated again and 
again. The British understood that their subsidy to the Jordanian armed forces was the 
main conduit of their influence in Jordan and had to be protected (FO371/115683:577). 
At each crucial point in the struggle over the Baghdad Pact the central question was the 
British subsidy to the armed forces. 
Yet this question was not simply one of a neutral selection of aid providers. 
Rather it reached into Jordanian society itself and the contending political visions that 
had emerged. In the period beginning with the Baghdad Pact the freshly crowned King 
Hussein moved between two congealing sets of social forces in his expanded kingdom. 
On one side stood this grandfather’s coterie, ‘the King’s Men’, their British patrons and 
a (still largely passive) bloc of the Arab Legion. On the other were the forces of the 
Jordan National Movement, parties such as the ‘National Socialist Party’, the Baʿath and 
the Communists based in trade unions and the (comparatively) urban milieu and a 
group of army officers increasingly hostile to British control of the institution. The 
Baghdad Pact struggle thus inextricably bound ‘international’ and ‘social’ in a way best 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 I do not intend here to repeat the narrative of sophisticated West Bankers against doggedly loyal East 
Bankers, so prevalent in both colonial and historical accounts. There is some truth to it, as there is to all 
clichés, but it is important to note counter-examples such as the 280 members of the Communist Party in 
the supposed conservative heartland of Karak (Anderson 2001:44), the radically oriented Hijaz Railway 
Workers’ Union established before the unification of the Banks (Hourani 2001:39) or the Marxist circles 
in East Bank towns which came together with the Palestinian National Liberation League to form the 
Jordanian Communist Party. See Al Iubil Al-dhahabi l-il Hizb al Shuiu”ii al-Urdunii, 2001, Amman, Jordan 
Communist Party, p.42, also personal interview with Dr. Munir Hamarneh 16th of February 2009 
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understood by uneven and combined development. What was the substance of this 
social struggle? 
5.2.2 The Pro-Baghdad Pact Forces 
	  
The arguments made to support the Baghdad Pact were notable for the inability 
of almost any Jordanian politician to support the pact on its own, anti-Communist 
terms – those who did speak in support of it tended to gloss the issue as the provision 
of more and better weaponry to ready the country against Israeli attack (Satloff, 
1994:113). The actively pro-Baghdad Pact side consisted largely of the Glubb and the 
British – who, as we have seen, were so eager for Jordan to join the pact that they 
considered the shooting of anti-pact demonstrators an insufficiently firm response—
and some of the ‘King’s Men’ in the cabinet. The mass of the army, away from the anti-
pact Free Officers, seem to have remained loyal to the King’s decisions. As I argue 
below this was connected to the central issue around which the Baghdad Pact 
controversy revolved, that of subsidy to the armed forces.   
British pressure to join the Baghdad Pact came not only through diplomatic channels 
but at the heart of the Jordanian state, through the position that General Glubb, the 
British officers and the annual subsidy occupied within it. This reflected the importance 
of the subsidy to both sides and its penetration into Jordanian society. The British saw 
Glubb and the subsidy as a vital conduit of influence in Jordan and the region, which 
had to be defended with the ‘utmost firmness’ against ‘the disruptive forces of 
Communism incited by Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money’ (FO371/121462:602).  
After Nasser’s Czech arms deal both Glubb and the Foreign Office became increasingly 
distressed by the prospect of losing such a channel and considered it a matter of the 
highest importance that ‘General Glubb’s prestige… should not be 
weakened’(FO371/115683:577). The prospect of a joint Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian 
replacement for the subsidy reduced Glubb to a state of near paranoiac terror, claiming 
that the anti-Baghdad Pact movement was a ‘carefully prepared plot by Egypt Saudi 
Arabia and Syria to drive out King Hussein and establish puppet republic’ and that the 
funding was a disguised Soviet ploy (FO371/121465:577). At every stage in the 
negotiations around the Baghdad Pact (from the original visit of Prime Minister Tawfiq 
Abu-l-Huda to London, through the visits of Beyar and Templer to Amman) the  
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pattern was for Jordan to demand or be offered increased subsidy in order to join the 
pact. The British conceded such inducements (but not the issue of control of the money 
via Glubb) to the Jordanian politicians with whom they negotiated but those politicians 
themselves were rejected by the Jordanian “street” who would not accept the pact. 
 Initially even some of those who came to oppose the pact, such as Sulaiman 
Nabulsi, met with Iraqi representatives to suggest what further aid would bring them 
round to the idea of Jordanian accession – a discussion perhaps made more amenable 
by a shared antipathy to Abu-l-Huda as Prime Minister (Satloff, 1994:106). Abu-l-Huda 
represented that narrow stratum of the ‘King’s men’ of adventurers turned advisors who 
had accompanied the old King Abdullah since the mandate period, ruling over a ‘a 
police state with a civilian face’ (1994:71). Evidently out of favour both with the Iraqi 
branch of the Hashemite family and the semi-official opposition figures briefly falling 
into its orbit, he was dismissed in May 1955 (1994:104). His replacement, Saʿid al-Mufti 
was no populist demagogue, however, but the scion of landed Circassian family with 
close links to the Baghdad court (Satloff, 1994:105). The central figures in his cabinet, 
the defence minister Farhan Al-Shubaylat and the interior minister (later himself to 
become Prime Minister) Hazzaʿ al-Majali were powerful figures in the clans of Tafileh 
and Karak in the south-east of the country and ‘formed a potent pro-Iraqi/pro-British 
bloc’ (1994:106). Shubaylat in particular seems to have conferred closely with Glubb and 
the British out of concern that the King was too susceptible to ideas about reform of 
the Arab legion (FO371/115683, 1995:573). 
The base of active support for the Baghdad Pact was fairly narrow, then, but more 
important were the implications of any accession decision for the power of the regime 
as a whole. Here again the crucial linkage between the army, the subsidy and Jordan’s 
mechanism of combination into the world economy becomes clear. The Anglo-
Jordanian treaty, the vital issue for supporters of the pact, was the framework by which 
subsidy was delivered to Jordan and the control of the armed forces by British officers 
perpetuated. This control was particularly important for the ruling clique of which Abu-
l-Huda formed a part – the army offered not only coercive force to support the regime 
but was also the main conduit for the electoral fraud by which particular cliques of the 
‘King’s men’ maintained their rule (al-Jamʿani, 2007:48). Within the army, as discussed 
below, groups aspiring to the role of the Egyptian Free Officers had begun to form but 
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the rank and file remained passive and even prepared, at crucial points, to fire on 
demonstrators. This undoubtedly caused disquiet amongst the soldiers (al-Jamʿani, 
2007:50) and concern amongst the Western powers about their reliability 
(WO2552C:580). Yet orders to fire were obeyed. The army was not the primary site of 
the struggle over the Baghdad Pact but rather its object – the Free Officers met to 
discuss their response to the situation only after the major demonstrations had taken 
place (al-Jamʿani, 2007:58). Front line troops were recruited largely from those 
pastoralist and formerly pastoralist groups—the “bedouin”—who had no roots 
amongst the protestors (WO2552C:580)—and for whom the British subsidised armed 
forces had replaced their traditional economy. However, the accelerating polarization 
within the country and the distancing of relations with Britain would subsequently bring 
about significant divisions within the army, which emerged after King Hussein’s 
sacrifice of Glubb as a scapegoat for the ire aroused by the suppression of the anti-
Baghdad pact protests. The British subsidy and its role in integrating the bedouin in the 
state of course, preceded the existence of Jordan as an independent kingdom. The new 
factor that emerged in the Baghdad Pact interlude was that of a mass movement based 
on similar social forces to those that had emerged in other Arab states. 
5.2.3 The Social Base of the anti-Baghdad Pact Movement 
	  
We can identify three main streams that joined together to form the nationalist 
current of which the anti-Baghdad Pact movement became a high point. As in any 
dynamic political movement there was a substantial overlap and common evolution 
between these but for the purpose of analysis we can view the main components as the 
National Socialist Party of Sulaiman Nabulsi and the civilian nationalist left of which the 
most significant groups were the Ba’ath and Communist Parties as well as the 
Movement of Arab Nationalists (Gharabieh, 2004:85). To these should be added the 
military nationalists associated with the Ba’ath and the Organisation of Jordanian Free 
Officers (Anderson, 2005:132). What is noticeable about all these groups is their 
location in the changing Jordanian social formation. The leadership of these groups 
belonged precisely to the professional and intellectual occupations associated with the 
implantation of the colonial state in Jordan (al-Hamoud, 1999:82, Anderson, 2005:143). 
As such they represented the Jordanian component of the the new effendiyya, 
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demonstrating the fluidity of that class in their the new frequent migrations between 
government service and opposition, although there was a continuum between those 
closest and farthest from the regime. At the close end of the spectrum stood Sulaiman 
Al-Nabulsi of the National Socialist Party– regarded even by the Communists as a great 
national leader (Hijazain, 1999:123) but who also served as a member of previous 
governments, ambassador to London and secretary to the Prime Minister (Al-Shaʿir, 
1999:68). It is this fluidity that accounts, for example, for the founding of the National 
Socialist Party by Hazzaʿ al-Majali who would go on to be the Prime Minister against 
whom the anti-Baghdad Pact movement was directed (Anderson, 2005:142). 
At a somewhat greater remove from power we find the Jordanian branch of the 
Baʿath. Whereas the National Socialist Party shared only its unfortunate choice of name 
with parties in other Arab states, the Baʿath was of course supposed to be operate as a 
pan-Arab organisation. The party in Jordan, as in Iraq and Syrian, operated through 
both civilian and military wings. The Baʿath is thus particularly interesting because of 
this interaction and the internal fractures it generated in the army, the main mechanism 
of Jordan’s combination with the global capitalist relations. The party was founded in 
1951 mainly by teachers (Anderson, 2005:136) but split over whether to have a 
conscious component in the military, which the main civilian leadership rejected25. The 
civilian Baʿath grew sharply before and during the Baghdad Pact struggles, with a strong 
representation amongst teachers and the student union (Gharabieh, 2004:89). The party 
also claimed a majority representation in the leadership of the General Federation of 
Trade Unions, reflecting an influence carried over from the Palestinian union 
movement26 (2004:52). The party’s claims of thousands upon thousands of members are 
probably exaggeration (Anderson, 2005:143) but the claim of a widespread influence 
seems borne out in the organisation of demonstrations and strikes (2004:89). 
The question of Baʿathist influence allows us to consider the opposition within the 
military, the core of the state. The Baʿath officers shaded into the Organisation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Interview with Bahjat Abu Gharabieh, 4th of May 2009 
26 Although the competition between the Communists and the Baʿath in the trade unions means Baʿath 
sources tend to emphasise their own influence and ignore that of the Communists and vice versa. 
 152 
Jordanian Free Officers. Glubb considered this organisation an ‘invented’ front for 
Egyptian propaganda (FO371/121540:615) while US intelligence was concerned that a 
‘a Palestinian elite group among younger Legion officers, similar to and inspired by the 
Free Officers in the Egyptian Army’ was developing (WO2552C:580). These views fit 
well with those explanations that see the Baghdad Pact opposition as the manipulation 
of Palestinian resentment to serve Egyptian hegemonic ends. The Free Officers were 
not invented, although they were a fairly small group, composed of supporters of all 
anti-colonialist parties or none: Daafi al-Jamʿani,, a leading Baʿathist officer counted five 
Baʿathists, one National Socialist, one Communist influenced engineering officer and six 
non-aligned officers among the core group(al-Jamʿani, 2007:56). 
As we have seen, US intelligence identified the Free Officers as mainly 
Palestinian. Although the Palestine question—and Glubb’s identification of Egypt 
rather than Israel as the main threat to the country—undoubtedly motivated the 
officers, they were not all Palestinians. Free Officer leaders such as al-Jamʿani, Shahir 
abu Shahut and sympathisers and forbears such as Ali Abu Nuwwar (Nuwwar, 1990:9) 
and Abdullah Tell (Massad, 2001:166) came from East Bank town backgrounds of some 
prosperity. The Free Officers were not republicans but did seek closer military co-
operation with Syria. As a social milieu they seem, as in other Arab states, to have 
formed part of the new effendiyya which formed the basis of nationalist discourse. They 
demanded the expulsion of the British officers and the Arabization of the army. This 
demand reflected quite directly their material interest:  the persistence of British colonial 
power through Glubb’s command blocked the advance of Arab officers and especially 
those from town backgrounds (FO371/115683:573). Yet, if Glubb were removed 
would Britain continue its subsidy? The question was an open one. The search for an 
alternative subsidy implied at the same time a re-alignment in Jordan’s Arab politics and 
the advancement of that part of the new effendiyya in the officer corps(Be'eri, 1970:7)—
what one is tempted to call the petit-bourgeoisie in arms. The advances of the Free 
Officers were to come in the main after the impact of the mass movement against the 
Baghdad Pact, only meeting to discuss their strategy after the downfall of the al-Majali 
cabinet (al-Jamʿani, 2007:53). 
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The Baʿath and the Nabulsites were thus embedded to greater or lesser degree 
in a ‘professional stratum…at the forefront of national political discourse throughout 
the region by the late 1940s because of its educational experiences and its unique 
position within a changing socio-economic milieu’ (Anderson, 2005:29). To their left 
stood the illegal Jordan Communist Party27. The JCP cadres usually came from the same 
backgrounds—sometimes families—as the Baʿath and National Socialist Parties but 
sought to cultivate much stronger links with such working class organisation as existed 
in Jordan at the time28. The paradox of the ‘politics of combined and uneven 
development’ (Lowy, 1981:94) is that Communist Parties came to lead anti-colonial 
movements even in places where the industrial working class was very small.  King 
Hussein’s contemporary denunciations of Communism have the ring of an instrumental 
appeal to Cold War priorities. This should not obscure the significant role of the JCP. 
Amnon Cohen, an Israeli historian working with Jordanian mukhabarat records, 
concludes that the JCP ‘was the most powerful political party in Jordan in the 
1950s’(Cohen, 1982:57). But whom did this notionally proletarian party seek to lead?  
In 1950s Jordan, the working class was small indeed. As I have argued above, 
the central mechanism of Jordan’s combination with the world economy was the British 
subsidy which flowed through the army to the regime’s agrarian base. There were, 
however, elements of a working class produced by the development, albeit highly 
limited, of capitalist productive enterprise and the operations of the state. Much, though 
not all, of the Jordanian working class movement owed its development to the nakbah. 
The Palestinian refugees of 1948 brought with them traditions of organisation from the 
(comparatively) more urban and industrialized areas of the Mandate. Of course, 
organised workers were a minority amongst wage-earners who themselves formed a 
small fraction of the population, as this table illustrates:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This section draws on Allinson, Jamie C. (2009) Workers and Communists in Jordan's Years of Crisis. 
In 10th Mediterranean Research Meeting. Montecatini, Italy. 
28 The story is told of a Jordanian communist who, having been imprisoned after the popular uprisings in 
the country in 1957 was visited by his father. On the way to the desert prison, the old man visited 
working class communities throughout Jordan to ask them what they thought of his son. Everywhere he 
was told that they had never heard of him. Upon telling his incarcerated son this news, the father was 
surprised to find the younger man apparently delighted and asked him “Why are you happy? The working 
class you’re supposed to be fighting for don’t even know you exist!” To which the younger man replied 






Figure 5 The Jordanian Labour Movement 1954-8. Adapted from Hourani (2001:57) 
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E xp en d i tu re  ( JD )  NA  266  2 , 076  3 , 557  4 , 776  4 , 166  
 
The trade unions thus organised just over 1% of the labour force (both agricultural 
and non-agricultural) in the period of the Baghdad Pact; perhaps close to 2.5% at their 
height two years later. The noteworthy point here is not necessarily the absolute size but 
the rapid growth of the unions, in particular the ten-fold leap in the period of the 
struggle against the Baghdad Pact between 1954 and 1956. In part this growth was a 
legal artifice, union registration only having been permitted in 1953 (al-Hourani, 
2001:12). Yet the period of enormous growth from a low base of the trade union 
movement coincides with the more general struggle against British colonialism and 
therefore with an awakening to the possibilities of political and economic activism 
amongst workers. Several of the most active of these unions were founded or expanded 
by Communist Party members (2001:36-56). The Party, which had its roots in a merger 
of East Bank Marxist circles and the Palestinian National Liberation League (Hijazain, 
1999:122). Communist activists began in earnest to organise workers on both Banks in 
195129.  The first groups of workers to organise themselves were in sectors of light 
industry associated with the increases in consumption and construction following the 
unification of the East and West Banks of the Jordan or often in the wage-earning 
sectors of the physical, financial and administrative infrastructure occasioned by the 
expansion of the state. Thus the General Union of Construction Workers, the Union of 
Municipality Employees, the Union of Public Service Employees, the Textile Workers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Interview with Walid al-Khayat, former President of Jordanian Electricity Workers’ Union, Communist 
Party Headquarters, Amman, 25th of February 2009. Also Hamarneh, Munir. (2001) Al-Iubill Al-Dhahabii 
Lil-Hizb Al-Shuiuʿii Al-Urdunii [the Golden Jubilee of the Jordanian Communist Party]. Amman: The Jordanian 
Communist Party. 51-2 
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Union, the General Trade Union of Mining and Mining Employees, the Print Workers’ 
Union and the General Trade Union of Banks, Insurance and Auditing Employees were 
all established in 1954 (al-Hourani, 2001:36-56).  The port workers’ union—Jordan 
having only one port at Aqaba—began in 1956 (2001:53) but the Hijaz Railway Workers 
union preceded even Jordanian independence in 1948 and was known for its militancy30. 
 What are the implications for our discussion of the Baghdad Pact of this history 
of the making of the Jordanian working class? This discussion allows us to fill in with 
empirical evidence, with theoretical guidance from the concept of uneven and combined 
development, the hole in accounts that see the anti-Baghdad Pact movement simply as 
an outgrowth of Nasser’s radio-borne propaganda. The Communist Party must be 
distinguished from the labour movement of course, but it was the significant—perhaps 
the most significant—organised force in the agitation against the Baghdad Pact. Its 
degree of organisation and commitment and its involvement in the trade unions were 
the source of this influence and therefore part of the pull on Jordan away from the pact. 
The party’s illegal newspaper Muqawama Shaʿibiyya was the only regular  organ of any 
political party in the country (Cohen, 1982:50).The trade union movement in this period 
was largely led by Communist activists31, a strength reflected in the strikes and 
demonstrations organised against the pact and later in favour of the Nabulsi 
government (Hijazain, 1999:131).. Their numbers were extremely limited but even 
Jordan’s limited degree of integration into the world economy as a governed unit of 
space produced an organisable group of workers in the administrative, educational and 
physical infrastructure of the state. In common with other Communist parties in the 
colonial world, the JCP adopted in some degree the politics of ‘stages’ of liberation 
(1999:122). Thus the primary points of the Communist Party programme, and therefore 
of the National Front it built, were the “independence of Jordan and the expulsion of 
the British forces and General Glubb Pasha and the Arabization of the army, the 
abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty', basic democratic rights and the ‘building of 
an independent national economy” (Hamarneh, 2001:42)32. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Personal communication with Mohammed El-Masri. The taxi drivers’ union was to become the largest 
union in the General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions but was known for its passivity and 
infiltration by the secret police. However, this development took place after the period under discussion 
here. Interview with Walid al-Khayat; see also al-Hourani (2001:57). 
31 Interview Walid al Khayat 2009, also Al-Yūbīl Al-Dhahabii pp.52-3 
32 My translation. 
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 The wage-earning working class, still less the organised and conscious part of it, 
remained a very small minority in the Jordanian social formation. There was little of the 
shock of the new, of rapid industrialisation and the disjuncture between rhythms of life 
within a few years, which has been so important a feature of uneven and combined 
development elsewhere (Davidson, 2006b:211). What had occurred was rapid 
urbanization and expansion of the population, partly as a result of the Palestinian influx 
after 1948 (Anderson, 2005:122). Much of the population was unemployed or 
underemployed—a British sociologist found 90% of Amman residents considered 
themselves to live in unacceptable poverty (cited in Anderson, 2005:125). 1950s Jordan 
does not display the vista of pre-revolutionary Russia but it does show a remarkable 
change in the society in one lifetime: from a society in which stone buildings were a 
comparative rarity to one in which 43.9% of the population was urbanised (Anderson, 
2005:125). It was this urban population that provided the basis for the mass movements 
against the Baghdad Pact: “[w]hile the majority of the urban masses did not become 
party activists or even official members, the parties used their rising anger as 
ammunition against government policies. Workers, rural, migrants, and the unemployed 
all came out in protest whenever the parties led the way” (Anderson, 2005:125).  
5.3 Historical Outcome: the Baghdad Pact Struggle 
	  
How did the struggle between these various social forces play out in the actual 
history of the Pact? The Baghdad Pact, was signed by Iraq and Turkey on the 24th of 
February 1955 (Podeh, 1995:1) . The declared purpose of the pact was to deter the 
Soviet Union from threatening the Middle East. Egypt rejected the alliance: Britain 
joined it six weeks after it was first signed (Satloff, 1994:110). Egypt was more interested 
in the actual conflict embodied in the continual skirmishes along the armistice line with 
Israel than with a notional Soviet threat to be combated under Iraqi leadership 
(1994:110). Although the first signatories to the pact were Iraq and Turkey, the initiative 
aimed at creating a ‘central Treaty organisation’ along the lines of NATO, thereby 
integrating the Middle East and the consequent struggles around the pact into the 
dynamic of the global Cold War—an organisation that would, it was hoped, prevent the 
region’s oil reserves falling into Soviet hands and also providing for continued British 
influence over the local governments (Ashton, 1996:37). These dynamics covered both 
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the hostility between the superpower blocs and the tensions within them. Thus US 
officials such as Dulles saw more clearly than the British that the pact was unlikely to 
attract Egypt and that this would hobble the initiative. The US was also much more in 
favour of using the pact as a vehicle for a ‘Northern Tier’ of anti-Soviet states including 
Pakistan, while attempting to normalize relations between Israel and the Arab states. 
The US therefore did not join the pact and sought a moratorium on further Arab 
membership (1996:49). Yet this meant that the pact was apparently bereft of Arab 
support and particularly of Arab support amongst the ‘front-line’ states along the 
armistice line with Israel thereby undermining the notion that the USSR was the main 
threat to the region. This rendered potential Jordanian membership in the pact crucial 
for its success (Podeh, 1995:172).   
 5.3.1 Early Negotiations: The Crucial Subsidy  
	  
Jordan’s involvement with the pact began with intimations that the country 
might join given the right inducements. In late 1954, when proposals for the pact were 
being discussed, the then Jordanian Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu-l-Huda mounted an ‘ill-
considered and ill-prepared visit to London ostensibly to negotiate for the revision of 
the Anglo-Jordanian treaty’(FO371/121461:525) In his negotiations with Anthony 
Nutting at the Foreign Office in December 1954 presented the demand for Jordanian 
control over the subsidy and therefore the Jordanian armed forces. The British would 
not wear such insubordination. Abu-l-Huda was informed that there would be no 
changes to the subsidy and compounded the failure by implying that Jordan would join 
the Baghdad Pact (Satloff, 1994:104). Once Britain had officially joined the pact in April 
1955, Abu-l-Huda was in an even greater quandary. He sought to bargain entry to the 
pact for treaty revision but (given the dependence on British subsidy of both the state 
he served and the ruling group to which he belonged) had no leverage over the colonial 
power. Hussein, to the extent that he displayed a position, began to favour entry to the 
pact, as did the notables of the National Socialist party such as Sulaiman Nabulsi. In 
their dealings with the Iraqis these men requested inducements for Jordan to join the 
pact, in return for which Nuri al-Saʿid demanded that the vacillating Abu-l-Huda be 
sacked (1994:106). 
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In the spring and summer of 1955, Hussein’s discussions with Glubb Pasha the 
British commander of the Jordanian armed forces seem to have centered on defensive 
strategy against Israel and the question of placing mechanized forces in the north of the 
country (FO371/115719:569). The British considered this concentration on the 
Palestine front evidence of a ‘ timorous and indecisive’ attitude in the Jordanian 
government towards ‘what they privately admitted was the best course for the country’, 
i.e. joining the pact (FO371/121461:535). The British were resolved to cajole Jordan 
into a more a positive public attitude towards the pact, but were overtaken by events in 
the form of Nasser’s famous Czech arms deal. 
Here the intertwining of social and geopolitical factors through uneven and 
combined development becomes clear in the narrative of the Baghdad Pact in Jordan. 
The pact was originally signed in a context in which the newly formed Egyptian Free 
Officers’ regime and much of the Arab public were in no doubt as to the identity of 
their enemy (Anderson, 2005:157): a series of Israeli raids inflicted devastating casualties 
in Gaza and the West Bank (al-Hourani and al-Tarawneh, 1985:121). In response to 
these, Nasser executed in September 1955 the first of his characteristic coups de main—
the arms deal with Czechoslovakia that was in fact an agreement with the Soviet Union 
(Anderson, 2005:158).  Egypt was seeking aid from the Soviet Union, the target of the 
Baghdad Pact, in order to fend off Israel, a friend of the British sponsor of the alliance. 
The British Embassy in Amman considered this ‘severe rebuff to the Western powers’ a 
major source of Nasser’s popularity in Jordan (FO371/121461:532). The Foreign Office 
instructed the local embassy that with ‘the new Soviet intrusion into the Middle East it 
is of the greatest importance that our position in Jordan, which depends quite 
considerably on General Glubb’s prestige, should not be weakened. We must therefore, 
take all possible measures to ensure that this does not happen.’(FO371/115683:577). 
 5.3.2 Turning Points: The Czech Arms Deal and the Baghdad Pact 
Intifada  
	  
The importance of the Czech arms deal was that it offered a potential alternative 
source of support for Arab states to that of the old colonial power, and that alternative 
came from the Soviet power against which the Baghdad Pact was directed. The efforts 
of Britain, Turkey and Iraq would have to be redoubled to ensure Jordanian entry to the 
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pact. Abu-l-Huda was sacked and replaced by Saʿid al-Mufti who was, in the British 
view, ‘not up to the responsibility of taking such a major decision’ as joining the 
pact.(FO371/121461:526).  The British, and the Turks as conduits for British influence, 
increased their efforts to get Jordan to join the pact (al-Jamʿani, 2007:48).  The 
centerpiece of these efforts—‘with our support’ (FO371/121461:531)—was the visit of 
the Turkish President Celal Beyar to Amman in November of 1955.  Bayar spent a week 
talking to Hussein’s advisors. The vital point again was increasing the subsidy for the 
Arab legion (al-Hourani and al-Tarawneh, 1985). After the Turkish visit al-Mufti 
notified the British embassy of the price for Jordan’s entry, which the British considered 
an ‘extravagant list of their alleged military requirements’ (FO371/121461:531) which 
nonetheless indicated how Jordan could be brought into the pact. The Foreign Office 
was unambiguous about the means and importance of British influence in the country, 
reminding the Amman Embassy that ‘our position in Jordan… depends quite 
considerably on General Glubb’s prestige’ and to ‘assure Glubb that he has the full 
support of Her Majesty's Government and that we shall back him if any attempt is made 
to impose measures on the Arab legion which are likely to impair its efficiency’ , i.e. the 
Arabization33 of the officer corps. (FO371/115683:577). The British dispatched the 
Chief of General Staff, Gerald Templer with a modified financial package to win 
Hussein over (FO371/121461:531). 
Templer went to Amman in December 1955 to gain Jordan’s entry to the pact. 
He failed because, the government ‘[g]overnment cannot or will not carry through 
unpopular policies…[m]ass pressure now so sways Amman authorities [that] they fear 
mob action if government tried to move against current Arab thinking’ ( US embassy 
cited in Anderson, 2005:166). Shortly before Templer’s visit, the Commander in Chief 
of Egyptian (and therefore also Syrian) forces visited Amman to wide popular acclaim—
a dramatic and personal illustration of the choice facing Jordan and the gulf between the 
regime and the populace (Satloff, 1994:116). Templer’s negotiations began only 
moderately cordially on the 7th December and throughout the following week 
degenerated to the point of humiliating collapse. The turning point was the resignation 
of four (West Bank) ministers from al-Mufti’s cabinet and the refusal of a Jordanian 
‘counterproposal’. Glubb and the British put about the claim that the ministers had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Arabization meant the replacement of British with Arab commanding officers 
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been bribed by the Saudis and Egyptians(FO371/121461:526). The ministers 
themselves insisted that the resignations were a matter of national honour (Diya, 
1983:197). Whatever the truth of the affair it is noteworthy again that the British would 
not budge on the Jordanian demand in the ‘counterproposal’ for control of the subsidy 
to the Arab Legion (Satloff, 1994:119).   
The cabinet crisis brought the resignation of Saʿid al-Mufti. Hussein replaced 
him with Hazzaʿ al-Majali, Kerak notable and former member of the National Socialist 
Party, explicitly to bring the country into the Baghdad Pact. These efforts gave rise to 
the ‘popular agitation’ (al-Hourani and al-Tarawneh, 1985:129) that began on the 17th of 
December. There were widespread demonstrations throughout the kingdom: not just in 
Palestinian cities with existing histories of resistance such as Nablus and Jerusalem but 
also in Amman, Irbid, Salt, Jericho, Hebron, Aqaba and even the ‘tribal’ towns of 
Ma”an and Kerak. The protestors were certainly not satisfied by the choice of Majali to 
carry out precisely the opposite of their demands, and were willing to risk death. The 
British were very keen on the use of deadly force against protests and regarded their 
own countrymen in the legion as the only ones reliable enough to order the shooting of 
protestors (FO371/121466:640). Nationalist officers of the time also report that most 
soldiers were against shooting the protestors (al-Jamʿani, 2007:49).  Yet orders to shoot 
were obeyed. At least 15 people were killed in the suppression of the December 1955 
protests (Satloff, 1994:121). It was unclear how much more stress the regime could take, 
however. The King could not be assured even of the loyalty of his own civil servants 
nor al-Majali of his own cabinet ‘even senior government officials came out into the 
streets and consequently some of the Ministers…were intimidated into resigning’ 
(FO371/121461:527). Majali resigned and Hussein promised new elections which would 
be a referendum of sorts on the Pact (Satloff, 1994:122).  
The fall of Hazzaʿ al Majali’s government marked the effective end of attempts to get 
Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact but the beginning of a new influence by the popular 
national movement on Jordanian alignments (Anderson, 2005:165). The caretaker 
government of Ibrahim al Hashim promised ‘no new pacts’ and to hold power only 
until new elections (Satloff, 1994:127). Having promised elections for the New Year, 
Hussein soon went back on the promise and revoked the dissolution of Parliament 
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(Satloff, 1994:128). The opposition was understandably enraged at this demarche and 
set to organizing fresh demonstrations. The British Foreign Office urged the ‘utmost 
firmness’ in the ‘struggle between forces loyal to the Dynasty and the disruptive forces 
of Communism incited by Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money’ and commended 
Hussein’s banning of a National Socialist public meeting (FO371/121462:603). This ban 
sparked off a new popular uprising, more serious than the first (al-Hourani and al-
Tarawneh, 1985:156). The British certainly considered it such, discussing plans to 
evacuate British nationals (FO371/121464:607) and suggesting calling in Iraqi troops 
(FO371/121465:610). Entry to the pact was dropped and in effect the entire project of 




This chapter has sought to examine the usefulness of uneven and combined 
development for analysis of the International Relations of the Middle East by a detailed 
examination of the Jordanian response to the Baghdad Pact. In so doing, I advanced an 
interpretation of those events that challenges the neo-realist and constructivist accounts 
(which hold a privileged position in the development of those theoretical traditions) and 
which expands, analytically and empirically, on existing historical sociological accounts. 
Based upon the sources used in this chapter, primary and secondary, I have attempted 
to demonstrate how the uneven development of capitalist social relations (embodied in 
the “late” arrival of the colonial state in Jordan and the results of earlier Ottoman 
attempts to catch up with the capitalist empires) produced the social trajectories through 
which the conscious political actors worked in the period of the struggle against the 
Baghdad Pact. The analysis in this chapter demonstrated in particular how the role of 
the effendiyya and urban popular milieu in Jordan’s social formation derived from uneven 
and combined development and the impact this had on the alignments of the state. The 
following chapter continues the analysis by taking up further case studies of Jordan’s 
alignments: the Suez Crisis, the expulsion of the British Officers, the abrogation of the 
Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and the eventual acceptance of US aid.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide a second case study illustrating the 
utility of uneven and combined development in explaining geopolitical alignments of 
post-colonial states, taking four instances of Jordanian alignment to do so. The chapter 
therefore provides evidence to support the theoretical claims for uneven and combined 
development made in chapters one and two and extends the argument made in the 
previous chapter on the Baghdad Pact. In that chapter, I argued that Jordanian policy 
towards the Baghdad Pact resulted from an oscillation between two polarized sets of 
social forces. These forces were produced in the Jordanian social formation by the 
process of uneven and combined development substantiated in chapters three and four.  
 
In so doing, the chapter addresses some of the specific empirical lacunae present 
in omni-balancing approaches. For example, Laurie Brand is surely correct to claim that 
‘[t]he US was willing to step in to play the former British role [in Jordan] because its 
strategic interest included maintaining regional stability to ensure the free flow of oil’ 
(1994:42). However, the statement that ‘a coup attempt  by members of the army in 
1957 led the king to dismiss his Arab nationalist-oriented Prime Minister’ leading to the 
removal of Arab budgetary aid and its replacement by US support (1994:42) requires 
some qualification. As is shown below, the purported coup attempt was a very murky 
business, of which most of the alleged leaders disavowed responsibility (Massad, 
2001:192, Nuwwar, 1990:316).  
 
Nonetheless, there was an influential Arab nationalist movement amongst army 
officers, and this movement was contemporaneous with and connected to the 
democratic upsurge that brought about the Nabulsi cabinet and its appeal for aid for the 
Arab solidarity pact. Although Brand and others have explained Jordan’s realignment 
with the West as a result of the ASP’s failure actually to come up with the money 
(Anderson, 2005:187), the Arab Solidarity Pact implied opposition to Western 
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intervention in the region and was hence presented incompatible with the US aid. As is 
demonstrated below, it was the King’s insistence on the impossible demand of receiving 
both that led to the rescinding of the Arab offer. The notion of budget security explains 
the vital need for aid⎯it does not explain the choice of the particular provider of that 
aid amongst alternatives. 
 
 The contribution of this chapter lies, then, in extending the argument already 
made— that Jordan’s alignments resulted from the pull of the poles of Jordan’s social 
formation—to a different case of behaviour to that analysed in chapter five. Indeed, the 
events discussed in this chapter follow almost the mirror image of the Baghdad Pact 
alignment. Jordan initially proposed adherence to the pact only then to reject it and 
move closer to the emerging axis around Nasser’s Egypt. In this chapter I analyse 
alignments that proceed to a high point of identification with the Arab axis in the 
signing of the Arab Solidarity Pact in January 1957 then followed by the rejection of that 
axis and the return to the Western fold with the implicit acceptance of the Eisenhower 
doctrine in April of that year. If we can account for this variation in terms derived from 
uneven and combined development then this case indicates the strength of the concept. 
  
 
6.1 Origins of the alignments: unevenness and combination 
 
The outcomes examined in this chapter were not, of course, predetermined by 
the previous social history outlined in this thesis. As the previous chapter demonstrated 
for the case of the Baghdad Pact, these contingent outcomes were responses to a social 
context brought about by uneven and combined development. The decisions examined 
below were largely responses, fought out on the basis of Jordan’s combined social 
formation, to the programme of mimetic modernization, in Egypt. This programme 
derived from the effects of colonial rule had been contradictory: introducing capitalist 
development, permitting the partial growth of a bourgeoisie but centred around the 
main mechanism of Egypt’s combination with the global economy, the cotton crop 
(Hussein, 1973:61). This retardation of economic growth—the promotion and 
entrenchment of uneven development by the colonial power—rendered the Egyptian 
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state unable to compete geopolitically. The loss of Palestine to the Zionist forces in 
1948 revealed the basic dysfunctionality of the Egyptian ruling class. 
  
As Mahmoud Hussein writes the Free Officers ‘hoped to create a strong 
Egyptianized state with the aid of an up-to-date army, and compensate the failure of the 
traditional representatives of the ruling class’ reflecting their keenly felt awareness of the 
political consequences of Egypt’s uneven development in the ‘politico-ideological 
inferiority… with respect to foreigners, loss of the state's moral authority, and 
anachronism of the traditional political parties’ (Hussein, 1973:95). The steps of this 
attempt at mimetic modernization, resulting from the ‘whip of external necessity 
identified in Chapter 2, were were often impromptu and haphazard but they fed back 
into geopolitical competition itself providing the context to which weaker Arab states 
such as Jordan had to react. This was particularly the case in the Suez War as I 
demonstrate below, but the entire period was over-determined by the emergence of the 
Nasser regime in Egypt and the Anglo-Iraqi response to it: the poles between which 
Jordan swung and with which different social forces inside the Jordan state identified.  
 
Such, then, was the regional context to which Jordan had to react. In the 
following section I analyse specifically how Jordan’s geopolitical alignments can be 
traced back to uneven and combined development. The decisions examined here—the 
expulsion of British officers, rhetorical belligerence and actual neutrality over Suez, the 
abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and the final decision to accept American 
rather than Arab aid in its place—were open and contingent matters. History could have 
been different. For it to have been so, however, different social forces would need to 
have been mobilized.  Different strategies would need to have been pursued and sother 
structures successfully challenged or reinforced. The investigation below rather seeks to 
demonstrate that the oscillations of Hussein’s regime, in a context that was 
simultaneously ‘external’ and ‘domestic’ reflected the attractive force of two poles within 
the combined social formation that it ruled. As was argued in the previous chapter, 
these principal poles comprised on one side the effendiyya, their allies in a diverse milieu 
of the urban dispossessed and the embryonic working class but not a discontented rural 
mass. On the other we find the limited core of merchants, shaykhs and landowners 
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around the King and with them the formerly nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists 
who had been integrated into the state through military subsidy, the main mechanism of 
combination with the global capitalist economy. How does this scheme fare in 
comparison with the empirical evidence? I take up the case where the last chapter left 
off, immediately after the fall of the Baghdad Pact in early 1956 leading up to the 
expulsion of the British officers from Jordan in March of that year. 
 
6.2 Glubb and the British officers 
 
6.2.1The Dilemma and Conflict 
 
  King Hussein decreed the dismissal and expulsion of General Glubb and the 
British officers, along with two of the senior Arab officers most associated with Glubb, 
on the 1st of March 1956 (al-Luqyaani, 1993:36).  The command of British officers over 
the Jordanian army had allowed London effectively to determine Jordan’s responses to 
Israel on the one hand and the front-line Arab states, particularly Egypt, on the other 
thereby forming a crucial conduit of British influence in the Middle East. The FCO 
recognized this situation and saw it as crystallized in the position of General Glubb, as 
revealed in the dispatch of the 26th of October 1955 stating: ‘with the new Soviet 
intrusion into the Middle East it is of the greatest importance that our position in 
Jordan, which depends quite considerably on General Glubbs prestige, should not be 
weakened’ (FO371/115683:577).  
 
The decision to expel the British officers therefore represented a further interaction 
between British decline and the assertiveness of the new effendiyya within the Jordanian 
combined social formation. The King’s move in dismissing Glubb appeared to take a 
step closer to the Nasserist anti-colonial position. The expulsion flowed from the mass 
movement against the Baghdad Pact in the preceding months: as Betty Anderson writes, 
‘Jordan’s swing to the political left, begun in December 1955 appeared on a steady 
course’ with the dismissal of Glubb in March 1956 (Anderson, 2005:167). The dismissal 
of the British officers was thus a rejection, at least partial, of British tutelage over Jordan 
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in favour of a more Arabist course. 
 
How does uneven and combined development help us understand that course? 
As I have argued above, the British subsidy, administered directly through Glubb, 
represented the main mechanism of combination between the Jordanian social 
formation and the global political economy. The British subsidy was not simply one 
option amongst a number of alternatives available to the Hashemite regime to sustain 
itself—the position implied by theories of omni-balancing and budget and regime 
security. Rather the annual subvention formed an integral part of the Jordanian social 
formation, one whose rejection by the regime implied the search for an alternative social 
base. The kin-ordered networks of patronage and loyalty—the  tribal confederations 
such as the Bani Sakhr and Huwaytat integrated and subsidised through the processes 
described in chapter 4—were thus maintained and reproduced in combination with the 
colonial and post-colonial state and beyond this to the imperial power in London.  Yet 
the emergence of the effendiyya with the unification of the West and East Banks and the 
expansion of state functions was also replicated in the army itself. The Free Officers and 
their sympathizers represented this trend. The expulsion of the British officers 
necessarily implied a turn towards the Free Officers and the wider anti-colonial current 
to which they were linked.  Hussein’s dismissal of Glubb and company should therefore 
be seen not simply as a royal decree but as a response to the struggles and dilemmas 
produced by uneven and combined development in the Jordanian social formation.   
 
What evidence bears out this claim? The King had, since his ascent to the 
throne, entertained the idea that Glubb and his entourage were stifling the development 
of the Jordanian armed forces, preventing the appointment of talented Jordanian 
officers and inhibiting national defence against Israeli raids (al-Luqyaani, 1993:28). 
Foreign Office dispatches record several quarrels between the King and Glubb over 
materiel, appointments and the stationing of forces (FO371/115719:569). Already in the 
Autumn of 1955 British officials complained that ‘King Hussein is behaving in a 
manner calculated to undermine the organisation and discipline of the Arab legion’ and 
had described it as a ‘rabble’ without ‘proper organisation’ and ‘that good men were 
being kept back and incompetent people promoted’((FO371/115683:573). While at 
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Sandhurst Hussein attended a party in Paris organised by the Free Officers group at 
which he established contact with Ali Abu Nuwwar whom he was later to promote, 
against Glubb’s resistance, to aide-de-camp (Massad, 2001:172). Hussein thus seems to 
have harboured a desire to get rid of Glubb from very early in his reign but could not 
simply act on that desire—contrary to the notion that Hussein’s personal policy was the 
most important factor in making Jordanian alignments. Such a decision had to await a 
changed political context in which possible alternative sources of support for the regime 
were available both inside and outside the Arab Legion. 
 
What changed the political context was the movement against the Baghdad Pact, 
analysed in the previous chapter. This movement changed the options available to 
Hussein. The crisis had demonstrated the shakiness of the regime and, most of all, its 
reliance on the Arab Legion under British command. Retreat from the pact, and 
therefore victory for the forces of the anti-colonial left in the Jordanian National 
Movement, won Hussein breathing space by the beginning of 1956. The next step 
would have to be precisely made. The JNM, based in an urban and semi-urban milieu of 
the new effendiyya and the dispossessed urban milieu grew in influence and with it the 
current of pro-Nasser nationalist opinion. To repress it would require even greater, 
bloodier reliance on the Arab legion and therefore on the British. Yet to continue to 
allow the JNM, its supporters and the republican regime in Egypt to influence policy 
through their power in the street opened up a very dangerous route for the monarch. 
Hussein therefore made a tactical move to the left in dismissing Glubb. The killing of 
anti-Baghad Pact demonstrators by the Arab legion was seen in the street largely as 
Glubb’s work (al-Jamʿani, 2007:49-50, Satloff, 1994:137). By dismissing the unloved 
Briton Hussein succeeded in deflecting the anger of the preceding months onto Glubb 
and indeed winning wide popular and regional acclaim. 
 
This break from British influence over the Jordanian army involved both pre-
conditions and consequences rooted in the Jordanian social formation. The dismissal of 
Glubb brought Hussein close to anti-colonial nationalists both military and civilian. 
First, the British officers had been largely running the Arab Legion. Their numbers had 
increased greatly after the Second World War. Expelling these officers from the army 
 168 
and the country meant promoting Jordanians to replace them—for which personnel 
Hussein turned to the Free Officers’ movement and allied individuals such as Abu 
Nuwwar. According to Abu Nuwwar, the King visited him the night before dismissing 
Glubb explicitly seeking assurance that Abu Nuwwar  and ‘the brother officers’ were 
capable and prepared for the ‘operation’ to take control of the army (Nuwwar, 
1990:171).  Hussein believed, at least, that sections of the army would remain loyal to 
Glubb and to Britain, telling the British ambassador that ‘although he realized the 
British officers would not start a revolt… some of the others in the Legion, particularly 
among the Bedouin from outside Jordan whom Glubb had recruited in the Legion, 
might do so’ and that ‘a number of them were plotting against him’ 
((FO371/121541:622). Glubb and his subordinate Peter Young, in a perhaps self-
serving aside, also claimed that number of avowedly Bedouin officers were prepared to 
reject the decision by force only to be restrained by the British officers themselves: it 
seems some soldiers loyal to Glubb left the army in protest at his dismissal, particularly 
from the armoured car regiments and the First Infantry which had been the most 
prominent sites of Glubb’s military integration of the Bedouin into the state (Massad, 
2001:186). A few British officers hung on under the terms of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty 
along with the British air and sea bases in the country but the army was now re-
organised to reflect the control of Ali Abu Nuwwar and his allies in the Free Officers 
movement. 
6.2.2 The Outcome 
 
The dismissal of the British officers thus involved satisfying some of the 
demands of the effendiyya in and out of uniform and the wider group of demonstrators 
and strikers they could mobilise within the Jordanian combined social formation. Again 
this vector of combination was intertwined with British decline. The British ambassador 
considered the dismissal of Glubb the ‘most spectacular incident’ in the broader trend 
of  ‘a movement away from the influence of Britain (and the lesser influence of Iraq) 
accompanied by a progressive alignment with the views and policies of Syria and Egypt’ 
(Johnston, 1957:679-80). 
The British embassy considered the option of cutting off military supplies to 
Jordan as a response but hesitated on the grounds that there was ‘little doubt that the 
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Jordanians could get both financial and military help from the Egyptians and Saudis, 
possibly with Russian backing, for a time anyway which would be long enough to 
destroy our position… and would cost us the rights and facilities which the R.A.F at 
present have under the treaty (FO371/121466:647). Hussein’s decision thus implied the 
alignment away from Britain and towards Egypt.  This carried further implications 
shown in those documents: why should the UK continue to subsidise a military over 
which it had lost control? From this dilemma followed a further shift in military and 
civilian bases of support for the regime. The King was acclaimed in the days following 
Glubb’s dismissal by thousands of demonstrators ‘in every town and village’ (Nuwwar, 
1990:180), expressing their support for both Nasser and Hussein (FO371/121466:629).  
 
In sum then, Glubb and the British officers represented the persistence of the 
apparatus of the British colonial state even in post-independence Jordan—an apparatus 
the British considered necessary for the geo-political reasons given in the documents 
above. Yet that apparatus also oversaw the distribution of a subsidy that played a central 
role in the Jordanian social formation as its main mechanism of combination with the 
global capitalist economy; indeed, the precondition for the reproduction of the state. In 
removing Glubb, Hussein undoubtedly acted out of a canny sense of self-preservation. 
Yet both his capability to make the decision and the necessity of making arose from the 
social context produced by uneven and combined development. The demand for full 
independence and career advancement in the army reflected the politics of the new 
effendiyya represented in Jordan by the JNM, the Free Officers and their associates such 
as Ali Abu Nuwwar. The dismissal of Glubb was a concession to these groups as a 
result of the crisis around the Baghdad Pact movement (reviewed in the preceding 
chapter.) By dismissing Glubb, Hussein had to rely further on Abu Nuwwar and the 
Free Officers, encouraging the nationalist wave inside Jordan’s borders and aligning the 
state more closely with Egypt where a military nationalist regime was already in power. 
This was a moment of anti-colonial unity. The moment was unlikely to last. Hussein 
remained a monarch of the old type in a binding treaty relationship with Britain. The 
alignments of the following twelve months reflected the sharpening and resolution of 
this contradiction, accelerated by the election of a nationalist government under the 
Jordanian National Movement umbrella, at almost the same time as the outbreak of the 
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6.3.1 The Dilemma and Conflict 
 
The Suez case is particularly illuminating because it represents a fulcrum in the 
transition in Arab politics similar to that analysed in the previous chapter. Investigation 
of the Jordanian response to the Suez crisis demonstrates how unevenness and 
combination interact. At first sight the Jordanian position seems rather self-
contradictory: it was Hussein who publicly declared support for Nasser and the 
nationalist Prime Minister Nabulsi who counseled caution and effective neutrality. In 
examining the elements of this conjuncture that produced the Suez Crisis and the 
Jordanian response to it, we do not find factors easily divisible along the boundaries of 
domestic, regional and external levels but rather the axes of unevenness and 
combination spread throughout those levels. The unevenness within capitalism 
presented in the second section of this chapter played a prominent role in the origin of 
the Suez Crisis.  
 
 The British alliance with France and Israel to weaken or overthrow Nasser 
represented a last desperate (and finally futile) attempt to maintain dominance in the 
Arab world. We may trace an explanatory plumb-line from the expulsion of the British 
officers to the Suez War, as the Glubb affair drove Prime Minister Anthony Eden to a 
near pathological obsession with Nasser. On the day of Glubb’s dismissal Eden, unable 
to believe that Jordanians were responsible, declaimed to Anthony Nutting ‘[w]hy can’t 
you get it into your head I want the man [Nasser] destroyed!’ (Hennessy, 2006:411). In 
the days following Glubb’s dismissal Eden took to haranguing the Middle East desks of 
the FCO, declaring his intent to re-take the Canal Zone with ‘a sort of 1940 look’ in his 
eye (Shuckburgh in Hennessy, 2006:411). Eden was undoubtedly drifting away from 
soundness of mind: but his Nasser mania was a symptom of a broader panic at Britain’s 
decline. The anxiety about the Canal Zone in particular reflected an aspiration to 
hegemonic status no longer warranted by the country’s economic base. The FCO civil 
servant Kirkpatrick was fond of pointing out that ‘Britain's continued place as an 
advanced power depended upon both the maintenance of its strategic flow of oil 
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[through the Suez Canal] and upon the country's willingness to take on those who 
sought to disrupt it’ (2006:416). The future Prime Minister Alec Douglas Home struck 
an even more alarmist tone, telling Eden one month after the Suez nationalization ‘we 
are finished if the Middle East goes and Russia and India and China rule from Africa to 
the Pacific’ (2006:421).  Harold Macmillan was later to echo the same sentiments in his 
diary (Hennessy, 2006:434). Britain was no longer sufficiently ‘advanced’ a power to 
guarantee the flow of oil. The war to re-take the Canal Zone represented an adaptation 
to this fact. 
 
To explain the other half of this conflict, Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez 
Canal and the acclamation in Jordan of this and other daring maneouvres, we return to 
second aspect of uneven and combined development: the attempts at mimetic catch-up 
emerging from combined social formations brought about by the unevenly distributed 
impact of capitalist relations. The Egyptian Free Officers’ programme comprised the 
strengthening of the army through the expulsion of foreign influence, industrialisation 
and agrarian reform (Hussein, 1973:96). The new regime sought to shift Egypt’s source 
of foreign currency from the export of cotton—the main mechanism of combination by 
which capitalist relations had penetrated the country—towards a strategy of self-
sufficient industrialization (Hinnebusch, 1985:23). In so doing Nasser took his place 
amongst the wider category of regimes that had emerged from the crises of permanent 
revolution resolved by ‘middle class nationalists determined on independence in the 
global arena and national unity internally’ (Hinnebusch, 1985:15).  
 
To carry out this programme required energy, currency and weapons. The Suez 
nationalization emerged from these requirements. Nasser planned the famous Aswan 
High Dam to support modernization of both industry and agriculture (Hinnebusch, 
1985:22) . At first Nasser asked for Western funding for the Dam but was rebuffed—a 
humiliating brush-off being dispensed to the Egyptian ambassador in Washington on 
the 19th of June 1956 (Hennessy, 2006:416).  Nasser ordered the nationalization of the 
canal a few days later. With this move Nasser both demonstrated his independence of 
the West (doubtless a gratifying revenge for the hauteur displayed by John Dulles) and 
sought to obtain a source of revenue for his revolution from above.  
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  The overall foreign policy challenge that nationalization of the canal created for 
Jordan can thus be traced back to the unity of the axes of unevenness and combination. 
Nasser seized control of the means of creating an independent centre of accumulation 
from Britain which had lost the financial means to control the canal, the Indian Empire 
beyond it and predominance in the trade that passed through it. Yet in what sense did 
this affect the actual political outcomes in Jordan? Faced with imperial decline, Britain 
and France drew closer to Israel which in turn grew more belligerent in its reprisals for 
‘infiltration’ from the West Bank. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1956 Israeli 
raids increased sharply. These raids became a major issue in the elections scheduled for 
October of that year. Hussein had called the elections in an attempt to maintain the 
popularity won through his dismissal of Glubb precisely to avoid a confrontation with 
the opposition over the treaty. The notional purpose of the treaty was to ensure the 
Jordan’s defence. Yet the country was sustaining its highest losses at Israeli hands since 
1948, and Israel’s cross-border raids were increasing, a trend that ‘radicalized even 
further the opposition groups inside Jordan and prompted them to adopt an even more 
militant and anti-imperialist stand in the lead-up to the general elections’ (Shlaim, 
2007:109). What purpose did the treaty with Britain—at best indifferent to, at worst 
complicit with Israel—serve? The treaty and its attendant subsidy were intertwined with 
the question of the response to the Israeli raids and alignment with Nasser or the UK. 
The effendiyya and its allies embodied in the Jordanian National Movement, on the 
advance following the victory of Arabization of the army, pressed these points 
forcefully in the election campaign (Shlaim, 2007:109). Unlike in the previous election of 
1954, the regime did not rig the poll through using soldiers’ votes (2007:111).  
 
The available Jordanian responses to the Suez invasion reflected the ‘two-fold 
effect’ of the clashes with Israel: accelerating the trend in Jordan's foreign policy away 
from the reliance on Britain and Iraq and towards Egypt and Syria’ and radicalizing 
‘even further the opposition groups inside Jordan…to adopt an even more militant and 
anti-imperialist stand’ (Shlaim, 2007:109). The result of the election registered an 
overwhelming victory for the stand of these forces, organised in the JNM. The 
movement—comprising the communist-led National Front, the Ba’athists and Suleiman 
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Nabulsi’s more diffuse (and unfortunately named) National Socialist Party—won 
200,000 of 240,000 votes cast in the October 1956 elections, the freest hitherto seen in 
the country (Anderson, 1997:260). The JNM’s programme stressed the abrogation of 
the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and support for Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, although rhetorically opposed to British influence, supported 
the regime in its clashes with the left. The smaller Islamist party Hizb al-Tahrir, winning 
one seat in the parliament, limited itself to combining blood-curdling sectarian rhetoric 
with actual political quiescence.  
 
 Hussein asked Nabulsi, who had failed to gain a seat but remained the 
recognized leader of the JNM, to form a cabinet. Almost immediately the government 
had to react to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt.  Nabulsi was the first prime 
minister actually to have a power base independent of the King. An urban notable at the 
more conservative end of the JNM spectrum, he was aware that the present Jordanian 
army could not defeat an Israeli invasion of the West Bank—nor, Nasser seemed to 
indicate, was such a confrontation desirable for Egypt at that point (Gerges, 2001:98).  
Nabulsi and the organisations largely restrained popular demands for intervention on 
the side of Nasser: there were no major demonstrations around Suez. In this situation it 
was Hussein who had nothing to lose by competing to out-Arabize the Arab 
nationalists. His claim to stand by Nasser would never have to be cashed in. In any case, 
unevenness in the form of economic decline—as well as the guerilla resistance in the 
Canal Zone itself —forced the retreat of the tripartite alliance. The United States 
famously refused to accept this last colonial escapade but the means by which the US 
exerted its leverage is instructive: the US would not support the issue of IMF special 
drawing rights to halt a run on the pound (Hennessy, 2006:447).  
 
6.3.2 The Outcome 
 
The Suez crisis began with the apparent inclination of Hussein to support 
Nasser: even going so far as to telephone him after the nationalization to offer ‘hearty 
congratulations’ and potential military support—an offer the sincerity of which would 
never be tested (Gerges, 2001:98). In the end, however, Jordan effectively stood on the 
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sidelines in the conflict between its imperial patron and the emerging nationalist pole of 
Egypt.  Under the terms of the military agreement between Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
and Syria signed in October 1956 Jordan was obliged to aid Egypt but all sides were 
content to allow Jordan to adopt discretion as the better part of valour, arguing that the 
country’s ‘first duty to the Arab cause was to hold her [sic] own fontiers’ 
(FO371/127876:686). Syrian, Saudi and Iraqi troops were allowed into the country 
while the newly-elected Nabulsi government was spared the decision to break 
diplomatic relations with Britain while still dependent on the subsidy 
(FO371/127876:686-7).  
 
  This outcome reflected rather the rise to power, through both elections and the 
Arabization of the army, of a cognate force to the Egyptian regime within Jordan: the 
effendiyya and its allies organised through the JNM and the ‘Free Officers’ in the army. 
Prime Minister Sulayman Nabulsi no doubt identified with Nasser’s nationalization of 
the canal and resistance to the subsequent invasion. However, for the first time in 
Jordanian history a cabinet exercising a genuine popular mandate was now taking the 
decisions. Hussein was now the one in a position to issue rhetorical support for Nasser 
while the cabinet acknowledged there was no way Jordan could take on Israel without 
Syrian support and simultaneously fight was in effect a war against the country’s patron. 
This situation further deepened the need for the JNM cabinet to find an alternative to 
the British subsidy. Yet the policy of effective neutrality had, paradoxically, a radicalizing 
effect as the government restrained its popular base with the purging of old regime 
officials and an official statement of the government’s intent to abrogate the Anglo-
Jordanian Treaty (and with it the subsidy) and to establish relations with the Eastern 
bloc (FO371/127876:686). This outcome set the stage for more decisive confrontations 
over the abrogation of the treaty and the replacement of the subsidy, to which we now 
turn. 
 
6.4 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty abrogation 
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  6.4.1 The Dilemma and the Conflict  
 
The Suez crisis had thus exposed the deep contradiction of the Anglo-Jordanian 
relationship, based around the annual subsidy and with it the entire apparatus of the 
Anglo-Jordanian treaty. An unguarded dispatch to the embassy in Iraq from the Foreign 
Office summed up the situation even before the nationalization of the canal: 
I am beginning to wonder whether our investment there [Jordan] is worth 
it…we get no adequate military or political return. Militarily the Arab Legion 
has, since Glubb’s dismissal, ceased to be of much value. Politically Jordan, 
having refused to join the Baghdad Pact, seems to slipping increasingly over the 
Egyptian side of the fence. Is it worth our while to go on paying £12 million a 
year in order to prevent her falling over completely? We are only doing so 
because Jordan is the outer defence of Iraq; and if she goes there will be no 
buffer between Iraq and Egypt. Our future policy towards Jordan depends very 
much on the importance of maintaining this buffer (FO371/121468:650) 
 
To the Foreign and Colonial Office, the subsidy was a matter simply of ensuring 
certain outcomes on the regional stage: it was that but also more. The subsidy 
represented the main mechanism of combination between Jordan’s rural political 
economy and the global capitalist system: the treaty represented the semi-colonial 
apparatus of control that Britain had attempted to preserve in the decade since the 
Second World War.  Arguments around the subsidy, and therefore around Jordan’s 
alignment in the Arab world, therefore went deeper than such a view would allow.  
 
These arguments, and the social bases they represented directed Jordan’s path 
towards the abrogation of the Treaty in early 1957. Once in power, however, the 
popular front represented of the JNM and its moment of anti-colonial unity with the 
king had begun to break down. Faced with crises over external orientation and the role 
of the monarchy, left and right wing divisions predictably developed. The JNM’s leaders 
differed over the speed with which the move toward the Arab unity should be 
accomplished and on which role the king should play in the new regime thus created 
(Anderson, 2005:182). It became clear that King and movement could not co-exist: this 
polarization took the form of arguments about how to replace the subsidy provided by 
the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. The Communist Party had consistently argued for the 
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abrogation of the treaty, only to be faced with the response ‘who will pay for Jordan?’34  
The interaction of unevenness and combination made the abrogation of the treaty not 
only possible but necessary. As the dispatch quoted above indicates, the British side, 
Glubb’s dismissal had already led to a re-consideration of Jordan’s value. 
 
On the other side of the ‘fence’, Nasser’s anti-colonial riposte to uneven 
development emerging from the social dynamics of combined development was 
providing a potential alternative to British subsidy.  Nasser’s paradigmatic non-aligned 
revolution from above demonstrated not only the weakening of the colonial power 
during the Suez war but also the availability of different sources of finance. The Egypt-
Czech arms deal of a year previously had already shown an example of the sort of 
alternative available (FO371/121461:531). The JNM was a movement against British 
control and once in power the Nabulsi cabinet moved to implement it main promise of 
abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty (Anderson, 2005:180). 
 
The moves to abrogate the Anglo-Jordanian treaty represented a moment of 
centrifugality to the benefit of the left: an emerging fissure in the pan-nationalist front 
that had been formed with the King in the expulsion of Glubb. The autumn and winter 
of 1956 saw several advances in this process, both in the internal composition of the 
state and its external alignment. In December of that year Nabulsi dismissed, still with 
the King’s signature, several regime figures whom he considered ‘corrupt’, ‘inefficient’ 
or not ‘sincere nationalists’ (Anderson, 2005:177). Soon after the Prime Minister gave an 
interview to the New York Times stating that ‘Jordan cannot live forever as Jordan’ but 
would necessarily be part of a wider Arab structure at least in the military sphere 
(2005:178). This vision of course implied a shift in the financial and social basis of the 
state, away from the colonial power and towards the Arabist wave and the Eastern bloc. 
Nabulsi himself regarded this posture as conditional but drew a strong distinction 
between the options available to Jordan, saying in early 1957: ‘we do not side with the 
East unless the East sides with us. But we do not side with the West, because the West 
can never be with us. It wants to colonise and exploit us’  (2005:179). Breaking the 
regime’s 1953 anti-communist laws, Al-Nabulsi allowed the publication of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Interview with Dr Munir Hamarneh, Amman, 16th of February 2009 
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Communist Party newspaper al-Jamahir and released leading Party figures from 
detention. It was becoming more difficult for the regime to identify openly with the 
British protector, which in any case was less interested in offering protection. 
 
On the other side a most significant moves occurred with the signing of the 
Arab solidarity pact on the 19th of January 1957. The Arab Solidarity Agreement 
presented an alternative to the British subsidy, and was therefore the precondition for 
the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and the answer to the question ‘who will 
pay for Jordan?’ The Agreement committed Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia to provide an 
annual subvention of 12.5 million pounds. Here, the Jordanian parliament (which the 
election of October had endowed for the first time with some actual reflection of public 
opinion) played an intermediary role. The Left in Parliament released a petition 
attacking the Eisenhower doctrine as an imperialist intervention in the region. The 
presence of Saudi Arabia, archetype of the conservative monarchy, amongst the 
potential backers of anti-colonial Jordan’s may seem puzzling. The incongruity only 
serves, however, again to reveal the transitional nature of this period in Arab politics 
and the trajectories brought about by the uneven and combined development of the 
region. The Sauds were motivated by a dynastic antipathy toward the Hashemites, 
whose continued presence on the Arab scene undermined the claim of the House of 
Saud to be protectors of the two sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina. Participation in the 
Arab Solidarity Pact aimed at chipping off the Jordanian Hashemites from their stronger 
co-sanguinaries in Iraq and thereby diminishing the Hashemite influence as a whole. 
The Jordanian regime’s close brush with collapse later in 1957 changed the Saudi 
attitude from a dynastic politics pursuing the interest of the house to one directed at 
preserving the status quo the region in general: hence the transformation from allies into 
enemies of Nasser in Yemen and elsewhere. That point was yet to be reached in the 
period under discussion, however. 
 
6.4.2 The Outcome 
 
Saudi participation in the Arab Solidarity Pact notwithstanding, the abrogation 
of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty represented a victory for the anti-colonial pole in Jordan. 
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The official act of abrogation itself on the 13th of March 1957 was met with three days 
of official and unofficial celebrations (Anderson, 2005:180). The King clung to the 
nationalist banner once more but seems to have been thoroughly outflanked by force to 
his left, involving according to the British representative’s rather fevered and petulant 
report: ‘animosity shown by the mobs [sic] towards what may be described as the 
Jordanian middle classes…Such peoples [sic] were told by the crowd that they would 
soon be walking barefoot in the streets. The class struggle, rather than xenophobia, 
seemed to be the keynote’ (FO371/127878:760). Despite its rather wounded tone, this 
document lucidly identified the centrifugal trajectories that would become more 
apparent after the abrogation of the treaty:  
 
The anti-British theme was common to both Right and Left and the only friction it 
generated was in the competition to see which side could pursue it most effectively. In 
this contest the King scored an important point in the dismissal of General Glubb 
and, with his Right Wing supporters, has been harping on this success ever since. 
Unfortunately for His Majesty, Glubb Pasha is now rather vieux jeu with opinion here, 
and something more than constant regurgitation of this year-old story is needed to 
keep up the King's prestige as an Arab nationalist. King Hussein is known to be in 
favour of the Eisenhower Plan, and this is therefore a target where the Communists 
and the left have the advantage of him. 
(FO371/127878:762) 
‘An old game’ the Glubb affair may have become: but the loss of the British treaty 
subsidy left Jordan suspended between its erstwhile colonial protector and a pan-nationalist 
alliance reliant on the social base of the effendiyya. This situation would have to be resolved 
one way or another. The ‘Eisenhower plan’ was indeed to mark the decisive confrontation, 
simultaneously external and internal, in the post-colonial confrontation over Jordan’s future. 
The following, final, section of this chapter analyses this confrontation and its outcome in 
terms of the social forces produced by uneven and combined development. 
6.5 The Eisenhower Doctrine 
6.5.1 The Dilemma 
 
 This polarization around Jordan’s domestic direction and external alignment represented 
the ‘climax of a struggle between Right and Left in Jordan, exemplified respectively by King 
Hussein with his immediate advisors, and by the forces of radical nationalism working in 
close alliance with the mob [sic] from the cities and the refugee camps’ (FO371/127880:721). 
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Even before the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty Hussein was already bruiting the 
possibility of ‘very early action against Communism [sic] in Jordan’ (FO371/127989:705). 
Certainly surviving activists of the period maintain that the King sought to move against the 
JNM first, thereby assuring Jordan’s ability to accept American aid. Hussein began by 
attempting to suppress the left of the movement, sending out a ringing denunciation of 
‘Communism’ in February and insisting on the closure of the Soviet news agency and Al-
Jamahir, the open newspaper of the Jordan Communist Party (Anderson, 2005:179). The 
King also moved carefully to assure his base of support. He rallied the Muslim Brotherhood 
to his side, and engaged in ‘sounding out areas of likely personal support within the Army, 
maintaining a separate police’ and ‘secretly made contact with several influential tribal leaders 
to rally their support’ (WO2552S:714). This last was to prove especially important in the 
decisive confrontation of early April. US intelligence reports noted that ‘[w]orry about the 
Army's future financing is also reportedly spreading to the lower-ranking officers and 
undermining their confidence in the present [Nabulsi] Cabinet's policies’ (WO2552S:716). 
This balance of forces was different to, for example, Egypt or Iraq where the anti-colonialist 
officers of the middle-to-upper ranks could rely upon the support or at least acquiescence of 
a rank-and-file drawn from disinherited rural populations. 
 
 On the nationalist side, the JNM retained its street strength in the cities but with an 
emerging political division inside its own ranks in the cabinet, especially between Nabulsi and 
the left grouped around the Foreign and Justice ministers Abdullah Rimawi and Shafiq 
Irshediat (Anderson, 2005:181). Outside of these maneouvres, however, the JNM sought 
both to affirm the replacement of British subsidy with the Arab solidarity pact and to 
maintain its mobilisational structures through the organisation of ‘popular conferences’ 
which one of Hussein’s confidants considered  ‘could be regarded only as a direct challenge 
to the king’ (FO371/127989:701). The two sides, based in the trajectory of Jordan’s uneven 
and combined development, were rapidly reaching a point of confrontation that would 
determine the alignment of the state. 
 
The particular moves that precipitated this confrontation centred around the control of 
the state apparatus and its attitude to the Soviet Bloc—and by extension the emerging policy 
of ‘positive neutrality’ proposed by anti-colonialists such as Nasser (WO2552S:711). On the 
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3rd of April 1957 Nabulsi publicly announced the government’s intention to establish 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, in the teeth of Hussein’s opposition (Anderson, 
2005:182). There followed a flurry of reciprocal demands for the resignations of personnel to 
which each side objected: the JNM demanding the sacking of Hussein’s security chief and 
the royal side insisting on the dismissal of Abdallah Rimawi as foreign minister 
(FO371/127880:720). Hussein forced the resignation of the Nabulsi cabinet on the 10th of 
April (Anderson, 2005:182). The crisis was resolved at two levels of confrontation—civilian 
and military—and eventually in favour of the King and a pro-Western alignment in receipt of 
US aid but without formally joining the Eisenhower plan (Ashton, 2008:61).  
 
6.5.2 The outcome 
 
The details of the crisis are obscure but a broad outline can be deconstructed. The most 
noticeable aspect is the return of the King to a base of loyalty established through long years 
of military subsidy to the (formerly) nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists. First Hussein 
shored up his support in the army, the better to be able to use it against his civilian 
opponents. The centerpiece of the military side of the confrontation occurred in the abortive 
‘coup’ attempts of April 1957, usually known as ‘operation Hashim’ and ‘the Zarqa affair’. 
The history of both these events is disputed, to say the least. What is known is that there was 
some kind of conspiracy within the army and that it occurred within the context of the 
civilian political confrontation between the king and the Nabulsi government. On the 8th of 
April roadblocks were set up around Amman, ostensibly to conduct a census of traffic under 
the codename ‘Operation Hashim’. Abu Nuwwar cancelled these maneouvres after assuring 
the king that no conspiracy was afoot (Massad, 2001:192). Five days later fighting broke out in 
Zarqa between Bedouin and hadari (sedentary) troops over rumours that the King had been 
assassinated, while troops were moved into strategic positions around Amman. According to 
the British account of the incident, Abu Nuwwar’s cousin Ma’an Abu Nuwwar (then 
commander of the first tank regiment) ‘ordered two predominantly Bedouin Infantry 
Regiments under his command on a night exercise; the troops refused to go’ 
(FO371/127880:734). The King rushed to Zarqa with Abu Nuwwar, thus forestalling any 
coup attempt (Satloff, 1994:167). Abu Nuwwar may have expected the troops in Amman to 
support him but found that they were commanded by bedouin NCOs loyal to the king 
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(Satloff, 1994:167). The ‘Free Officers’ largely fled or were arrested. By these means Hussein 
assured himself of the military support that would later be fatally found lacking for his cousins 
in Iraq. 
 
On the civilian side, an interregnum of a week proceeded in which new cabinets were 
appointed with remarkable alacrity: however the JNM did not give up immediately. Rather 
the opposition deepened the ‘popular conferences’ movement. Some state employees, 
particularly in the media observed calls to strike (FO371/127880:739). A national congress 
met in Nablus, effectively seeking to de-legitimise the King: the congress called a general 
strike and demonstrations in support of its demands for: the re-instatement of the national 
government; the rejection of the US Eisenhower plan; the dismissal of conservative officials 
and the taking of steps towards union with Egypt and Syria (FO371/127880:740). The 
movement did return to the streets but Hussein was well prepared. The King appointed a 
right-wing government on the 25th of April, in particular bringing in Akif al-Fayiz of the Bani 
Sakhr (FO371/127880:740). Not only were the troops used in the repression predominantly 
‘Bedouin with blackened faces [to prevent their recognition]’ (FO371/127880:740) but at the 
same time, the large Bani Sakhr and ‘Adwan tribal confederations were mobilised to Amman 
to suppress dissent (Robins, 2004:100, Satloff, 1994:172). According to a Huwaytat sheikh 
who was a member of the military at the time, the Huwaytat from the south also rallied to 
support the King35. The promise of US aid was both precondition and reward for Hussein’s 
decisive crushing of the opposition (Gerges, 2001:101). 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to provide further evidence for the utility of uneven and 
combined development to account for the underlying trajectories worked out in Jordanian 
alignments of the 1950s. It accounted first for the overall regional context in which those 
alignments were made, demonstrating how the weakening British position in the Middle East 
and the rise of an Egypt-centred nationalism reflected unevenness and combination. 
Focusing on Jordan, I then argued that the widely divergent alignments pursued in this 
period represented a microcosm of this wider process as Hussein oscillated between two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Interview with Sheikh ʿAnbar Dahash al-Jazi, Amman, 27th of May 2009 
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potential social bases of support before eventually returning to the core of the state 
established under the mandate: the British subsidised armed forces that had integrated the 
formerly nomadic pastoralists into the state. The contingent nature of these outcomes, and 
the clashes examined in detail in this chapter, demonstrate that these decisions cannot be 
treated simply as the choices of a regime ‘balancing’ above a society but rather reflect the 
composition of the social formation emerging from uneven and combined development as 
demonstrated in the previous chapters of this thesis. 
 
At this point we have reached the end of the empirical investigation carried out in this 
thesis. I sought to provide an explanatory framework for geo-political phenomena based on 
uneven and combined development in contradistinction to the presuppositions of stages of 
historical backwardness underlying other theories such as omni-balancing. This chapter and 
the last have sought to provide such a focused examination—the success of which only the 
reader can judge. In the following, concluding chapter, I consider the broader implications of 
the results of this investigation for the study of the International Relations of the Middle 
East. 
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7. Conclusion, Discussion and Implications for 
Further Research 
 
 In this thesis I have sought to explain the case of Jordan’s alignments in the 
1950s through the prism of a new theoretical approach: that of uneven and combined 
development. In doing so  the thesis has been designed to develop theory by bringing 
the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development, derived from 
historical materialist premises, into engagement with an empirical study and to develop 
understanding of the international relations of a particular case of the international 
relations of a state in the Global South, Jordan. 
 In this final chapter I draw together these aims, reiterating the findings of the 
case, comparing these to the neo-realist, omni-balancing and constructivist theories 
reviewed in the first chapter and then drawing out the potential contribution of uneven 
and combined development to further study, especially of the Middle East. In particular 
I present the following relevant conclusions about uneven and combined development 
from the research on Jordan carried out in the main body of the thesis: i) the need to 
unify geopolitical and social modes of explanation; ii)the embedding of regimes in 
certain social relations rather than their dislocation from them; iii)the varying results of 
the ‘primitive accumulation’ process and accompanying mechanism of combination 
with the world economy as vital to the ensuing domestic and external trajectories of 
Arab states. The second half of this chapter deals with the contributions that these 
conclusions can make to current studies of Middle East International Relations—in a 
context at the time of writing where a theoretical perspective based upon the premise 
that ‘society, torn as it is by inner contradictions, conclusively reveals in a revolution not 
only its anatomy, but its "soul" (Trotsky, 1997:507) has suddenly become much more 
relevant. 
    As will be recalled, the problematique with which this thesis began is what 
Dannreuther and Kennedy refer to as ‘the international relations of the transition’ 
(2007:339).Chapter one therefore surveyed attempts to account for the specificity of 
international relations in those states which experienced the simultaneous, but 
problematic and incomplete, formation of centralized nation states amid the imitation 
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or imposition of capitalist social relations. I took up Jordan as one such instance of a 
‘dependent zone of support’ whose existing social relations and ruling arrangements 
were disrupted by the expansionary dynamic of Euro-Atlantic capitalism (Migdal, 
1994:10). The consensus around the international relations of these states is that they 
reflect this tardy arrival on the international scene in various forms of domestic 
disaggregation—along axes of class, religious, linguistic or ‘tribal’ distinction. This 
insufficient degree of ‘stateness’ (Nettl, 1968:561) then renders foreign policy a two-way 
conduit for these divisions to operate, lacking the basic characteristic of a unified agency 
that is presumed to undergird the international relations of other regions of the world. 
The result of this disaggregation is the ‘third world security predicament” in the form of 
incoherent domestic societies; borders, institutions and elites lacking widespread 
legitimacy; an open invitation to external intervention and the making of foreign policy 
on the basis of domestic interest: in sum, a fundamentally ‘distorted and dependent 
development’ (Ayoob, 1995:20). Whereas the state actors of the European locus classicus 
of realist IR theory faced a security dilemma posed by the existence of other rational but 
sovereign actors, the Southern state faces an ‘insecurity dilemma’ rooted in its late 
development and constituted by the presence of both internal and external challenges 
(1997:121).  
 It is this consensus that the thesis sought to transcend and to challenge. The 
most succinct and rigorous example of theories based on the idea of the Southern 
security dilemma is the body of work concerned with ‘omni-balancing’. Jordan has 
already played the role of a testing ground for these theories in the form of concrete 
instances of aligments as the search to secure the Hashemite regime as a whole (Ryan, 
2009) or simply its financial survival (Brand, 1994). At the heart of omni-balancing lies 
the contention that in Southern states regimes represent themselves rather than their 
societies and therefore although they engage balancing behaviour towards various 
sources of threat this ‘means appeasing other states (which often pose less pressing 
threats)’ than the domestic challenges to its power (David, 1991:235). In the case of 
Jordan, the thesis sought to move beyond Laurie Brand’s argument that foreign policy 
has served most often to assure the financial solvency of the regime (Brand, 1994:26). 
Curtis Ryan extends this argument to the ‘multi-dimensional’ threats to and resources of 
the regime (Ryan, 2009:10).  
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7.1 Summary of Chapters 
	  
 The contribution of this thesis was thus to improve on the accounts described 
above. Therefore chapter 1 critically reviewed the existing explantions. The main claim 
of the chapter was not that these accounts do insufficient work in explaining Jordanian 
alignments.  Rather, the critical lacuna of approaches based on omni-balancing and the 
Third World security dilemma is that they reproduce a uni-linear and non-interactive 
concept of development to undergird their assumptions behind the international 
relations of Southern states. The explanation is offered in the form of an absence—of 
integration, of ‘stateness’ or legitimacy—rather than of a presence. States such as Jordan 
appear as in some sense deviant as result of their late-development, ruled by regimes 
that pick domestic and internal allies as if they were the imagined sovereign and rational 
actors of neo-realist theory. These perspectives meet here with those more historical 
explanations of Jordanian alignments, also reviewed in chapter 1, which vest explanation 
almost entirely in the person of King Hussein. The question arises of how and why the 
regime (either in the person of Hussein or more broadly construed) made and was able 
to make the choices it did. 
 The theoretical framework of uneven and combined development, outlined and 
refined in the second chapter, fits into this gap. Chapter two therefore addressed the 
second aim of the thesis, to establish uneven and combined development as a viable 
theoretical framework for empirically based research in international relations. Uneven 
and combined development, revivified as an approach to International Relations by 
Justin Rosenberg and others, addresses the problem of the divided ontology of the 
discipline. On one side we find a tendency—exemplified by the neo-realist school but 
with its echoes amongst constructivists and others—to cast social interpretations of the 
origins of geopolitical phenomena out of the realm of enquiry on the grounds of their 
‘reductionism’ to domestic factors. On the other we encounter attempts to understand 
International Relations under the rubric of historical sociology: producing a remarkable 
body of work but vulnerable to the objection that at key points a recalcitrant Realist 
logic of inter-state power competition emerges to trump the social, whether conceived 
in broadly Marxist or Weberian terms. The revival of uneven and combined 
development represents an attempt to overcome this ‘classical lacuna.’  
 Chapter 2 therefore set out to define and delimit the terms of this revived 
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theoretical framework. I argued for a middle position on the operation and extent of 
uneven and combined development: between Justin Rosenberg’s more maximalist 
conception of uneven and combined development as an explanation for the existence of 
political multiplicity and therefore ‘international relations’ almost from pre-history, and 
the limited conception which may or may not be ascribed to Trotsky himself, of uneven 
and combined development as representing solely the internal effects of capitalist 
transformation on late-developing societies. Rather, in chapter 2 I argued that uneven 
and combined development is a characteristic of the pre-capitalist era and that ‘the 
"combinedness" created by the world economy that links together national (or regional) 
formations’ (Ashman, 2006:94)  but that it takes on its specific causal aspect of a 
feedback loop between social transformation and geopolitical relations only in the 
capitalist epoch (see Allinson and Anievas, 2010a, Allinson and Anievas, 2009). It is the 
logic of capitalist relations, in particular the attempt to imitate or impose the process of 
‘primitive accumulation’, that gives particular content to uneven and combined 
development in a given case and thereby the means by which to trace by the social 
origins of foreign policy in that case. 
 Working from the Marxist premises that inform Trotsky’s concept, I defined 
‘development’ as patterned change in social relations. The unevenness of this change 
consisted in its occurring earlier or more extensively in some places rather than others 
and producing a greater accumulation of productive force—‘growth’ in the terminology 
of orthodox economics. The interaction between these uneven areas produces 
combination: the causal interaction of different kinds of social relations of production, 
which can be classified into modes of production. In particular I argued that Jordan 
represents a ‘combined social formation’ in which the social relations of a particularly 
fragmented form of the tributary mode (the extraction of surplus as khuwwa by 
pastoralists and semi-pastoralists) was combined with the global capitalist system 
through the British colonial subsidy that replaced this form of surplus extraction. The 
colonial state itself, across the two sides of the Jordan that were unified in 1950, thus 
produced two social poles of attraction. One of these was the body of pastoralists and 
semi-pastoralists integrated into the state via military pay (the British subsidy) and 
embedded in a comparatively egalitarian landholding structure. The other was the group 
of the ‘new effendiyya’ of civil servants, teacher and army officers allied with a mass of 
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semi- or under-employed new urban dwellers.  In chapter 2, I argued that by looking at 
the political struggle between these groups in the 1950s we can trace the social origins 
of Jordan’s international alignments and thereby demonstrate that uneven and 
combined development can answer questions about geopolitical phenomena. 
The remainder of the thesis provided the evidence that uneven and combined 
development offers a fuller account of the origins of Jordanian geopolitical alignment 
than the other perspectives reviewed in the first chapter. Chapters 3 and 4 gave the 
content to answer the questions: what was the nature of the different choices available 
to King Hussein in the 1950s and what were the bases on which he made them? 
Chapters 5 and 6 gave case studies as an analytical historical account of the struggles 
that led to those choices. Chapter 3 argues that the basic elements of Jordan as a 
combined social formation can be traced back even to before the creation of the 
Transjordan mandate in 1922, to the late Ottoman period and the attempt by the 
Ottoman Empire at a mimetic transformation of social relations in order to increase 
revenues and thereby fend off the Western powers.  
The chapter demonstrated that the spur for this attempted transformation lay in 
what Trotsky called the ‘whip of external necessity’ in the form of accelerating territorial 
and military decline, forcing the Ottomans consciously to imitate the social relations of 
the Western powers threatening them—a case of the mimetic modernization identified 
by Trotsky (Trotsky, 1997:25).  It was at this point that, the chapter demonstrated, that 
the conflict between central and local tributary powers in southern Syria/northern Hijaz 
became an attempt to restructure social relations from localized coercive surplus 
extraction (inter-tribal raiding and the taking of khuwwa) to the provision of tax revenue 
by private cultivators to a uniform authority.   
This attempted transformation, embodied in the tanzimat reforms and the 
Ottoman expeditions into trans-Jordanian steppe, was far from entirely successful. Had 
it been so we would have less cause to speak of a ‘combined’ social formation rather 
than straightforwardly capitalist social relations. However, this period established the 
outlines of what would become the Jordanian social formation (laying the groundwork 
for a more decisive intervention under the British mandate) on the basis of which the 
struggles of the 1950s were to be conducted. The late Ottoman reformers did not 
succeed in their attempt to shift to a revenue regime based on productive, privatized 
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property relations rather than coercive authority—tax-farming was still in place when 
the Empire collapsed in 1918. Yet there were  lasting effects of this attempted mimesis 
that were ramified under the British giving rise to that amalgam of social forces that 
formed the basis of Hussein’s decisions in the 1950s. These were two-fold:  on the one 
hand the principle of settlement and registration of productive land as the basis for 
taxation but maintaining the horizontal unity of the tribe and on the other the 
establishment of a relatively egalitarian land-holding pattern in the settled areas. These 
represent the beginnings of ‘combination’ as a result of the uneven attempt at primitive 
accumulation—the creation of labourers free both from the compulsion and the means 
to use their labour power—in the Ottoman reforms. These were just the beginnings, 
however, and the resulting social formation could have taken a different path. The 
British mandate period proved decisive in bringing together this process with the 
formation of the core of the Jordanian state, the armed forces. It was the externally 
subsidised armed forces that became both the site and the object of the struggles of the 
1950s, intertwining international and domestic politics. 
Chapter 4 presented the specific mechanism by which the social formation of 
‘Transjordan’ became ‘combined’ with the global system of capitalist social relations and 
inter-state competition in the mandate period, with important consequences for the 
alignments of the 1950s. This mechanism, the replacement of the coercive tributary 
extraction of khuwwa of pastoralists and sem-pastoralists with the British subsidised 
military pay, resulted from British policy and in particular the work of John Glubb 
‘Pasha’. However, this policy was a response to the broader unfolding of the process of 
uneven and combined development. This was manifested in the dilemma to which the 
British had to respond and the conceptions that underlay that response. On one side, 
the maintenance of the coercive extraction of khuwwa was incompatible with the 
uniform exercise of British authority, with the establishment of a secure border with the 
Saudis and with the project of landed private property the British believed to be the 
bedrock of civilized prosperity—in short with the model now being imposed by the 
mandate powers across the region, of a uniformly governed space in which economic 
and non-economic power were formally separated.  On the other side, the Mandate had 
to govern. Glubb and others saw that given an alternative to the collapsing khuwwa 
system, the tribes of the south and east could form the strongest allies of the regime 
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against any threat from the fabled ‘half-educated townsman’: the mixture of new 
effendiyya and underemployed migrants likely to result from an unchecked process of the 
separation of rural cultivators from the means of production even as their compulsion 
to produce tribute was removed. From this period emerged the ‘improbable 
combination of foreign and colonial regime together with indigenous Arab tribal 
society’ (Alon, 2007:3) that engaged in the alignments of the 1950s. 
 Chapter 4 thus demonstrated the utility of uneven and combined development 
for explaining such combinations by comparing the different outcomes in Iraq and 
Jordan, ruled by the same mandatory power and in some cases even the same personnel 
(such as Glubb himself). In Iraq the main mechanism of combination with the world 
economy swiftly became the export of oil, there was a significant workers’ movement 
and land settlement led to the entrenchment and even creation of shaikhly power over 
cultivators for whom the primitive accumulation process was dissolving the kinship ties 
of tributary relations. The army, and most especially its officer corps, became a 
repository for the resentment of the new (and old) effendiyya excluded from this 
structure. In Jordan, by contrast, the army was a means by which the process of 
primitive accumulation process—the breakdown of tributary relations and the 
replacement of coercive by non-coercive surplus extraction—produced the bedrock of 
later support for the regime, as British subsidy through ‘military Keynesianism’ (Tell, 
2008:9) replaced the khuwwa tribute. Individual land-holdings remained small and fairly 
evenly distributed: where there was polarization between large and small landholdings or 
between landless labourers and landlords this was usually in the form of ‘plantation 
villages’ worked by incoming sharecroppers on land registered in the name of a sheikh 
or a tribe as a whole that subsisted by pastoralism or military pay. The vertical ties of 
tribal loyalty—deriving from the main economic unit of the tributary past—were thus 
integrated in a new way into the state itself rather than undermined. The evidence of 
Chapter 4 supports the ‘Gerber thesis’ that Jordan’s path through the upheavals of the 
1950s can be traced back to the transformations of its rural political economy. Uneven 
and combined development makes a contribution here by showing that those 
transformations consisted of responses to the uneven development of social relations of 
production and resulted in a particular combined social formation linked to the global 
capitalist system by a distinct mechanism of combination. On the basis of these 
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specificities we can then analyse Jordan’s later geopolitical alignments in social terms. 
Chapters 5 and 6 took up this challenge by examining specific case studies of 
Jordan’s geopolitical alignments in the 1950s. These chapters thus sought to bridge the 
macro-phenomenon of uneven and combined development and concrete analysis of 
geopolitical alignments. Of course, it would not make sense to argue that because 
capitalist relations emerged in North Western Europe in the sixteenth century, King 
Hussein chose to align his state with the US in April 1957. The process does not work 
that way: nor should it be expected to, given that other structural theories of 
International Relations such as neo-Realism do not begin from the detailed cut and 
thrust of decisions about foreign policy. Rather, what uneven and combined 
development does in this chapter is indicate the social basis of the options available to 
Hussein and particular points and how the (contingent) outcomes emerged from 
struggles within the Jordanian combined social formation. Uneven and combined 
development, in the thick form of the historical evidence provided in chapters 3 and 4, 
explains the un-chosen circumstances in which geopolitical alignments were made. 
 Chapter 5 made the first such detailed study of the interaction between 
circumstance and agency. It focused on Jordanian policy towards the Baghdad Pact in 
1955: the beginning of that decisive period that inaugurated a new Middle Eastern 
system centred around Egypt, Arab nationalism and military coups leading to 
revolutions from above. At this point and throughout the events analysed also in 
chapter 6, Jordan was poised between the two emerging camps of the Arab world, 
making the country an instructive case for the wider region. Chapter 5 argued that the 
shifting Jordanian policy toward the Baghdad Pact reflected the oscillation of the 
inexperienced Hussein between two poles within the combined social formation: on one 
side a popular movement emerging from the new effendiyya including part of the officer 
corps; a semi-proletarian urban milieu comprised of refugees and migrants; and the 
small working class. These are familiar forces to the students of the anti-colonialist Arab 
nationalism of the middle twentieth century. At the other pole stood the British; a clique 
of landowners, shaykhs and merchants associated with the palace and most importantly 
the pastoralists and semi-pastoralists who had been integrated into the rank and file of 
the army through the British subsidy. The purpose and possible replacement of that 
subsidy, as the historical documents examined in chapter 5 demonstrate, were at the 
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heart of the struggle.  The anti-colonialist side won the first round thanks to a popular 
intifada in the winter of 1955-56. 
Chapter 6 offered further case studies of Jordan’s alignments in the transitional 
period of 1956-7—a turning point during which Jordan seemed likely to enter the Arab 
nationalist camp only to end eventually firmly anchored to a new Western patron, the 
United States. The chapter examined the divergent outcomes of the major crises in that 
period: the expulsion of Glubb and the British officers in March 1956: the Suez Crisis in 
the autumn of that year: the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and finally the 
acceptance of US aid in April 1957.  
At each point, the analysis traced how these outcomes emerged from the social 
struggles between the two poles of the Jordanian combined social formation, in 
particular as these were fought out over and through and the mechanism of 
combination itself—the British subsidised armed forces. The chapter identified a 
polarizing dynamic in Jordan over this issue. Hussein expelled Glubb and the British 
officers as a tactical move to garner some of the anti-colonial popularity of the anti-
Baghdad pact moment, deflecting onto Glubb the opprobrium of the repression of that 
movement. In doing so, however, Hussein boosted and would increasingly have to rely 
on those forces, civilian and military, that wished to cut the sustaining link with Britain 
(the main mechanism of combination) and replace it with an Arab subsidy. This trend 
was expressed in the free elections of October 1956, after which a cabinet of nationalists 
and leftists from the Jordanian National movement was formed. Just at this point, the 
UK, France and Israel attacked Egypt, precipitating the Suez War. Again, Hussein 
tacked to the nationalist side to outflank the new Prime Minister Nabulsi. Nabulsi was a 
wealthy figure from the ‘moderate’ end of the Jordanian National Movement who had 
no intention of making good on promises to help Egypt against Israel. That would 
require war: the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, the central plank of the 
JNM’s programme, would not. Its implementation in March 1957— a decision 
essentially of the government reflecting the democratic success of the movement and 
the demands of its social base—clarified the polarization in the country over the 
acceptance of Arab or Western aid. This reached its peak with events of April 1957. 
Hussein, claiming that a coup was being planned, himself acted to decapitate the military 
and civilian opposition and relied on his supporters from the formerly pastoralist groups 
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in the army to do so. The subsidy to these still had to be assured so Hussein accepted 
US aid as a replacement for the British. 
7.2 The Contribution of Uneven and Combined Development: 
the dialectic of universal and particular in the Middle East 
	  
 This thesis has thus provided an extended analysis of uneven and combined 
development in Jordan and how this shaped the trajectory of that state’s foreign policy 
at a period of transition in the Middle East. It was necessary to pursue this case in depth 
to contribute empirical weight to the hitherto largely theoretical work on uneven and 
combined development, and thereby to judge the explanatory utility of the concept in 
International Relations. Re-stated most directly, the conclusion of this thesis is this: 
Jordan’s alignments in the 1950s are best understood not as ‘omni-balancing’ but as 
emerging from the trajectory of  political struggles engendered by the combination of 
pre-capitalist social relations and capitalist ones in the Jordanian social formation. The 
empirical chapters presented evidence to support this case for Jordan but what are the 
broader implications for the study of the region of the Middle East and the discipline of 
International Relations? 
 7.2.1 Intervening in the Debate: Particularism and Universalism in the 
Middle East 
	  
 The results of this thesis present a potentially fruitful intervention into a key 
debate in (and between) Middle East studies and International Relations. This might be 
framed in Fred Halliday’s terms as the confrontation between universalism and 
particularism. Can the International Relations of the Middle East—as well as other 
aspects of the political life of that region—be understood only through its especial 
inheritance or is the subject amenable to analysis through the ‘universal tools and 
methods of social science’ (Stein, 2011:2)?  The answer will depend on what we consider 
those universal tools to be, but the question opens up a scholarly terrain to which the 
concept of uneven and combined development may offer a significant contribution. To 
explain what this contribution might be, we must first consider how the broader 
argument of universalism versus particularism maps overlaps with arguments of 
‘omnibalancing’ and defective state-society relations that the results of this thesis have 
challenged.  
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 It will be recalled that one of the main contributions of uneven and combined 
development is to present a view of history that is interactive and multi-linear. Before 
the charge is raised that this is an uncontroversial ‘denial of the theory of unilinear 
development…[that] does not make any positive contribution’ (Elster, 1986:55) we 
must first reckon with the premises of the universalist/particularist debate in the study 
of Middle East International Relations. Here notions of the deformity of history and the 
inheritance of Modernization Theory retain their currency. The basic assumption is that 
the liberal self-image of the state is valid within its Western zone of origin—
characterized by ‘the unconditional legitimacy of the state, a societal consensus over 
basic values and the near-elimination of violence from political life, which permitted a 
strong identification of the security of the state with the security of its citizens’ (Krause, 
1996:320). One of the premises of this thesis has been that one cannot take for granted 
the existence of such ‘unconditional legitimacy’ of the state in the North: thereby 
rendering problematic the important point here is the contrast thus drawn between an 
integrated and legitimate Western state and a Middle Eastern state notable for the 
absence of these qualities. From this contrast flows the argument for omni-balancing 
with which this thesis has critically engaged.  
 This basic premise behind the dicohotomy of universalism/ particularism in the 
study of the Middle East may also be framed in disciplinary terms. Andrea Teti thus 
identifies a gap between a Middle East studies based on a hermeneutic understanding of 
the region’s supposedly sui generis characteristics and the discipline of International 
Relations which assumes ‘understands regional politics as a variation upon a universal 
set of laws based on "Western" history’ with the result that ‘they often highlight the 
region's exceptionalism rather than its distinctiveness, implictly legitimizing the pursuit 
of exceptionalist policies such as the "necessity" of collaboration with unsavoury 
regimes during the Cold War’ (Teti, 2007:119). There is ample evidence to support this 
view in the canon of studies of international relations of the Middle East and in Middle 
East Studies. This exceptionalism is most often vested in the claim—far from 
baseless—that the states of the region area are constrained from ‘normal’ operation by 
the persistence of regional (Arabist, Islamic) or substate (tribal, sectarian) influences 
(Ismael and Ismael, 2000:8).  L. Carl Brown codifies these elements into a series of 
‘rules’ of the ‘Eastern Question game’: these consisting mostly of diplomatic short-
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sightedness or attempts to ensnare external powers in various political initiatives 
(Brown, 1984:16-17). Michael Barnett gives these constraints a more definite content by 
referring to the ‘norms’ of opposition to Zionism and imperialism and affirmation of 
Arab identity (Barnett, 1998, see also Stein, 2011:14-15) while Marc Lynch extends this 
notion of inter-subjective norms of Arab identity into the public sphere beyond the 
state (Lynch, 1999:23) 
 7.2.2 The Advantages of Uneven and Combined Development 
	  
 What relation does this discussion bear to the findings of this thesis and the 
potential of uneven and combined development? The parallels between Middle East 
Studies, International Relations and the debates amongst Russian Marxists of the early 
20th century are not immediately apparent to the observer—but they are pertinent. They 
lie in the evolutionary model of development undergirding the study of Middle East 
international relations. As Ewan Stein argues, ‘the study of states in the Middle East has 
often stressed their artificiality and illegitimacy’ engendering a dichotomy ‘in which the 
state form (its borders and institutions) is treated as self-evidently part of the Western 
Westphalian system that was organised around the concept of sovereignty; while Arab 
society remains in a pre-modern condition’ (Stein, 2011:8). Malak Mufti’s research 
encapsulates this view in arguing that as regimes build stable political institutions—as 
their degree of “stateness” increases— their amenability to pan-Arab regionalist 
schemes decreases and thereby they come to resemble more closely the sovereign 
unitary actors of Realist international relations theory (Mufti, 1996:8). Here we reach the 
point of contact with the idea of omni-balancing in Jordan and elsewhere. Omni-
balancing placed states on a continuum between the fully legitimate, embedded state of 
the West (which can then be understood through the lens of conventional international 
relations theory) and the fractured, disconnected Third World regime-state which must 
balance and bandwagon with elements of its pre-modern society. These states, of which 
Middle Eastern cases form a disproportionate part of the examples, should then be 
understood through a theory attuned to their deviation from the universal pattern 
(Brand, 1994:23-4, David, 1991:235, Frisch, 2011, O'Reilly, 1998, Olson, 2000, Ryan, 
2009:9).   
 This thesis has attempted to show that uneven and combined development, 
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being derived from Marxist premises, has the advantage of rejecting the assumption that 
there is such a thing as an inherently “legitimate” or “normal” state towards which 
progress may be achieved or deflected. The concept allowed us rather to make 
statements about the actual and particular political economies in which states are 
embedded and within which—taking the imperative of regime survival as a given— 
certain alignments are then adopted. I took up Jordan as a particular instance of this 
process, but the method of examining how, in Trotsky’s words’, ‘national peculiarities 
represent an original combination of the basic features of the world process’ 
(1972a:147) might be a route to overcoming the universalist/particular divide. Yet, in 
what might these ‘basic features’ consist? Can we adopt the notion of ‘peculiarities’ of 
combination without slipping back precisely into the mode of false universalism by 
which the Middle East appears as a deformed caricature of the West? 
 The research presented in this thesis will hopefully have provided a tentative 
answer in the affirmative. It has offered uneven and combined development as a 
framework for ‘matching an analytic universalism with a historical particularism’ 
(Halliday, 1995:15). This means that the analytical categories and procedures are 
universal but that each region or social formation is to be understood through its 
‘specific processes of historical formation’ (1995:15). These analytical categories, or 
‘basic features’, were presented in Chapter 2 are the social relations of production, 
uneven in chronological and geographical distribution and therefore resulting in certain 
combined social formations on the basis of which political struggles are fought out. 
With this perspective we avoid the over-stretched claim of, for example, Isam Al-
Khafaji that the transition to capitalism is a universal process and that therefore the 
Arab states of the first half of the twentieth century have to be considered pre-capitalist 
(Al-Khafaji, 2004:42). Rather than see forms of semi-servile labour in ‘the internal 
structure and working of agricultural systems’ as indicators of a society dominated by 
pre-capitalist relations (2004:42).  we may then take a more nuanced view of these as 
combined with the global capitalist system.  
 7.2.3 The Risks and Responses to Eurocentrism 
	  
 Yet, might not the argument put in this thesis still pose the risk of exporting a 
European standard by which to judge non-European societies? After all, the historic 
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process of primitive accumulation is ‘uneven’ in the sense that it occurred first and most 
fully in England and then exported elsewhere by means of colonial rule or mimetic 
modernization⎯as Trotsky put it to ‘turn the foe into tutor’. John Hobson argues 
precisely that behind ‘the revival of Marxism in the  contemporary IR literature often 
lurks a Eurocentric narrative that subliminally naturalizes Western power’ (Hobson, 
2007:593). Gurminder Bhambra has criticised uneven and combined development for 
working ‘within an already accepted ‘universal’ framework of categories which is, in fact, 
articulated in relation to an initial core that is European… [which] does little to mitigate 
the basic Eurocentric assumptions informing the underlying frameworks within which 
that difference is to be contained’ (Bhambra, 2011:679). In relation to the Arab world in 
particular, such criticisms reflect an attentiveness precisely to those aspects of the region 
usually taken to constitute its distinctiveness⎯ the axes of sect, language and tribe or 
shared cultural systems of (Islamic) religious or (Arabic) linguistic heritage⎯at the 
expense of universal analytical categories such as those employed in uneven and 
combined development 
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s pioneering work (2008) offers the most powerful version 
of this argument. Chakrabarty argues that ‘uneven development’ (he refers to Trotsky 
but not to the idea of development as both uneven and combined) is an intellectual 
strategy to retain an essentially ‘historicist’ position (2008:12). By historicism, 
Chakrabarty means the assumption in history ‘that any object under investigation 
retained a unity of conception throughout its existence and attained full expression in 
secular, historical time' (2008:xiv). The idea of uneven development, ‘originally invented 
in the workshop of the Scottish Enlightenment’36 cannot overcome ‘the intimations of 
pre-existing histories that were singular and unique, histories that belonged to the 
multiple pasts of Europe’(2008:xi,xiii). Chakrabarty regards uneven development as 
therefore implicated in a philosophy of the ‘not-yet’, by which the post-colonial subject 
is always waiting for a European status that should never have been expected to arrive: a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Chakrabarty’s contention about the origin of uneven development in the Scottish Enlightenment 
thought of Smith and Adam Ferguson is certainly correct. However, this may render the idea of greater 
rather than lesser relevance in the South. As Neil Davidson shows, the historical context of the Scottish 
Enlightenment displayed precisely that constellation of trauma, rapid transformation and imperative to 
‘catch-up’ that characterises much of the post-colonial experience: see  Davidson, Neil. (2003) Discovering 
the Scottish Revolution 1692-1746. London: Pluto Press.pp.273-5. Likewise one may point to Trotsky’s 
original presentation of uneven and combined development as an adaptation of historical materialism to 
the politics of a state that was simultaneously  super- and sub-altern. 
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criticism that this thesis has made of existing approaches to the international relations of 
Southern states and which should therefore by taken especially seriously when mounted 
at the theoretical framework proffered as the potential solution to this problem. 
 Yet, closer examination of Chakrabarty’s argument reveals a similarity to uneven 
and combined development, particularly in its ‘combined’ aspect, and suggestions of an 
agenda for research similar to that followed in this thesis. Chakrabarty argues that 
‘universal concepts of political modernity encounter pre-existing concepts categories, 
institutions and practices through which they get translated and configured differently’ 
(2008:xii). This statement calls to mind Trotsky’s description of ‘national peculiarities’ as 
‘an original combination of the basic features’ of a world process constituted by the 
historical actuality of European dominance but not any necessary historical convergence 
on a European-style endpoint (Trotsky, 1972a:146-7). Chakrabarty’s distinction between 
different kinds of pasts, ‘History 1’ and ‘History 2’ poses an especially interesting field 
of comparison with the ideas of uneven and combined development. Chakrabarty 
speaks of ‘History 1’ as ‘the past that is internal to the structure of being of capital’ 
representing (in the person of a worker entering a factory) ‘a historical separation 
between his/her capacity to labor and the necessary tools of production…showing that 
he or she embodies a history that has realized this logical precondition of capital’ 
(2008:66). History 2 means ‘other kinds of pasts… [that] may be under the institutional 
domination of the logic of capital and exist in proximate relationship to it’ but ‘do not 
belong to the "life process" of capital’ and may be compatible with it (2008:66-7).  
Chakrabarty’s notion of different kinds of pasts is not identical to uneven and 
combined development (2008:67). However, the research presented in this thesis works 
fundamentally from the premise of analysing ‘the concrete as a combination of the 
universal logic of History 1 and the heterotemporal horizons of innumerable History 2s’ 
(2008:xxvii). One does not have to look far in Trotsky’s writings37 to find colonial-era 
clichés, Eurocentric slips of the mind, and plain old rubbish about ‘Eastern barbarism’ 
or ‘Asiatic despotism’. However, the logic of uneven and combined development need 
not lead in this way. Indeed, as Kamran Matin argues in a closely-read engagement with 
post-colonial thought, uneven and combined development has the advantage of 
retaining the goal of understanding the ‘dynamics and processes that have enabled these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Although emphatically not, one must stress, in his political practice. 
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particular western categories to assume, in a real historical sense, universal significance’ 
(Matin, 2009:7). This thesis has attempted to reach such an understanding in a particular 
case. In so doing it has sought to emphasise those aspects of uneven and combined 
development compatible with the rejection of the idea of humanity’s progress through 
‘a homogenous empty time’ (Benjamin, 1999:251-2) and instead envision a world of 
‘[n]on-contemporaneity, non-linearity’ (Bensaid, 2002:23). 
 How, though, do the results of this thesis relate to these claims about the 
combination of universal and particular work? How do we go from them to 
understanding more about the International Relations of the Middle East, especially? 
How do concepts of unevenness and combination provide the means to understand the 
international relations of a particular ‘late-developing’ society and therefore offer a way 
to overcome the universal/particular distinction? 
7.3 Lessons of the thesis 
	  
 The answer I provided to the above questions and sought to substantiate in the 
case of Jordan is this: all forms of social relations of production (a universal analytical 
category) have been distributed unevenly in space and time. The descriptive 
generalization of ‘unevenness’ therefore has a universal character—if only to the extent 
this refers to the universal existence of particularities. Such a statement would remain at 
the level of tautology, were it not for the crucial distinction within uneven and 
combined development between different social relations of production and in 
particular capitalist relations and their predecessors. The emergence of capitalist 
relations begins a transformative process in the social relations of all societies, because 
of this universalizing imperative, that in turn changes the nature of unevenness in 
development. Pre-capitalist tributary social relations, uniting directly coercive and non-
coercive moments of exploitation, also contain an imperative to expand. However, 
because these relations rely upon direct coercion in exploitation (being based on tribute 
rather than free labour), they expand extensively rather than intensively. That is, the 
exploiters seek to bring more producers and more territory under their sway rather than 
improving methods or compelling the adoption of new social relations. The dynamic of 
this tributary mode is therefore one of crisis between centralization and decentralization, 
as identified by Michael Mann. Where the central authority loses control, perhaps due to 
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geographical or topographical inaccessibility, the coercive power fragments into 
localized relations of tribute-taking. 
 
7.3.1 Specifying uneveness and combination: social relations of 
production 
	  
The first lesson from this thesis in the application of uneven and combined 
development is in how to specify the meaning of this unevenness between different 
modes of production. Chapter 3 undertook this task in the Jordanian context (or rather 
for the lands that eventually became Jordan) identifying the dominant social relations of 
production as a fragmented form of tribute taking—the extraction occurring in the 
form of khuwwa. Characterizing the social relations of the sub-Syrian steppe in this way 
led to an understanding of the ‘tribe’ not as an inherent cultural trait of Arab society but 
as an ‘economic unit’ whose content and operation changes with the imposition or 
adoption of new forms of social relations. This approach, of identifying the nature and 
history of the predominant pre-capitalist social relations, offers us an understanding of 
the ‘particular’ in universal terms. Given that almost the entire Arab world saw a similar 
dynamic of tributary centralization and fragmentation under the Ottoman Empire, 
identifying the place of a particular region along that continuum is the first step to 
understanding its later trajectory.  
 The second lesson offered by the thesis lies in how to apply the idea of 
combination: in other words, how the ‘particular’ becomes subject to the universalizing 
imperatives of capitalist social relations, thereby producing a particular combined social 
formation.  Combination forms the bridge between macro-social concept of uneven and 
combined development and the particular phenomena studied under the heading of 
International Relations—phenomena such as international alignments. In the case of 
Jordan I traced the origins of those alignments back to struggles around how to sustain 
the alternatives to khuwwa. Other cases would demonstrate different specific 
mechanisms of combination.  
 The way to find out what those mechanisms, based on the case study evidence 
in the thesis, is to find the operation of what Trotsky called the ‘whip of external 
necessity’. The thesis demonstrated that this imperative operates both by the familiar 
mimetic “revolutions from above” of the mid-nineteenth century, of which the 
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Ottoman tanzimat, provide one instance, and by the contested imposition of the 
framework of capitalist social relations under colonial rule.  Chapter 4 demonstrated 
how the British land reform—reflecting a compromise between the demands of 
governmentality and a uni-linear conception of development on the other—embedded a 
roughly egalitarian land-holding structure in Jordan and replaced the taking of khuwwa 
with imperial subsidy. This subsidy thus formed the main mechanism of combination—
a non-market relation embedded in networks of vertical tribal solidarity—between the 
Jordanian social formation and the global capitalist economy. This was contrasted with 
Iraq, where the same mandate power produced different results and therefore different 
social bases for the struggles around international alignments in the 1950s.  
      The findings of chapter 4 on the emergence of the Jordanian combined social 
formation (detailing the positive bases of Jordan’s foreign policy rather than the 
negative absence of Western-ness) therefore demonstrate how a universalizing 
imperative becomes embodied a particular social trajectory or ‘an original combination 
of the basic features of the world process’. One might argue that this imperative was 
rather a matter of occasionally ad hoc policy making among the British. However, such a 
claim would both diminish the agency of the (Trans) Jordanian side and misunderstand 
the reasons why certain policies were chosen or effective. The Mandate authorities 
sought immediately to enforce their rule: but the context for this was the collapse of the 
Ottoman system and the return of raiding for khuwwa as world depression and 
technological change caused the breakdown of the pastoralists economy. Raids 
exacerbated British problems in enforcing a border where the concept of a state 
authority uniform across space but absent from extractive coercion was an alien one.  
The solution to these problems meant dealing with transformations in the economic 
basis of raiding—and Glubb’s solution worked because it replaced the tribute exacted 
by raiding with direct subsidy from the world’s leading capitalist power. 
 7.3.2 Mechanisms of Combination 
	  
     The utility of the concept of different mechanisms of combination, around which foreign 
policies are likely to revolve, was therefore a key finding of this thesis. It may be 
objected here that the notion of a mechanism of combination repeats the familiar idea 
of the domination of the rentier, or in Ayubi’s words ‘circulationist’, state in the region. 
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In this view, Jordan’s subsidy could be seen simply as a kind of strategic rent given 
because of its pivotal position next to Israel (Beblawi, 1987:61, Heydemann, 2000:23, 
Luciani, 1987:71, Tal, 2002:3). This strategic rent, unearned through productive 
enterprise, would then have the same effect as the oil rents distributed throughout the 
Gulf States, Iraq and Saudi Arabi although relatively meagre in quantity.  The rentier 
state argument shares a basic outline with the notion of a deflected modernity discussed 
above. That is, it takes the classically assumed English or French path as the model 
from which late-developing states deviate: the particular nature of their deviation in this 
case being that the availability of external income hampers the emergence of an 
independent-minded third-estate that would demand representation in return for its 
financial contribution to the state (Anderson, 2006:201, Hinnebusch, 2006:375). Indeed, 
this argument identifies the pathologies of the rentier state with the absence of the 
characteristic slogan of what were once called the bourgeois revolutions in England, 
France and the USA— no taxation without representation (Beblawi, 1987:53). The 
history of inter-Arab relations can then be read through the conflicts between 
‘production’ and ‘allocation’ states (Luciani, 1987:80). 
    The notion of a specific mechanism of combination in uneven and combined 
development, and in particular its application to the British subsidy to Jordan studied in 
this thesis, may thus seem to cover similar ground to that of idea of the rentier state. In 
particular, the allocation of an external revenue through a ‘ hierarchy of layers of rentiers 
with the state or the government at the top of the pyramid, acting as the ultimate 
support of all other rentiers in the economy’ (Beblawi, 1987:53) resonates with the 
argument of this thesis that external subsidy provided to former pastoralists and semi-
pastoralists combined this tributary groups with capitalist world economy via Britain, 
creating a support base for the Hashemites in the process. However, uneven and 
combined development offers advantages over the rentier state in being both broader 
and more specific. First of all, as a broad proposition, uneven and combined 
development dispenses with the belief—highly redolent of the stages theory of 
history—that an incipient bourgeoisie is required to lead the struggle for 
democratization on the basis of its fiscal contribution to the state. As critics of the 
rentier state thesis have pointed out, there is no reason to make this assumption in the 
Middle East, and therefore to derive the nature of the state and international relations in 
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the region from the failure of this assumption to hold true (Herb, 2003:25).  
Second, at a more specific level, the notion of a predominant mechanism of 
combination allows us to differentiate amongst the very wide variety of external 
revenues sustaining the economies of most Arab states. This heterogeneity, and the 
attendant diversity of trajectories and outcomes, is subsumed beneath the concept of 
the rentier state. These mechanisms of combination will be found in the way not only 
that the national income is provided but how it relates, or possibly replaces, pre-
capitalist social relations. In the specific case of Jordan this means the argument 
summarised above concerning the replacement of khuwwa by subsidy but for other cases 
we will find different, possibly contrasting, mechanisms. The exploration of this aspect 
of UCD in the thesis therefore opens up further avenues of research in the region.  
7.4 The potential for further research 
	  
     Where might those avenues lead? Having summarised the conclusions of this 
thesis and their contribution to debates in the field of International Relations in the 
Middle East and more broadly, we must now consider critically those conclusions and 
the limitations of this work. Let us consider these in turn. 
  7.4.1Extending the research framework beyond the case 
	  
The clearest limitation of this thesis has been in its scope. The empirical 
chapters took up a number of points of explanation following a detailed historical 
examination of the process of uneven and combined development within one state. The 
objection may be raised, then, that a long-term macro-historical process—uneven and 
combined development—is being used to explain immediate historical events at a 
different level. As explained at various points in this thesis, this is not the structure of 
my argument. Rather uneven and combined development provides the un-made 
circumstances in which the history of Jordan’s alignments was made. One could 
certainly argue, however, that looking in detail at Jordan only, albeit with analytical 
excursions into comparison with Iraq, might render problematic the drawing of general 
conclusions about the utility of uneven and combined development to the study of 
International Relations.  
      The concept of uneven and combined development in its present form being a 
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relatively recent arrival in the field, the main concern of this thesis has to been to 
examine its utility and therefore to build theory. The debate on the concept has hitherto 
been conducted in a quite abstract theoretical register, and characterised by a regrettable 
scantiness of in-depth studies uniting theoretical clarity and empirical evidence. This 
thesis sought to fill that gap. It was necessary,then, to provide a thorough examination 
of an empirical case, for which I chose Jordan in a particular period, that of the rapidly 
changing alignments of the 1950s. The reasoning behind this decision reflected the 
following considerations: Jordan is the subject of previous rigorous work based on the 
assumptions of omni-balancing (Brand, 1994, Ryan, 2009): Jordan in this period was a 
middle-case, poised between the simultaneously external and internal alternatives, to 
borrow terms from Hinnebusch  of a  ‘populist authoritarianism of the left’ and a 
‘shaikhly authoritarianism of the right’ (2006:379) and its evolution would therefore 
shed light on the broader trajectories that led to those two poles elsewhere; and the 
country’s status as a predominantly agrarian economy lacking the proletarian 
concentrations of Tsarist Russia that first inspired the concept of uneven and combined 
development allows examination of how and how far the concept can be extended. 
Nonetheless, the reader may legitimately ask: after Jordan where next? 
 7.4.2 The potential for new cases 
	  
 In the study of the Middle East, both as International Relations and comparative 
politics, the conclusion of this thesis suggests at least three paths forward from the 
necessarily limited work already undertaken: geographical, thematic and chronological. 
Geographical extent is perhaps the most straightforward way in which the research 
programme may expand. One means of doing this would be the integration of further 
case studies— a kind of work already being undertaken on Iran (Matin, 2006, 2007). 
This would not mean, however, a merely descriptive agglomeration of cases but the 
selection of research topics for analytical purposes. For example, what distinguishes 
Egypt from the rest of the Mashreq in its history of industrialization and modernizing 
revolution from above? Are there parallels between this case and Trotsky’s analysis of 
Russia? Does uneven and combined development reveal shared historical dynamics 
between the Arab and the indigenous non-Arab societies of the region, Turkey and 
Iran? One may also move up a level, from research on individual state to the region as a 
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whole. In the history of the international relations of the region, since there have been 
independent states able to have international relations, one observes a frequent division 
into two poles, associating certain forms of state-society relations with opposition to 
external influence and most especially that represented by Israel. These may be 
registered as ‘cold wars’ or bloody confrontation between the ‘moderate’ and the 
‘steadfast’ played out in the weaker states such as Lebanon or Jordan—but the most 
consistent aspect of these divisions is the sudden shift of states from one camp to 
another, often accompanied by convulsive changes in the corresponding state-society 
relations (Ayubi, 1995:1). Uneven and combined development provides questions to ask 
about this history. 
 
 7.4.3 The Potential for New Themes 
	  
    Raising the sights of uneven and combined development logically entails an 
orientation towards the thematic extension of the applicability of the concept. This 
thesis, in its attempt to break ground for uneven and combined development in 
International Relations, focused on a particular history of a particular states’ alignments 
but the results of the research suggest its potential for the consideration of themes or 
phenomena in the politics of the Middle East. One of these, suggested by the focus of 
my research, would be a more detailed ethnographic or historical approach to tribes, 
tribalism and the ‘shock of the new’ in the making of new social classes in the region. 
One of the most resonant aspects of uneven and combined development, particularly 
for the major oil-exporting states, concerns the extreme telescoping in ‘backward’ 
countries of processes of class formation and industrialisation. Thus, Trotsky identifies 
as one of the strategically important characteristics of the Russian working class the 
experience of ‘sharp changes of environment, ties, relations, and a sharp break with the 
past…combined with the concentrated oppressions of tsarism’ (1997:33). One is struck 
here by the similarity of the ‘shock of the new’ to the experience in the Gulf states 
registered by such novelists as “Abd-al-Rahman Munif whose novel Cities of Salt 
describes the fictional city of Harran ‘which had been undergoing constant change’ as 
the oil industry implants itself in a bedouin oasis, transforming the tribesmen into 
inhabitants of workers’ barracks from which ‘resentment moved like a bird from one 
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man to another’ (Munif, 1988:315).  
At least one other major research project addressing these questions on the oil 
industry in Iran, where many of the workers came directly from pastoralist or semi-
pastoralist tribes, is already under way and making some use of the idea of uneven and 
combined development38. What, if any, are the political effects of such combinations, 
the interweavings of Chakrabarty’s History 1 and 2? Was Trotsky right to identify this as 
a factor in making working class movements more revolutionary? Is this true of a region 
which has seen few highly successful labour movements, whether they sought reforms 
or revolution? How did the uneven and combined development of the region affect not 
only labour movements but those of the peasants and communist parties? 
 
7.5 Uneven and Combined Development and the Return of 
Revolution? 
	  
 The consideration of these themes allows a further chronological extension of 
research based on uneven and combined development in the Middle East, one that both 
dramatically restates the relevance of the concept and yet also returns to Trotsky’s 
original problematique of revolution. Indeed, this task could perhaps provide the most 
important contribution of uneven and combined development to Middle East studies 
and International Relations. The task in question is the attempt to understand the 
revolutions and revolutionary movements that burst upon the Arab world precisely at 
the time of writing of this concluding chapter.  
It would be adventurism of the most foolhardy sort even to begin to address 
this issue at the end of a doctoral thesis on a different topic. However, what can be 
noted is the especially sharp revelation provided by these events of the gap into which 
uneven and combined development fits and the warrant provided by them for a 
resuscitation of certain aspects of the theoretical framework. The revolutions and 
revolts of the ‘Arab Spring’ have re-opened in discussion about ‘returning to or 
revisiting approaches grounded in political economy, as a way to address issues such as 
neoliberalism, counter-revolution, contentious politics and social movements’ (Jadaliyya, 
2011 ). Might there be grounds to reach therefore for a theoretical framework, such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The research project on Social History of Labour in the Iranian Oil Industry 1908-2008 at the International 
Institute for Social History, Amsterdam. 
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uneven and combined development, pre-eminently concerned with questions of 
revolution and its international spread and orgins? 
Indeed, if there is a consensus about the revolutionary outbursts that have re-
structured politcs both between and within states in the Middle East in the months 
preceding the writing of this conclusion, it is that the conventional assumptions of 
much of Middle East studies and International Relations in the region must be re-
thought. These assumptions, and the questions addressed in the field, in many ways 
reflect the dichotomy of universality and particularity and the ideas of insufficiently 
modern state-hood critiqued above and throughout this thesis. This ensemble of 
assumptions has also exercised a particularly powerful hold on policy-makers, especially 
in the United States. The first of these is that the politics of Arab societies are 
fundamentally connected to religious or sectarian identity: therefore the beneficiaries of 
any collapse of authoritarianism would most likely be Islamist movements. A second, 
and related assumption reflects the ‘end of history’ thesis promoted by Francis 
Fukuyama and others in the immediate aftermath of Cold War: ‘liberal democracy’ (by 
which is meant a market economy and electoral competition) has won the battle of 
history and therefore any regions of persistent authoritarianism may be expected either 
to move towards this model or require analysis to explain their failure so to do. Hence, 
much of the discussion in the decade preceding the revolutionary outbursts of 2011 
concerned the durability of authoritarianism in the Arab world, the reasons for this, and 
whether it was worth explaining at all. (overviews of which are found in Anderson, 
2006, Hinnebusch, 2006). The usual response to this dilemma was to pose one of two 
alternatives: either of Western military intervention in the manner of the arguments 
offered in favour of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 or the programme of gradual, NGO-
led democratization favoured by such actors as the European Union. 
At the time of writing of this thesis it is, of course, simply too soon to tell 
whether ideas of authoritarian resilience or Islamist resurgence will retain their currency 
in the study of Middle East international relations. That initial elections in both Tunisia 
and Egypt returned strong showings for Islamist-influenced parties, while Egypt 
remained under the (thoroughly shaky) control of a military junta, the Libyan National 
Transistional Council struggled to impose its Western-backed authority over the country 
and Syria and Yemen seemed to pass into slow-motion civil wars, gives cause to be even 
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more than usually cautious in discussing the future of the region. Nonetheless, it may be 
useful precisely because of this uncertainty, to adopt an approach that sees revolution as 
fundamentally a process that is neither solely ‘external’ nor ‘internal’ but a fundamental 
interweaving of the two, for which, as Fred Halliday argues, the uneven and combined 
‘terms of the larger capitalist whole’ form an inescapable background (1999:315). 
The warrant for this claim comes not only from the place of the concept in the 
consciousness of participants in the Arab revolutions themselves (al-Hamalawy, 2011). 
Uneven and combined development, even in Trotsky’s rough outlines for Tsarist 
Russia, presents some prima facie parallels (as well, of course, as very significant 
differences) with the dynamics of the Arab revolutions. These lie in his identification of 
the changing nature of social agency and the resulting dynamic (within, between and 
across states) of the revolutionary process. One of the most striking aspects of the Arab 
revolutions has been their passage across borders, most often through imitation rather 
than direct intervention, and the consequent embroiling of external powers as military 
actors: for example the Saudi-led intervention of the Gulf Co-operation Council in 
Bahrain and the NATO action in Libya. Waves of popular uprisings across a zone of 
shared culture and political systems are not new—one may think of Latin America in 
the 1990s and 2000s, or the fall of the Warsaw Pact regimes—but the swiftness of the 
Arab case and the rapid transition to military confrontation in certain states calls to 
mind Trotsky’s somewhat apodictic comment that a revolution ‘begins on the national 
arena’ and ‘unfolds on the international arena’ (1972a:276). Still more examples may 
present themselves, as Qatar and Turkey seize the opportunity to re-organise the 
regional architecture in their favour, in particular through intervention in the Syrian 
rebellion. 
This ‘contagion effect’ across borders and the consequent re-organisation of 
regional geo-politics cannot be separate from the process of polarization that occurs 
within each revolution. One might point especially to the loss of control by the 
Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces over policy towards Israel in the 
summer of 2011, when mass demonstrations effectively expelled the Israeli ambassador 
from Cairo. The resulting fear of a ‘political tsunami’ (Benn, 2011) coloured subsequent 
Israeli and US strategy in the region. Trotsky spoke of such processes of polarization 
when he described a tendency to ‘call forth powerful class conflicts’ after the initial 
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euphoric toppling of the ancien regime (Trotsky, 1972a:29). These conflicts would then 
reflect the nature of the combined social formation, which in Russia he argued meant an 
inevitable divergence between the working class and any limited programme of simply 
political, rather than social or economic, change (1972a:29). 
It would be entirely inappropriate simply to read off what one Russian 
revolutionary had to say a century prior to the ‘Arab spring’ and then imagine that the 
work of analysis had been done. However, what can be taken up here for future 
research is the idea that revolutions are not simply one event but a long process of flux, 
struggle and continuum, in which the initial removal of a ruling figurehead (the Tsar, 
Mubarak) shakes but does not completely destroy the structure of rule: and that the 
placement of any given society on the continuum between ancien regime and revolutionary 
transformation reflects the outcomes of struggles now openly waged amongst the 
classes emergent from uneven and combined development. Again with all necessary 
caveats, it is possible provisionally to discern that those states that (at the time of 
writing) have moved furthest along this continuum and which seem to reflect greater 
histories of industrialization and traditions of working-class collective action. At the 
time of writing, in Yemen and Libya, such organisation has so far played only a limited 
role while in Syria the uprising has yet to spread to urban and industrial centres around 
Aleppo or Damascus. 
In Tunisia, by contrast, the participation of the General Federation of  Tunisian 
Trade Unions in a general strike—historically a pillar of regime corporatism—seems to 
have marked the turning points in the ousting of Ben Ali (Piot, 2011). Egypt presented a 
picture redolent of the description of a Russia in which ‘peasant land-cultivation as a 
whole remained, right up to the revolution’ at a fairly low productive level, while ‘the 
extreme concentration’ of manufacturing industry meant that ‘no hierarchy of 
transitional layers’ imposed itself between potential vectors of class conflict (Trotsky, 
1997:31-2). An initial examination of Egypt similarly reveals an agricultural sector 
'dominated by small farmholders who hold less than one feddan [about one acre] each' 
but in which 'since 1987 agrarian strategy has focused on marginalising these small 
peasants and attacking their standard of living’ (Bush 2010: 52) combined with a 
number of large concentrations of manufacturing workers. 
 There is some evidence that the ‘Revolution of the 25th of January’ owed some 
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of its origins to a wave of strikes that passed through these concentrations and in 
particular in the symbolically important town of Mahalla el-Kubra. Some 1.7 million 
workers took part in more than 1,900 strikes and other protests (in the absence of free 
unions) between 2004 and 2008 (Beinin, 2009:49). According to Gamal Eid of the 
Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, ‘[a]fter Mahalla in 2008, the first 
weaknesses in the regime appeared... [n]othing was the same in Egypt after that’ (Gopal 
2011). The US state department, in a leaked diplomatic cable, recognized that "in 
Mahalla, a new organic opposition force bubbled to the surface, defying current political 
labels, and apparently not affiliated with the [Muslim Brotherhood]. This may require 
the [Mubarak] government to change its script’ (Gopal 2011). In the fall of Hosni 
Mubarak from power in February 2011 ‘workers visibly contributed to the revolutionary 
process by engaging in some sixty strikes, some with explicitly political demands’ 
(Beinin 2011). The polarization within the revolution, presented by Trotsky in his 
argument for the ‘passing over’ from political to economic demands on behalf of the 
workers, seemed in evidence in the months following the revolutions, particularly in 
Egypt as ‘[s]trikes and sit-ins… continued regularly… at the rate of several per week’ 
(despite the ban on such actions)  (Beinin 2011), and passing into a second popular 
uprising in November of 2011 immediately prior to the first round of elections 
(Hamalawy, 2011) .  
 The above, of course, constitutes mere reflection rather than fully finished and 
theoretically informed analysis. At this stage no more than that can be offered. My 
intent here is not to give a didactic explanation of processes still unfolding, the 
consequences of which will be felt and studied over many years. Rather, I am indicating 
a preliminary zone of comparison between the original problematique of uneven and 
combined development and the politically re-constitutive events of the beginning of the 
second decade of the twenty-first century in the Middle East. The purpose of such 
provisional considerations is only to lead us to more pertinent questions: does the 
original stress on concentrated populations of wage-labourers in agrarian countries 
under authoritarian rule still hold true for these cases? If so, how are the dynamics of 
polarization in the revolutionary period after the immediate fall of the authoritarian ruler 
likely to develop? Trotsky suggests a polarization around questions of more thorough-
going social transformation—how much this is happening in the case of the Arab 
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revolutions? How is this ‘social’ dynamic related to the ‘geopolitical’ one of the 
extension of the revolutionary movements across borders and the re-casting of the 
security architecture of the region? At this point, of course, only questions are available. 
If, however, the concept of uneven and combined development can provide the right 
questions then it may serve a useful role guiding future research on a rapidly changing 
region.
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